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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the legally regulated world changed: The most essential
and capital-intensive industry in the United States, in the largest
state in the Union, which itself is one of the six largest energy
economies in the world,' collapsed. The implosion of California's
electric power restructuring, massive bankruptcies of some of the
world's largest companies, and the demise of Enron and several
other major providers of essential electricity, are of global dimen-
sion.' How we produce, distribute, and consume electric power has
profound implications not only for social welfare, but also for the
environment.3
The problems in California unleashed a flood of litigation and
administrative proceedings of every conceivable claim and action,
involving every party involved in any aspect of the electric market
as the California system struggled to equilibrate. Part II of this
Article deconstructs and analyzes how legal institutions and
decision rules behaved during, and responded to, this regulatory
crisis.
Below the radar screen is a fundamental issue profoundly
shaping the litigation outcome: 4 With electric sector deregulation
1. See California Energy Commission, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/welcome.html (last
modified Nov. 17, 2003). From 1999 to 2000, its expenditures on electricity quadrupled from
approximately $7 billion in 1999 to approximately $28 billion in 2000.
2. See Ahmad Faruqui et al., Analyzing California's Power Crisis, 22 ENERGY J. 29
(2001).
3. It is estimated that electric power plants are responsible for:
* 66% of SO2 emissions
* 29% of NO. emissions
* 35% of CO 2 emissions
* 21% of mercury emissions
Clean Air Network, Poison Power: How America's Outdated Electric Plants Harm Our
Health and Environment (Sept. 1997). Statistics from the U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration, have these values for SO2 and NO. even higher on a
percentage basis. See ENERGYINFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'TOFENERGY, ANNUALENERGYREVIEW
2002, ch. 12, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/secl2.pdf (providing
tables of estimated emissions measured by million metric tons of gas).
4. For two treatments of deregulation to date, see STEVEN FERREY, 1 THE LAW OF
INDEPENDENT POWER ch. 10 (21st ed. 2004) [hereinafter FERREY, INDEPENDENT POWER];
STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION ch. 13 (2000)
[hereinafter FERREY, THE NEW RULES].
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now a reality in twenty states, is electricity a "good," or a service?
"Goods" are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
while services are governed by distinct common law precedent.
Each jurisprudence imposes significantly different decision rules
that alter the outcomes of legal disputes and the allocation of
societal rights and obligations regarding electricity.
Part II of this Article evaluates and compares the differences
between these decision rules as they affect electricity transactions.
With a fundamental shift across the country from government-
regulated, electric power monopolies to restructured, competitive
markets, whether electricity is a good or service will determine
both the legal rules by which the markets must operate and the
outcome of the plethora of pending disputes. The multibillion dollar
stakes of this choice of law are high.
Doctrine on this choice of law is emerging. Part III analyzes
California and other state jurisprudence electing to characterize
electricity as either a good or a service, evaluating both the legal
bases and policy rationales for the evolving checkerboard-and
often internally schizophrenic-choices of law made by the states.
In Part IV, this Article dissects the decisions of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) applying the U.C.C. to electricity
disputes, and demonstrates that the agency has done so haphaz-
ardly and uncritically, with no analysis as to whether electricity
actually is a good. Moreover, FERC has even applied the U.C.C.
incorrectly to adjudications where electricity transmission services
rather than "goods" clearly were at issue.
In Part V, I step back to examine the thermodynamic physics of
electricity and to determine what electricity truly is. Doctrinally
and physically, I compare electricity to other fossil fuels, to phone
service, and to cable television transmission, and their respective
regulation. From this comparison I draw conclusions about the true
physical and derivative legal character of electricity, and how its
physical thermodynamics create a legal continental divide in
application of the law. I analyze and chart that divide to the legal
fictions that are embedded in current case precedent.
As a result of this analysis, I challenge the conventional legal
constructions. As the various state common laws of contracts
replace traditional regulation for interpretation of electricity
2004] 1843
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transactions, legal rights and obligations, as well as the ultimate
judicial outcome of major disputes, will depend on how individual
states regard and treat the ephemeral thing known as electricity.
How we adjudicate rights in the inevitable move to a partially
deregulated, restructured electric environment is of critical
economic, environmental, and strategic importance in the United
States. First, I examine the massive collapse of legal and economic
foundations of the California electric market and its implications
for the energy future of the United States.
I. THE CALIFORNIA PARADIGM: MARKET RESTRUCTURING AND
STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE
A. Market Design and Response
In late 2000, California's restructured electric power market
imploded.5 In 1998, California became the third state in the nation,
after Massachusetts and Rhode Island, to restructure its electric
sector, allow retail competition, and force or incentivize its investor-
owned utilities to sell their generating assets.6 When California
eventually enacted Assembly Bill 1890 in September 1996, it
passed the state's deeply divided legislature by an unusual,
unanimous vote.' The retail value of the California electric market
was approximately $20 billion annually, with peak load of 53 GW
and consumption of 264,000 GWh.8
Assembly Bill 1890 adopted almost verbatim the state Public
Utility Commission's restructuring plan.9 The legislation was
5. See John L. Jurewitz, California's Electricity Debacle: A Guided Tour, ELECTRICITY
J., May 2002, at 10 (providing a detailed history of California's recent energy crisis); see also
Price C. Watts, Heresay? The Case Against Deregulation of Electricity Generation,
ELECTRICrrY J., May 2001, at 19, 22-23 (arguing against electric deregulation).
6. See Laura Goldberg, Deregulation Proving a Mixed Bag Elsewhere, Hous. CHRON.,
July 1, 2001, at Al.
7. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 13.
8. See The California Energy Crisis: A Brief Summary of Events, 2 ENVT'L ENERGY
TECHS. Div. NEWS (Lawrence Berkeley Natl Lab., Berkeley, Cal.), Summer 2001, at 1, 2,
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/newsletter/eetd-nl.html. Utilities supply approximately one
half of this load, with nonutility generators supplying approximately two-thirds of the
remainder and importation from out-of-state supplying one-third of the remainder.
9. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 13 (describing the California Public Utilities
1844 [Vol. 45:1839
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subsequently approved by FERC' 0 and capped the retail utility
rate for each class of customer at 90% of its current level for a
period of approximately six years." Because California's concept of
deregulation contained a 10% price cut to pacify consumers, 2
consumers were discouraged from shifting to alternative retail
suppliers.'" Accordingly, a vibrant retail market and significant
customer shift to alternative suppliers did not become a reality.
Because of the recession in California, demand for electricity
between 1991 and 1996 only progressed at a rate of about 1% per
year.'4 After deregulation was set in motion, and the economy
improved, between 1997 and 2000 the increase in demand for
electricity was 3.5-4% per year.' 5 Between 1993 and 1999, cumula-
tive electric power demand increased 18%.16
While retail rates under the restructuring system were frozen,
average demand for electricity in California increased almost 13%
from June 1999 to June 2000.'" Because of the 10% price cut, only
about 3% of customers, representing about 12% of electricity sales,
switched to new suppliers, leaving 88% of electricity sales subject
to default service by the regulated electric utilities.'8
Commission's proposed restructuring plan and the passage of Assembly Bill 1890).
10. Two FERC approvals transferred control of the utilities' transmission systems to the
California Independent System Operator (ISO), designated transmission infrastructure, and
approved the operation of the ISO and the Power Exchange. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 81
F.E.R.C. 1 61,122 (1997); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 80 F.E.R.C. 61,128 (1997). Supported by
California officials and the Public Utilities Commission, independent wholesale generators
applied for and were granted market-based rates by FERC, typical of those granted in many
other states. Duke Energy Moss Landing LLC, 83 F.E.R.C. 61,317 (1998); Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 81 F.E.R.C. 61,122 (1997).
11. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 368 (West 2002).
12. Id.
13. See Christopher Weare, The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options
12-13 (2003), Public Policy Institute of California, available at http://ppic.org/content/pubs/
R_103cwr.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
14. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 16.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. While average electricity demand increased dramatically, peak demand did not
increase substantially. Weare, supra note 13, at 17.
18. PAUL L. JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTICITY Csis 25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8442, 2001).
20041 1845
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These default service obligations were unhedged."9 Regulatory
authorities required the utilities to buy a substantial amount of
their power requirements on the spot market (day-to-day) rather
than through forward-hedged contracts.20 The utilities asked
permission to hedge their short positions in power supply not
covered by the approximately 12,000 MW of retained coal, nuclear,
and hydroelectric assets they had not yet divested, which retained
assets meeting only a minority of daily default service load.2
Petitions of Southern California Edison Co. hoping to purchase
some of its power in the forward market were denied in July 1999
and again in January and May 2000.22 Consumer representatives
feared that this would undermine the health of the Power Ex-
change.2" When the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
later approved these requests as the crisis loomed, the specific
Commission approval of forward contracts was slow.24 Responding
to political pressure to keep rates low, CPUC denied utilities'
requests to increase the retail cost of default service during 2000.25
The conventional utilities, therefore, continued to supply more
than 90% of the power being sold in the state.2' The California
system worked well enough from its beginning in April 1998
through approximately May 2000. At that point, wholesale prices
jumped dramatically.
19. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 15.
20. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 14.
21. JOSKOW, supra note 18, at 25.
22. See id. at 15.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 21.
26. Weare, supra note 13, at 7 (PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E owned 75% of state power sales
while Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and Sacramento Municipal Utility
District accounted for 15%).
27. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 21. The California restructuring order is Re Proposed
Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming
Regulation, 166 P.U.R.4th 1 (1995), as modified by Dec. No. 96-01-009 (1996). This order
created an ISO, which inherited operational control over the transmission systems of the
three large investor-owned utilities in California. See id. at 1-2. It also created a California
Power Exchange, which cleared all buy-sell transactions for wholesale power in the state,
attempting to create a transparent spot market administered by the state-chartered
Exchange. See id. The Power Exchange was independent of the ISO. See id.; Weare, supra
note 13, at 1-2.
1846 [Vol. 45:1839
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Power shortages began in the summer of 2000.28 During the first
four months of 2000, prices in the wholesale market on an hourly
basis averaged about $30/MWh.29 In June, July, and August 2000,
however, average prices on the spot market quadrupled to about
$125/MWh, and at times exceeded $200/MWh.3 ° By the end of 2000,
moreover, spot market values had doubled from this new plateau,"'
creating an increase of approximately 1000%, or ten times the price
of what they had been in 1998.32
What was unusual about these price levels was that they "were
not confined to a few peak hours per day, but frequently lasted all
day long."3 3 In May 2000, due to hot weather, out-of-service
generation, and increasing demand, the ISO declared a Stage II
emergency which resulted in power curtailment to certain nonfirm,
large, retail customers.34 Still more unusual was the fact that prices
continued to climb rapidly through December 2000 and January
2001, which are typically non-peak months for the summer-peaking
California system."
In response to rate payer protest, the state ordered retail rates
frozen at 5.5c/KWh. 36 Although many of the investor-owned retail
utilities were purchasing power at substantially higher wholesale
spot market prices, they were allowed to pass on only a fraction of
the acquisition costs in retail rates under this retail rate cap.37 In
late 2000, the utilities were selling power for less than 20% what
28. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 16; Weare, supra note 13, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Lyn Corum, As California PUC Probes Market, SDG&E Claims It Was Denied
Hedging Authority, POWER MKTS. WK., Aug. 28,2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 25140536.
Price spikes experienced in deregulated wholesale markets included a price rising up to
$7500/MWh; a price of $10,000/MWh on February 14-15, 1999, in the New York ancillary
services market, which was repeated in December 1998; prices in the New England ISO
which rose to $6000/MWh on May 8, 2000; and Pacific Northwest prices of $1000/MWh in
2000 and 2001.
32. See id.
33. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 16.
34. See Tom Zoeliner, Power Companies in the Hot Seat; Unreasonable Weather Strains
System, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 2000, at A20.
35. JOSKOW, supra note 18, at 1.
36. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 332.1 (West 2002).
37. See Faruqui et al., supra note 2 (describing PG&E and Southern California Edison
debt accumulation which could not be passed on to consumers who were still billed at frozen
retail rates).
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they were paying for it on the wholesale market. 38 The revenue-
strapped, regulated California distribution utilities were unable to
pay on time for their wholesale power acquisitions, because of
dwindling cash resources, and teetered on the verge of bankruptcy
as a result.3 9
On January 17, 2001, Governor Gray Davis declared a state of
emergency based on an "imminent threat of widespread and
prolonged disruption of electrical power."4° In early February, the
California utilities began defaulting on their payment obligations
for wholesale power to the ISO and the Power Exchange,4 which
rose to more than $12 billion, causing the Power Exchange to
discontinue its operations in February and to declare bankruptcy
on March 9, 2001.42 As a result, the first rolling blackouts in
California since World War II occurred on January 17, 2001."3
B. Wholesale Litigation
Amidst this fire storm, litigation rose instantly from the ashes. 4
California utilities fell more than $12 billion in arrears on obliga-
tions to pay for purchased wholesale power.4 The parties owed
were principally those who had purchased former regulated, utility-
generating plants and had continued to sell power on the wholesale
market. Litigation was the front line of the response. There
38. Cf Paul L. Joskow, California Can Tame Its Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2001, at 18
(discussing the disparity between cost and price under the spot market); JOSKOW, supra note
18, at 34 (utilities were paying approximately $400/MWh for power in the wholesale market
while reselling it on the retail market for $65/MWh).
39. See Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 20; Joskow, supra note 38, at 13; JOSKOW, supra note
18, at 34-36.
40. See Governor Gray Davis, Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California
(Jan. 17, 2001).
41. See Nancy Vogel & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Power Sellers Told To Justify Prices or
Refund $69 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al.
42. See CALPX Files for Bankruptcy, Blames Lawsuits, EEI ENERGY NEWS, Mar. 12,
2001, at 2.
43. See Reme Sanchez & William Booth, California Orders Rolling Blackouts, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 2001, at Al.
44. The following sections are meant to illustrate the possibilities of litigation when a
complex deregulated energy system implodes, including pending, as well as possible, claims
and litigation.
45. See Vogel & Brooks, supra note 41, at Al.
1848 [Vol. 45:1839
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followed numerous claims and suits involving the supply, failure of
supply, pricing, reliability, and intermediate transactions (the ISO,
the Power Exchange) of wholesale power supply and fuel supply in
California. Wholesale power suppliers litigated the slow payment
or nonpayment of power previously purchased by utilities."6 Based
on confidential data, the California ISO filed a report with FERC
in March 2001 accusing wholesale power suppliers of overcharging
the state by nearly $6.2 billion, representing 30% of wholesale
power costs (the California ISO claimed that power suppliers
overcharged by $500 million during December 2000 and January
2001)."' In return for dropping the charges against it, Williams
Energy agreed to refund $8 million to the ISO, corresponding to a
shut down of two Williams plants in 2000, causing the company to
sell power from more expensive units.48
The City Attorney of San Francisco sued Dynegy Power Market-
ing, Inc., as did Ruth Hendricks on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated people in a class action suit;49 the Sweetwater
Municipal Water District and the Padre Dam Municipal Water
District also sued Dynegy (however, this was not a class action);50
Pier 23 Restaurant in California, on behalf of itself and others
similarly situated, sued Pacific Gas & Electric Energy Trading;5 '
and Pamela Gordon brought a class action and private attorney
general action versus Reliant Energy, Inc.52 These suits contain
46. See QFs Will Get Paid, but Methodology for Setting Rates Remains in Dispute,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 2, 2001, at 10, available at 2001 WL 10439940.
47. CAL-ISO Claims Suppliers Overcharged Over $6 Billion, EEI ENERGY NEWS, Mar.
23, 2001, at 2 (CAL-ISO alleging utilities overcharged by $500 million during December 200
and January 2001).
48. See Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a
Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297, 315 (2002).
49. Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
Plaintiffs originally had filed cases in California state court, alleging that defendants violated
California state law. Defendants had the cases removed to federal court, arguing that the
artful pleading doctrine required that the plaintiffs' actions must be cast in federal terms
under the Federal Power Act. The federal court held that it lacked jurisdiction, stating that
"the court need not recast plaintiffs' state law claims in federal terms, a plaintiff is the
master of his or her own claims." Id. at 1156-57. The court remanded the cases back to the
state courts from which they originated.
50. California Energy Crisis Lawsuits Continue as More Creditors Sue, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Mar. 23, 2001, LEXIS, Bloomberg News File.
51. See id.
52. Hendricks, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
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basic allegations of conspiracy to fix prices and of "gaming" the
auction process in California.53 A court rejected a motion by FPL
Group, a wholesale supplier, to place a lien on utility company
assets to secure amounts owed.54
California Attorney General Lockyer offered tens of millions of
dollars (as a percentage of any recovery that is made in actions
against wholesale suppliers) to "anyone who provides information
leading to the successful prosecution of a false claims action."55 The
Attorney General convened a grand jury investigation. 6 He then
sued Mirant and Reliant in state court for more than $1 billion for
"controlling" California electricity supplies and exercising market
power.5 His allegations were presented before FERC and in court,
53. The legal authority for plaintiffs' claims are California's Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 16,720-16,728 (West 1997) and California's Unfair Business Practices Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17,200-17,209 (West 1997). The former provides treble damages
relief similar to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37a (2000). Single damages are measured
by what the prices would have been without a conspiracy. Joint and several liability is
provided for all damages. Indirect purchasers (consumers of power) are granted standing to
sue. The latter statute outlaws "unlawful" business conduct, which is defined as conduct that
violates some statute other than the Unfair Business Practices Act. Misleading conduct,
which is not fraudulent, might be sufficient without regard to whether a consumer actually
detrimentally relied. "Unfair" business conduct has been described as anything constituting
"immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers."
Cmty. Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Sec. Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct. App.
2001) (quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct.
App. 1984), disapproved on other grounds in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular
Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 n.12 (Cal. 1999)). These lawsuits allege anticompetitive bidding
techniques. The claims for relief are equitable in nature, seeking the disgorgement of profit,
restitution, and civil penalty.
54. See QFs Will Get Paid, but Methodology for Setting Rates Remains in Dispute,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10439940.
55. Julie Tamaki, Punishing Producers CouldAdd to Problem, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17,2001,
at A17. The statute in California would allow an informant, likely from inside one of the
wholesale suppliers, to collect in Lockyer's estimation into the "hundreds of millions of
dollars" if that information led to a successful recovery of monies from a supplier. However,
the attorney general's investigation by mid-2001 had concluded that no criminal activity had
occurred, and no prosecutions followed.
56. California Sets Criminal Probe ofPower Prices, FACTIVAENERGYDIG., June 14,2001,
available at 2001 WL 4219920.
57. See Nancy Vogel, State Sues 2 Power Firms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at B3. The
stated aim of the suit was to force these owners to divest some of the power plants that the
state had approved them purchasing from the regulated utilities just a few years before. See
id. This was later expanded to include Williams, Powerex, and Coral Power, alleging
engagement in illegally priced sales from 2000 to 2001. See Calif AG Presses New Lawsuits,
PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 15, 2002, at 4.
1850
THERMODYNAMICS, MASS, AND ENERGY
calling the companies "power pirates." 8 FERC dismissed Mr.
Lockyer's complaint that power marketers operating under market-
based rates had violated the "filed rate doctrine."59
California contested wholesale pricing and price cap issues at
FERC, involving all of the competitive wholesale suppliers as
respondents. Governor Davis stated: "We are going to Washington
with one goal, and that is to bring back $9 billion. The fact is that
people have taken advantage of the market, the system, and ripped
people off." 0 FERC eventually imposed a so-called "soft cap" on
wholesale prices, and then extended it to the western system in
June 2001.61
In March 2001, FERC ordered thirteen wholesale electric
suppliers to justify that the rates they charged in the unregulated
California market were "just and reasonable."62 FERC focused on
January price sales by Dynegy Power Marketing, Duke Energy
Trading & Marketing, Reliant Energy Services, Williams Energy
Services, and Enron's Portland General Electric Company." In
March 2001, FERC ordered refunds of wholesale prices charged by
wholesalers during California Stage Three Power Emergencies,
amounting to 1-2% of wholesale power costs.64 The utilities coun-
58. Vogel, supra note 57.
59. F.E.R.C. Docket No. EL02-71; FERC Rejects Lockyer's Complaint that Suppliers
Violated Power Act, PLATrs ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 3, 2002, at 9. This was really a
collateral attack on the very efficacy of market-based rate authority of FERC, as opposed to
traditional cost-based rates.
60. Lynda Gledhill & Christian Berthelson, The Energy Crunch, S.F. CHRON., June 15,
2001, at Al.
61. The California Crisis: Western Regulators Gripe that FERC's Price Cap Is Biased
Toward California, ELEC. UTIL. WK, Aug. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10440679.
62. PG&E and SoCal Edison Ask FERC To Suspend Williams Energy Marketing's Market
Based Rate Authority; California ISO Says Williams Obtained Excess Profits of$114 Million
in Past Four Months, FOSTER ELECTRIC REP., Apr. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10251617.
The average California electricity bill increased by 36%, according to J.D. Power and
Associates. Study: Most Californians Conserve Power, ENERGY REP., July 23, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 8475156. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco calculated that the power
costs for the typical California household would increase by $750 annually, plus an additional
$200/year for natural gas, for a total 38% increase in energy costs. Jennifer Warren, Utility
Bills Are Just One Way People Pay for Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al.
63. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy & Ancillary Serv. into Mkts. Operated
by the Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator & the Cal. Power Exch., F.E.R.C. Docket No. EL 00-95-017
(March 9, 2001).
64. Nancy Vogel & Nancy Rivera Brooks, U.S. Power Order Won't Help State Prices
Critics Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at Al.
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tered that FERC was engaged in secret ratemaking. Dissatisfied
with FERC's progress, Governor Davis charged that FERC had
shown "little, if any, interest in consumers" and vowed court
appeal.65
In January 2002, Pacific Gas & Electric filed a $4.1 billion suit
with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims
Board against the State of California for damages resulting from
the state's alleged breach of contract under the 1996 electric
industry restructuring law. The company alleged that it was not
allowed to reflect certain amounts in its stranded cost recovery
under Assembly Bill 1890, the state restructuring law. 6
Power marketers and brokers were involved in claims regarding
their failure to supply contracted power to clients. With the collapse
of Enron in late 2001, 230 MW of long-term power contracts at
favorable prices were lost by the California university system.
The University of California and the California State University
initiated a suit, which was subsequently dismissed, involving
contract claims against Enron, a private wholesale energy supplier,
which withdrew from supplying retail power in California.6"
C. New Rules: Legislative Recourse
1. No Exit
On January 17, 2001, Governor Davis proclaimed a state of
emergency and authorized the California Department of Water
Resources (DWR) to supply power on behalf of beleaguered
utilities. 9 On February 1, 2001, this was embodied in emergency
legislation which authorized DWR to execute long-term wholesale
65. California Deserves Only $1 Billion Says Judge, SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J.,
July 9, 2001, available at http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/sanjose/. FERC precedent prevents
retroactive refunds even if evidence of overcharge is present.
66. For a discussion of stranded costs, see FERREY, INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4,
§§ 10:42-10:49.
67. Will Shuck, Big Power Users May Feel Big Effects from Enron's Demise, STOCKTON
RECORD, Dec. 5, 2001; California Universities Have Enron Collapse Exposure, EEI ENERGY
NEWS, Dec. 6, 2001, at 3.
68. California Universities Sue Enron, ENERGYREP., Apr. 2,2001, available at 2001 WL
8474716.
69. See supra note 40.
[Vol. 45:18391852
THERMODYNAMICS, MASS, AND ENERGY
power purchase contracts financed by state-bonding authority, and
to resell that power to utilities or retail customers.7 0
Governor Davis signed Assembly Bill 1X, which authorized DWR
to issue up to $10 billion in bonds to finance the long-term power
contracts." The California legislation empowered DWR to pay for
the difference between the price of agency acquisition of electricity
and the retail price for which it was eventually resold by the
utilities.7 2 In essence, the state was itself doing precisely what it
refused to allow the utilities to do-purchase long-term power
contracts. However, the state was doing so without experience in
such activity and at a time of crisis, instead of with the calmer
foresight it could have exercised six months earlier.
In a matter of a few months, the restructured California
environment created a $14 billion loss for the state purchasing
power on behalf of its essentially insolvent investor-owned
utilities.73 From mid-January through September 2001, DWR spent
$10.7 billion to purchase power on the spot market to supply
customers' needs.7 4 The cost of the California bail-out, while
publicly projected by Governor Davis to cost only $10 billion, was
admitted by several of his cabinet members to be expected to cost
up to $23 billion in the first two years alone. This would wipe out
the entire state tax surplus.
2. The Bankruptcies
The enactment of emergency legislation did not end the prob-
lems. By early 2001, both Southern California Edison Co. (SCE)
and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E) were effectively insolvent.
PG&E, the nation's largest utility, filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection in April 2001, voicing a lack of faith in Califor-
nia's legislative and executive response.7 5 The utility had incurred
70. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 360.5 (West 2003).
71. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 24.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Virginia Ellis & Nancy Vogel, 8 State Power Contracts Seen as Bad Deals,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at B1. This loss will have to be subsidized and recouped over the
next decade by California taxpayers and ratepayers.
74. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 24.
75. PG&E Files for Bankruptcy: "Regulators and Political Process Have Failed Us",
ELECTRIC UTIL. W., Apr. 9, 2001, at 1-2; Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 25.
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approximately $9 billion in purchased-power costs since June 2000,
with no prospect of recovering these costs in the near future.76 The
PG&E bankruptcy under Chapter 11 was meant to stem ongoing
losses exceeding $300 million per month."
PG&E was not alone-the bankruptcies were broader. They also
impacted quasi-public entities. At the end of 2000, FERC termi-
nated formerly approved tariffs of the California Power Exchange,
76. PG&E Files for Bankruptcy: "Regulators and Political Process Have Failed Us," supra
note 75, at 1-2.
77. All creditors are required to suspend collection efforts as soon as the petition is filed;
any further collection efforts may result in forfeiture of creditor's rights and loss of the
amount owed. This requirement allows for the debtor-in-possession to operate the business
without the constant harassment of creditors seeking payment. ROBERT L. JORDAN &
WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 753-55 (1985). Different committees will be created that
consist of representatives of the different types of creditors. A cap is placed on the committee
size at the seven largest for that respective class of creditors. Since different creditors have
different interests, generally there will be at least one representative from each class and the
representative will push for the most favorable recovery for that specific class. The PG&E
Bankruptcy involves thirteen classes of creditors and within those classes are an additional
thirteen subclasses of creditors. The Bankruptcy DataSource, Pacific Gas & Electric, Oct. 22,
2001. If PG&E is taking a course of action that creditors believe is an imprudent application
of the company funds, the creditors may file an objection to such activity in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals seeking an injunction preventing the company from undertaking the
activity. The actions by a debtor-in-possession are governed by the business judgment rule.
See In re Simasko Prod. Co., 47 B.R. 444 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that the debtor in
possession will be granted the authority to operate according to the business judgment rule
and the court will not disturb the debtor's operations absent a showing of abuse by corporate
officials). For a claim to be allowed, a creditor who is unsecured must file a proof of claim by
a bar date set by the bankruptcy judge. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3) (West 2002) (stating
that only after a motion, hearing, and allowance by the judge will a claim be allowed when
filed after the bar date). Special consideration is given to governmental unit claims. A claim
filed by a governmental unit must be filed within 180 days following the order for relief, an
order granted to the debtor immediately upon the filing of the petition for bankruptcy
protection. Ifa claim is secured, the secured creditor does not need to file a proof of claim but
it may. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(cXl) (West 2002). Under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
claim is secured if it has been allowed and is secured by a lien or subject to a set-off. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000). A claim is secured only to the value of the collateral it is secured by,
or up to the amount that is subject to the set-off. Id. Different claims are afforded different
levels of priority under a plan of repayment or a plan of reorganization. Id. § 507. The first
priority is usually given to the administrative expenses of the bankrupt estate. Id. §
507(aX1). A judge has the authority to grant a creditor superior priority in circumstances
when obtaining credit is vital to the success of the reorganization and obtaining that credit
may be realized only through the extension of a super priority status to the creditor. These
debts include the lawyers', trustees', and hired professionals' compensation. Third priority
in a Chapter 11 case is the payment of up to $4000 in wages and commissions earned by an
individual within ninety days of the petition. Id. § 507(a)(3)(B). Existing employee benefit
plans get paid next, followed by consumer claims and taxes. Id. § 507(a)(4)-(8).
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and by January 2001, the Power Exchange was bankrupt.7" The
California ISO subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection.
In February 2001, Governor Gray Davis used his emergency
power to seize forward power contracts of two of the large utilities
(PG&E and SCE) that were held by the California Power Exchange,
thus preventing the California Power Exchange from liquidating
them to repay power generators after PG&E and SCE defaulted.79
The value of the contracts was worth $150 million,0 a price that
Governor Davis subsequently disputed.
D. The "Solution" that Deepened the Hole
The panicked California response in early 2001 was to execute
nearly $43 billion in long-term power contracts with wholesale
suppliers on behalf of insolvent utilities to secure a long-term
power supply for a significant share of California's future require-
ments.81 The long-term (ten-year) average price for future whole-
78. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 23. The California Power Exchange blamed several
lawsuits by power generators for the necessity to seek bankruptcy protection. The Power
Exchange retained approximately $1 billion of its participants' money after SCE and PG&E
defaulted on some $3 billion they owed for power purchases.
79. Jennifer Coleman, The Energy Crunch: Power Contracts Seized To Keep Creditors at
Bay, THE COLUMBIAN, Feb. 6, 2001, at C2; see also 9th Circuit Rules Against Contract
Seizure, ELECTRIC DAILY, Sept. 24, 2001, at 1.
80. Id. Davis' goal in seizing the contracts was to remove the contracts from liquidation
to partially fund the bankruptcy estate for the California Power Exchange. Duke Energy had
a 43% secured interest in the contracts. When PG&E and SCE defaulted on those contracts
Duke Energy should have been entitled to a proportional payment from the bankrupt's
estate, pending liquidation by the California Power Exchange's Trustee. Molly McDonough,
Gov. Davis Loses Duke Energy Case, NAT'LL.J., Oct. 8,2001, at A18. Threats had been made
by Davis when he addressed the California Legislature in early January: "There is no easy
solution. But, if I have to use the power of eminent domain to prevent generators from
driving consumers into the dark and utilities into bankruptcy, then that's what I'll do."
California Governor To Meet with U.S. Energy Officials about Power Crisis (Jan. 9,2001), at
httpJ/www.cnn.com/200US/01/09/power.woes/.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, by a split decision, overturned this action as the state
intruding on federal (FERC) powers under the Federal Power Act, confiscating collateral, and
thus violating the Supremacy Clause. In dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that a clear
emergency affecting the health, safety and comfort of the people justified the Governor's
action which the court should not second-guess.
81. John Howard, Deal Reworking Calpine Pact Is Near, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 6,
2002, available at 2002 WL 5445386; Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 24; Davis Finally Makes
Contract Deals Public, EEl ENERGY NEWS, June 18, 2001, at 2.
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sale power paid by California under these contracts was about
7.9/KWh.82 This, however, proved inopportune.
California pressured wholesale suppliers to enter these contracts
at the worst possible time. The futures market in November 2000
was about $150/MWh;83 when California was negotiating these
contracts, the August 2001 futures price had increased to $350-
$550/MWh, s4 and even rose as high as $750/MWh when California
was finalizing these deals in April 2001.85 By July 2001, after
California concluded executing these contracts, the August 2001
future had receded to below $100/MWh. s6 California lost millions
selling excess power that it had purchased during 2001.87 In July
2001, the state lost $46 million after selling surplus power for
approximately 20% of the price it had paid for it.88
Further, in Spring 2002, it was revealed that Enron, Reliant,89
Dynegy,9 ° and CMS 9 engaged in false or manipulative wholesale,
power-trading activities in the California market.92 As a result, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission launched a "very broad"
investigation of various energy trading schemes.93 This also caused
82. Id. The contracts contained prices for power ranging between 2.5-25oKWh. FERC
Takes on Calif Contract Conflicts, ELECTRIC UTIL. WIK, Apr. 29, 2002, at 13.
83. Jurewitz, supra note 5, at 25.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Paul Feist, State Loses $25 Million in Power Plays, Ploys, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2001,
at A19.
88. Id. It sold power to the Los Angeles Department of Water & Power for 0.5g/KWh and
then essentially gave it away to Canada on another occasion in late May.
89. Reliant, CMS Trading Chiefs Resign as Companies Deal with 'Wash Trades,'
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 20, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 10510261; CFTC Seeks Aid
in Its Trading Probe: Feinstein Bill to See Action by Aug., ELECTRIC UTIL. W., May 27, 2002,
at 3
90. Dynegy Board Ousts Founder Chuck Watson, ELECTRICITY DAILY, May 29, 2002,
LEXIS, Electricity Daily File.
91. See CMS Chief, Quits Amid Trading Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2002, at C2;
Reliant, CMS Trading Chiefs Resign as Companies Deal with 'Wash Trades," supra note 89.
92. FERC Expands Western Probe, Seeks Reports on Extent of"Wash" Trading, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., May 27, 2002, at 3-4.
93. In "Very Broad" Probe, CFTC Looking into Energy Trading "Wrongdoing," ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., May 20, 2002, at 2, available at 2002 WL 10501262; CFTC Seeks Aid in Its
Trading Probe: Feinstein Bill to See Action by Aug., ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 27, 2002, at
3.
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the California Attorney General to increase the pressure on FERC
to order refunds to California.94
The U.S. Congress General Accounting Office released a report
in July 2002 concluding that during the California power crisis of
2001-2002, certain suppliers "exercised market power by raising
prices above competitive levels during some periods after the
restructured market opened."95 For example, Enron engaged in
practices 96 that essentially created phantom congestion on the
California grid or along certain paths of the grid and then was paid
for relieving some of the value of the phantom congestion they had
created."
Litigation intensified. The U.S. Justice Foundation filed suit in
the California Superior Court for Sacramento County to declare
void $43 billion in long-term power contracts negotiated by the
state.9" The suit alleged that the contracts locked the market into
a few generators and violated antitrust laws.99 The California
Department of Water and Power sued to void its contract with
Sempra Energy Resources for alleged failure to hit required
milestones.'00 In May 2002, two private law firms filed suit in the
94. See California AG Says New Enron Memos Should Force FERC To Order Refunds,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 20, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 10510268. California State
Senator Steve Peace accused FERC: "[Ylour investigation simply did not examine in any
depth the behavior of suppliers. Worse, the investigation was simply halted after the report
was prepared." Calif's Peace Faults FERC Market Monitoring in Light of Enron Memos,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WK., May 20, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 10510269. United States
Senator Byron Dorgan (D.-N.D.), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs, criticized FERC for its "impression of a potted plant" in response to the
California energy crisis. Newly Armed, Calif Attacks Enron, FERC, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK,
May 20, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 10501260.
95. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-828 RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY
MARKETS: CALIFORNIA MARKET DESIGN ENABLED EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER 11 (2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov.
96. Internal Enron memoranda dubbed these practices "export ofCalifornia power," "inc-
ing load," "Fat Boy," "Death Star," "Load Shift," "Scheduling Energy To Collect Congestion
Charge II," "Non-Firm Export," "Wheel Out," and "Get Shorty." See "Fat Boy," "Get Shorty"
and "Inc-ing:"A Look at Enron Trading Practices, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 13, 2002, at 7,
available at, 2002 WL 10510230 (describing each of these practices).
97. See id.
98. See Michael B. Marois, California Faces Suit on Long-Term Power Contracts,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001, LEXIS, Bloomberg News File.
99. See id.
100. Sempra, Calif DWR Contract Dispute Continues, ELECTRICITY DAILY, May 31, 2002,
LEXIS, Electricity Daily File; Sempra Fights DWR Claims That It Defaulted on Wholesale
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California Superior Court in San Francisco on behalf of all state
taxpayers seeking $9.1 billion in damages from wholesale power
suppliers who were alleged to have manipulated the market.'0 '
In response to this litigation, Governor Davis demanded sup-
pliers renegotiate the deals he had just made with them a few
months before. Many of California's long-term energy contracts,
however, contain clauses prohibiting the state from seeking any
federal review of the prices negotiated.'02 The state refused to honor
those clauses it had just negotiated.' 3 Jan Smutny-Jones, a
spokesperson for the Independent Energy Producers, some of
whom executed those contracts, said, "The state goes out looking for
contracts, sets the parameters of the contracts, and then tries to
renege on them.... This kind of thing happens in the Third World,
but companies have insurance for doing business there."0 4
Despite the contractual prohibition, in February 2002 the PUC
filed petitions with FERC to void thirty-two of the long-term power
contracts with twenty-two individual suppliers that the state
negotiated in 2001, alleging that the contracts were negotiated in
an anticompetitive environment and "exceed[ed] just and reason-
able prices by approximately $14 billion."' 5 At that time, the $43
billion in contracts had a market value of approximately half the
price at which they were negotiated.'0 6
Contract, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 3, 2002, at 11.
101. See Jessica Berthold, Calif Law Firm Sues Pwr Suppliers for Mkt Manipulation,
DOWJONES ENERGY SERVICE, May 13, 2002, WL 5/13/02 DJES 17:41:00. Defendants named
in the suit were Allegheny Energy, Dynegy, El Paso, Mirant, Morgan Stanley Capital Group,
PacifiCorp Power Marketing, Sempra, Williams, PG&E Corp., Edison International, Coral
Power, United Technologies, Calpeak Power, and Alliance Colton. Id.; Suit Filed to Protest
Power Supply Manipulation, EEI ENERGY NEWS, May 14, 2002.
102. See Virginia Ellis & Nancy Vogel, Energy Pacts Bar State from Seeking U.S. Review
of Prices, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at B5. Regarding the failure to provide the ability for the
state to exit these deals, California Energy Committee Chair, Debra Bowen stated: "You
would never find a provision like that in a contract that was negotiated under normal
circumstances, because it's patently ridiculous." Id.; California Contracts Bar Request of
FERC Price Review, EEI ENERGY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 2.
103. See Mark Martin, Move To Void Power Pacts Could Backfire, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26,
2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL 4013909.
104. Id.
105. See Wholesale Suppliers Plead with FERC To Uphold Calif Long-Term Contracts,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 10510008.
106. See James Sterngold, California Tries To Have Energy Deals Renegotiated, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, atA17; cf Tim Reiterman, StateDisputes Long-Term Power Pacts, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at B1 (noting that under these contracts suppliers can charge up to
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FERC rejected other efforts by the PUC to overturn certain
long-term purchase power contracts signed by the state.°7 A FERC
administrative law judge upheld four long-term power sale
contracts signed by the state during the crisis.' Another FERC
administrative law judge refused to reject Pacific Northwest
contracts executed during the crisis, as there was no fraud or
mutual mistake.' 9 A FERC administrative law judge in December
2002, however, ruled that electricity suppliers had overcharged the
since-defunct California Power Exchange and the California ISO by
$1.8 billion."0 In March 2003, a FERC staff report revised the
amount of overcharge that FERC might order restituted to $3.3
billion."'
Calpine, Constellation Energy, and three other companies agreed
to trim the length of eight of their contracts in return for California
almost twenty-five percent above benchmark prices for peak energy periods).
107. See, e.g., CalPeak Power-Panoche LLC, 98 F.E.R.C. 61,024 (2002). The PUC had
tried to turn over the contracts that California had signed alleging that the small generators
exercised market power when the California Department of Water Resources executed
contracts with them in early 2001. See id. The California PUC argued that because the
California market was dysfunctional, even small generators exercised market power and,
therefore, FERC should nullify the contracts, even though the state was not acting under
duress. See id. Calpeak entered a ten-year, 350 MW contract in August 2001 with the state.
It provided peaking power for approximately 110/MWh for up to 3000 hours of annual
dispatch over the contract period. This was the third time that FERC had rejected California
challenges to long-term contracts it had signed a few months before.
108. See Dean Calbreath, California Long-Term Power Purchases Upheld, COPLEY NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 20, 2002, LEXIS, Copley News Service File. The contracts involved Nevada
Power, Sierra Pacific Power, Southern California Water Co., and the Public Utility District
of Snohomish County, Washington. See id.
109. See ALJ Rejects PacifiCorp Contract Dispute, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Mar. 3, 2003,
LEXIS, Electricity Daily File. This decision upholds the Sierra-Mobile doctrine to uphold
contractual rates as "just and reasonable." See id.
110. See Calif Owes Suppliers, Rules FERC ALJ, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Dec. 16, 2002,
LEXIS, Electricity Daily File. FERC presiding judge Bruce Birchbaum ruled that the $1.8
billion in overcharges was offset by approximately $3 billion still unpaid by the purchasers
to the suppliers. See id. This decision culminated a process of off-record negotiations, record
hearings, and intervention by 100 active parties, amid political pressure. See id.; see also Let
Down by FERC ALJ Ruling, Calif. Vows to Push for at Least $9 Billion, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK,
Dec. 16, 2002, at 1.
111. The FERC report noted the root cause of the crisis was California's fatally flawed
market design. The report found an "epidemic" number of efforts to manipulate gas prices.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power was among those companies cited for
market manipulation. Kennedy Maize,Analysis: FERC is "Arresting a Corpse,"ELECTRICITY
DAILY, Mar. 28, 2003, at 1; Jonathan Peterson & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Energy Market
Manipulated, Regulators Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, Business Desk, at 1.
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releasing them from suit, reducing future California costs by $3.5
billion. 112 Ultimately, Calpine agreed to renegotiate $11.7 billion of
long-term power contracts entered with California."' In exchange
for cutting the duration of the power sale from twenty years to ten
years, "Calpine would be allowed to sell more power to California"
in 2002-2004.11 Commentators estimated that this renegotiation
would save the state $2.8 billion on the $70/KWh contracts." 5 The
DWR also "restructured its power supply contract with CalPeak
Power saving the agency 17% or $71-million."" 6
In total, thirty-four contracts were restructured under pressure
from California." 7 While Governor Davis "boasted that the state
saved $5.5 billion," an independent state auditor concluded that the
net savings was only $1.5 billion, in nominal dollars, or $0.5 billion
in net present value."' In most cases, the price was not reduced;
rather, the contract duration was shortened or the amount of power
to be sold was reduced." 9
The ultimate modus operandi is evident: California's energy
crisis and legislative response have and will continue to breed a
plethora of contests and litigation of every conceivable type in every
possible forum. Court decision rules, therefore, become as impor-
tant now, or more so, as regulatory commission rules did during
former periods of traditional bundled regulation. The key to the
substantive outcome is determining which rules apply to electric
power contracts.
112. See DWR Renegotiates Deals with Producers, But Consumer Group Mocks Savings
Claim, ELECTRIC UTIL. WE., Apr. 29,2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 10510124. These
eight contracts accounted for $15 billion of the state's $43 billion obligation. See id. These
renegotiations, however, did not significantly alter the price for power sale per megawatt-
hour. See id. Consumer groups criticized the "mere 2%" reduction in price in a Calpine
contract. Id.
113. See Calif., Calpine Reach Deal on $11.7B Power Contract, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Apr.
9, 2002, LEXIS, Electricity Daily File.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Settlement Talks for Renegotiating Calif Contracts Start at FERC May 16, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WF., May 6, 2002, at 7, available at 2002 WL 10510193.
117. Schwarzenegger Vows to Restructure State Power Contracts, EEI ENERGYNEwS, Jan.
7, 2004, at 2.
118. Calif Claim of Savings from Re-Doing Contracts Are Far Too High: Auditor,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 7, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WL 11143705.
119. See id.
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Although some California courts have held that electricity is a
"product" to adjudicate tort actions based on public policy and
metering distinctions, 20 the California courts have yet to address
definitively whether electricity is a good or service for contract
purposes. This decision must be made, however, especially in a
deregulated context amid the rash of recent commercial litigation
that has ensued with California's restructuring debacle.
Courts in each state will make individual decisions as to whether
electricity is a good, on the one hand, or a service, on the other
hand. However made, these decisions will fundamentally shape the
rules of the new market, in which case law will supplant traditional
regulation to a significant degree.
II. TREATMENT OF ELECTRICITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND
THE U.C.C.
As the role of direct regulation is replaced by new, restructured,
electric market rules, the judicial branch increasingly will replace
much of the prior role of executive branch regulators. The still
unresolved question in California and many states is whether
electricity legally is a good or a service. The distinction matters
in determining disputes regarding whether electricity contracts
have been formed, the substance of the contract, the performance
obligations, and the resultant legal obligations. Whether electricity
is a good governed by the U.C.C., or a service governed by the
general common law can alter the outcome of the legal dispute in
more than a dozen significant areas of contract law.
The contract precedent that directly governs business relation-
ships in this "new," deregulated market is a matter of state law and
varies from state to state. However, one can make generalizations
about how the typical (so-called "majority view") state common law
rule for electric services differs from the U.C.C. rule for goods. The
following table delineates several of these key differences, setting
traditional common law rules.'21
120. See, e.g., Stein v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Ct. App. 1992); Mancuso v.
S. Cal. Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Ct. App. 1991).
121. For a detailed discussion of the distinctions presented in the following table, see
Appendix.
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TRADITIONAL U. C. C.
ISSUE COMMON LAW
1. Must acceptance of a contract Yes No
offer exactly or materially
"mirror" the terms of the offer?
2. In wholesale electric No Yes
transactions, can additional
terms to the deal be added by the
acceptance, even if not contained
in the offer?
3. Must enforceable contracts for No Yes
more than $500 either be in
writing or evidenced by a
writing?
4. Can an existing contract be modi- No Yes
fled without new consideration?
5. Are prior oral statements Less likely Possibly
includable as part of a written
contract?
6. Can a contract be modified orally Yes No
even where that contract
prevents such modifications?
7. Will indefinite gaps in a contract Often not Usually
be filled in and the contract
enforced?
8. Must a demand for assurances of No Yes
performance be in writing? Is
response always required in less
than thirty days?
9. Can a firm offer in writing not Yes No
supported by consideration be
revoked?
10. Is substantial performance of Yes No
obligations, rather than perfect
performance, allowed?
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11. Are trade practices and past Often not Always
conduct relevant in interpreting
the deal?
12. Is the market value of an item Yes No
measured at the time of breach
rather than at the time that the
party was to perform?
13. Will implied warranties of No Yes
merchantability and fitness be
read into the contract?
14. If the warranty/remedy fails, No Yes
will courts throw out quality
disclaimers?
The U.C.C. definition states, in part, that "goods" are (1) all
things (including specially manufactured goods) that are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale, and (2) must be
both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass. 1
22
Since electricity can be conceptualized as a movable "thing," some
have leapt to the conclusion that electricity is a "good." In govern-
ing the sale of goods, the U.C.C. speaks to "identifying" those goods
at some point prior to delivery. 2 '
The electrons themselves cannot be identified and delivered in
any sense that the U.C.C. contemplates. Electrons move at almost
the speed of light, but specific electrons cannot be, and are not,
delivered to a destination or buyer. A seller or producer cannot
move or send identified electrons to a particular purchaser or user.
In this regard, electricity is much like another utility, telecommuni-
cations, which also transmits an electric-magnetic energy wave
through space in microwave form or along copper cable. Telecom-
munications and phone transactions in the electro-magnetic
spectrum are legally treated as services, rather than goods. 124 As
such, we are faced with a conundrum.
Unlike gas, electricity is an invisible wave or force. It is created
by the movement (not the consumption) of electrons, rather than
122. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1989).
123. See id. §§ 2-501, 2-613, 2-709.
124. See infra Part VI.C (discussing telecommunications case precedent).
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the sale and permanent transference of the electrons themselves.
Electricity is not matter, but the energy by-product of the move-
ment of matter. Even if it is matter, however, the movement of
matter is analogous to a transportation service. Electric production
merely induces the electro-magnetic fast movement of electrons in
a copper wire.
Different states have wrestled with defining electricity as a good
or service and have come to different conclusions. Some jurisdic-
tions, such as New York, treat electricity strictly as a service.'25
Other jurisdictions have drawn distinctions between "raw" energy
and "metered" energy, treating the former as a service and the
latter as a good.'26 The California jurisprudence illustrates the
confusion. Different decisions over time in California hold that:
" Electricity is personal property (1913)127
* Electricity is a product (for products liability) and may also be
a good (1985) 128
* Electricity is a service until it is metered (1991)129
* Electricity is an intangible or service (2002)130
These distinctions are increasingly important in this era of retail
electric sector deregulation since individual state common law and
court interpretation are replacing systematized regulation by FERC
and the states. Rules of this "new market" will be made by contract
and interpreted by courts. Because ambiguity exists in the current
125. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
126. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
127. Hill v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 136 P. 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913).
128. Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68 (1985).
129. Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 232 Cal. App. 3d 88 (1991).
130. California State Board of Equalization, Appeal of PacifiCorp, No. 90027, September
12, 2002.
The sales of electricity are sales of services that essentially consisted of
appellant's setting and keeping in motion, through its generation and
transmission facilities, electrically charged particles. Also as in Otte, we further
conclude that the basic reason the generation and transmission process
employed by appellant is appropriately characterized as a service is that the
process does not result in either (1) the "creation" in its generation facilities of
any such arguably tangible particles or (2) the "injection" of those particles into
its transmission facilities.
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judicial treatment as to whether electricity is a good or a service,
the next section considers some of this judicial treatment.
III. STATE PRECEDENT ON THE LEGAL NATURE OF ELECTRICITY
There are distinctively different legal rules applying to power
contracts as well as to injuries related to power. Two primary fields
of law are relevant to electricity: torts and contracts. Both involve
state law determinations.'3 '
A few states have wrestled with whether electricity is a good or
a service. Part II demonstrated that the answer to this question
will change the rules that apply in contract disputes. Moreover, as
these issues are determined by individual state courts, there could
be fifty separate and distinct answers.
Which way a state decides on this issue of good or service, while
an issue now that has attracted little attention, may be regarded in
retrospect as a key formative force in establishing the new rules of
the deregulated marketplace.
A. Electricity Sales
First, contract law, governing electricity sale transactions,
applies for resolving contract disputes regarding production, sale,
operation and maintenance arrangements, power wheeling, trading
of power, etc. In a deregulated power market, individual contracts
will need to address a variety of factors: how primary and back-up
power resources will be supplied; the allowable loss, disruption, or
variation in the quality and quantity of electricity supplied; the
remedies and damages for failure to supply; specific force majeure
provisions to relieve supply obligations, general allocation of risk
among various suppliers, transporters, intermediaries, and users
of power; insurance provisions to support power supply obligations;
and, agreement on the standard of provision of electric power.
Determining whether electricity is a good or a service thus remains
critical.
131. States also have construed whether electricity is tangible property that can be taxed
by the state.
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Contract disputes involving goods are resolved pursuant to the
statutory rules of the U.C.C. and its implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability for goods.' 32 State U.C.C. statutes generally
are, with some variation, uniform from state to state. Contractual
disputes involving services are not covered by the statutory
provisions of the U.C.C., but rather are ruled by the generic
common law in each state. The common law is the amalgam of legal
precedent, in the form of court decisions, in each state. The rules
under each system, as detailed in more detail in the Appendix, are
different.'33
1. Electricity as a Good Under the U.CC.
No reported court decision has defined all electricity as a good
under the U.C.C. In a 1979 case, the Court of Appeals of Indiana
made a distinction between raw and metered electricity.'34 The
court held, as it did in Helvey, that metered electricity was a "good,"
while raw electricity was not a good.3 5 The Court of Appeals of
Indiana held that the metered electricity sold in consumer voltage
that passed into the homes of consumers is a good covered by the
U.C.C., while raw electrical energy encountered in "an unmarket-
able and unmarketed state" in the overhead transmission cable was
not.3 6 The court further reasoned that "[tihe high-voltage electric-
ity with which the Hedges came into contact was not the good that
PSI was intending to sell or the Hedges were intending to buy."13 7
Instead, courts tend to draw a distinction between so-called raw
132. See infra notes 574-84 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Appendix.
134. See Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). John Hedges
owned a farm in Indiana on which he decided to build a barn. Id. at 934. Hedges contacted
the Public Service Company of Indiana (PSI) to extend his electrical service to the barn. Id.
PSI installed the electrical lines to the barn. Id. While moving an aluminum ladder, Hedges
struck an uninsulated power line and was seriously injured. Id. Hedges brought suit for
negligence, breach of implied warranties, and strict liability. Id. at 935-36. The court further
reasoned that "[tihe high-voltage electricity with which the Hedges came into contact was
not the good that PSI was intending to sell or the Hedges were intending to buy." Id. Thus,
"the tragic escape of 7,200 volts from the transmission wire, through the ladder and into the
bodies of these men is not a transaction in goods intended to be covered by the U.C.C." Id.
135. Id. at 935.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 936.
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electricity and metered electricity, similar to the line drawn by
some courts in strict products liability actions, discussed later as
part of the law governing electricity torts.
Section 105 of Article 2 of the U.C.C. defines "goods" as:
" "all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract for sale ....
• "Goods must be both existing and identified before any
interest in them can pass."'
As early as 1913, a California court held that electricity was
personal property, which may be bartered and sold. 4 ° Many
jurisdictions have found that electricity may be stolen and electric-
ity may be taxed. 4 ' Some courts have found that the delivery of
electricity is a service, but the actual consumable energy is a
good.' 42 In Helvey v. Wabash County REMC,13 the court reasoned:
138. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1989).
139. Id. § 2-105(2).
140. Hill v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 136 P. 492, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913) (citing Terrace Water
Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power, 82 P. 562, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905); see also Sixty-Seven
S. Munn, Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 147 A. 735, 736 (N.J. 1929).
141. See, e.g., Gross Income Tax Div. v. Chicago Dist. Elec. Generating Corp., 139 N.E.2d
161, 164-65 (1956) (holding taxation within state lawful while taxation of interstate
commerce is unlawful). ALA. CODE § 13A-8-23 (1975); ALASKA STAT, § 11.46.100 (2002); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:67.6 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-7 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-35-
103 (1993).
142. See, Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis. 1979).
143. 278 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). Mr. Helvey filed the action to recover
damages caused to his 110-volt household appliances when an electrical current in excess of
135 volts damaged them. Id. at 608. The electricity provider, Wabash County REMC, raised
the argument that it provided a good or product that was subject to the four-year statute of
limitations in the U.C.C. Id. at 609. It was unusual that the electric company took this
position because in most cases it argues against the U.C.C.'s applicability. Thomas Helvey
filed an action against REMC for breach of implied and express warranties. Id. REMC filed
a motion for summary judgment based upon the U.C.C. statute of limitations. Id. The
Indiana Court of Appeals stated that in order for the U.C.C. statute of limitations to apply,
electricity must be a "good" as defined in the U.C.C. Id. at 609-10. Helvey argued that
electricity is a service thereby invoking a six-year common law statute of limitations to his
advantage. Id. at 610. The court stated that to be a "good," electricity must be a thing, that
is both existing and movable simultaneously. Id. The electricity can be measured to establish
a price thereby fulfilling both the existing and movable requirements of goods. Id. The court
also stated that one of the underlying principles of the U.C.C. is uniformity among
jurisdictions. Id. (citing Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612,614 (Pa. 1964)).
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"Logic would indicate that whatever can be measured in order to
establish the price to be paid would be indicative of fulfilling both
the existing and movable requirements of 'goods." 144 The court in
Helvey held that electricity was a good for purposes of the U.C.C.
The court further held that the electricity, having passed through
the consumer's meter, was a good and the four-year statute of
limitations applied and barred recovery. 145 The court stated, "It is
necessary for goods to be (1) a thing; (2) existing; and (3) movable,
with (2) and (3) existing simultaneously."146 In 1979, the Tax Court
of Indiana concluded that electricity was not tangible personal
property in Mynsberge v. Department of State Revenue.'47 While
Indiana courts had never directly addressed whether electricity
qualifies as "tangible personal property," in 1978, the Court of
Appeals of Indiana determined that cable television signals were
not tangible personal property, but rather a service. 14 The Tax
Court of Indiana adopted the court's reasoning in Cable Brazil,
holding that electricity purchased by Mynsberge was "not tangible
personal property" and thus, Mynsberge's resale of electricity to
Coppes did not render Mynsberge's purchase of electricity within
the sales tax exemption.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 609-10.
146. Id. at 610.
147. 716 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). Richard Mynsberge leased buildings and
equipment to Coppes, a manufacturer of kitchen cabinets. Id. at 630-31. Under the lease
agreement, Coppes made monthly payments to Mynsberge in return for electricity. Id. at
631. Mynsberge paid a total of $11,492.11 in gross retail (sales) tax on its purchases of
electricity from NIPSCO during the tax years at issue. Id. Mynsberge filed for a refund with
the Department of State Revenue for the sales tax it paid on the purchase of electricity;
however, the Department denied Mynsberge's refund. Id. Mynaberge appealed this decision.
Id. Mynsberge stated that Section 6-2.5-5-8 of the Indiana tax code provides that transactions
involving tangible personal property are exempt from state gross retail tax if the person
acquiring the property acquires it for resale, rental, or lease. Id. Mynsberge, 716 N.E.2d at
637-38. The court held that Mynsberge's purchase of electricity was a "retail transaction"
subject to gross retail tax. Id. at 638.
148. Dep't of State Revenue v. Cable Brazil, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 555, 559-61 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978).
1868 [Vol. 45:1839
20041 THERMODYNAMICS, MASS, AND ENERGY 1869
2. Electricity as a Service
No court considers electricity a good under the U.C.C. under all
circumstances. 49 Some courts draw a distinction between raw
electricity and metered electricity, similar to the line drawn by
some courts in strict products liability actions. One court deter-
mined that electricity in its raw state, such as in high-voltage lines,
cannot be characterized as a good, but instead is a service; metered
electricity passing through homes, on the other hand, does consti-
tute a good.' 50
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Goebel, the dispute involved
a breach of contract action over unpaid bills for the sale of gas and
electricity. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. brought an action alleging
breach of contract. At that time however, no case law existed in
Ohio that was on point. Consequently, the Hamilton County
Municipal Court looked to other states' decisions concerning the
issue."' The court was most convinced by reasoning that distin-guished electricity in its raw form from metered amounts passing
149. E.g., Singer Co., Link Stimulation Sys. Div. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d
419, 424 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that the utility was not liable for implied
warranties for failure to deliver power because the court had found no reported decision
holding electricity to be a good while it remained within the utility company's distribution
system). On August 29, 1986, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) sent a letter to Singer
indicating the cause of power interruptin as faulty distribution system parts which were
damaged by severe lightning storms. Id. at 423. Singer then sued BG&E asserting claims of
contractual breach, breaches of the U.C.C.'s implied warranties, and negligence. Id. at 421.
The trial court dismissed the implied warranty claims, because "Title 2 of the U.C.C. applied
only to 'transactions in goods,' MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-102 (2003), that electricity did
not fall within the classification of 'goods' as defined in the U.C.C., MD. COM. LAWCODE ANN.
§ 2-105 (2003), and therefore the claims were inapplicable to the power outages at Singer's
facility." Id. at 423. The court held that jurisdictions with similar or identical versions of the
U.C.C. did not find electricity to be a "good" within the meaning of the U.C.C. Id. (citing
Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Helvey v. Wabash County
REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 234 N.W.2d 702
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div.
1981); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Mun. 1986)). Those courts
based their decision on the fact that electricity, prior to being metered and passing into
consumers' homes, was not a good within the meaning of their states' U.C.C.s. The court held
that electricity, while in the transmission and distribution system, is not a good within Title
2 of Maryland's U.C.C. Id. at 424.
150. Cincinnati Gas, 502 N.E.2d at 715.
151. Id. at 714-15.
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through utility-owned conduits and into the homes of consumers. 152
The court held that once electricity passes through the meter and
into the home of the consumer, it becomes a good as defined by the
U.C.C.'53 The court, however, after determining electricity did
constitute a good under the U.C.C., granted the defendant's motion
for summaryjudgment because Ohio's U.C.C. contained a four-year
statute of limitations, and plaintiff failed to commence its action
within four years.'54
In most cases involving stray voltage, courts typically hold that
stray voltage does not fall within the U.C.C. because stray voltage
usually does not pass through the customer's meter.'55 In G & K
Dairy v. Princeton Electric Plant Board, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky found that a municipal electric
board that received electricity from the Tennessee Valley Authority
did not manufacture the product within the meaning of strict
liability doctrine.'56 Kentucky had adopted the strict liability
doctrine of the Restatement Second of Torts, and applied Section
402A to the claim that G & K Diary's cattle were injured by
stray electricity.'57 The court found that under Kentucky law,
"strict products liability ... is unavailable against one who renders
a service as opposed to one who manufactures or supplies a
'product.'"'58 The court placed much weight on the term "service"
which was used "consistently" by the Kentucky Public Service
Commission's regulations in reference to the furnishing of
electricity."' The court stated that because Princeton Electric
Plant Board did not generate electricity, but rather received it
and distributed it to its customers, it provided a service and
products liability could not be applied. 160
A Maryland court determined that raw electricity did not
constitute a good under the Maryland U.C.C.' 6 ' Raw electricity still
152. Id. at 715.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 714-15.
155. See G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485,490 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
156. Id. at 489.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Singer Co. Link Stimulation Sys. Div. v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 419,424
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within the utility's distribution system exists in an unmarketed
and unmarketable state.'62 This high-voltage electricity, not yet
converted into usable electricity, "is not the refined product that the
customer intends to buy.'
16 3
Other courts do not make such form distinctions, but character-
ize electricity, in general, as a service.'6 4 In Farina v. Niagra
Mohawk Power Corp., New York refused to recognize electricity
as a good.' Mr. Farina was killed when an antenna he was
removing from the roof of his home came in contact with an
electrical wire owned by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. 6
The administratrix of Farina's estate sued Mohawk in tort and for
breach of warranty.'67 Unlike in Texas or Indiana where the courts
found that electricity was not a product at the stage when the
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). The Link Division of the Singer Company, a high tech engineering
firm which made training simulators for government and industry, opened a manufacturing
plant in Maryland. Id. at 422. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company supplied the electricity to
the manufacturing plant. Id. Singer's business was dependent on an uninterrupted supply
of electricity because its simulators could not run without it. Id. In addition, the heating,
ventilation, and cooling systems in the building were driven by electricity. Id. Singer
experienced eight electrical power interruptions or outages and claimed that such
interruptions violated the U.C.C. implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
purpose. Id. at 421, 422.
162. Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
163. Balt. Gas & Elec., 558 A.2d at 424 (internal citation omitted). This raw electricity
included electricity in the overhead cable transmission lines. See id.
164. See Encogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914 F. Supp. 57,
61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Encogen owned and operated a cogeneration facility in New York. Id. at
58. Niagara Mohawk provides electric gas and power throughout a larger portion of upstate
New York. Id. Niagara entered into a power purchase agreement with Encogen where
Niagara agreed, as required by PURPA and state statute, to purchase all electricity produced
by Encogen. Id. at 58-59. Niagara made payments for the electricity, but the payments were
below those amounts agreed in the power purchase agreement. Id. at 60. In a similar case,
Norcon, an independent power producer, entered into a power purchase agreement with
Niagara similar to the Encogen agreement. Norcon Power Partners v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1996). In both cases, Niagara requested adequate
assurances of future performance from Encogen and Norcon regarding their ability to
continue to produce electricity. Encogen, 914 F. Supp. at 60; Norcon, 163 F.3d at 156-57.
Under New York law, the sale of electricity is not a sale of "goods," but rather a service.
Encogen, 914 F. Supp. at 61. Thus, the U.C.C. would not govern contracts such as the
Encogen and Norcon electric power purchase agreements. Id. The United States District
Court in Encogen cited Farina as a basis for its conclusions, but just as in Farina, the
Encogen court did not state any analysis that lead to its holding. Id.
165. 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1981).
166. Id. at 700.
167. Id.
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contact occurred, the New York court concluded that electricity
could never be a product or good. 68 The New York court, after
deeming electricity a service, refused to enforce the U.C.C.'s
provision governing the right to demand adequate assurances of
future performance.'69
In a similar case the Court of Appeals of Michigan held, in
Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.,170 that
electricity was a service to which a warranty would attach under
Article 2 of the U.C.C.' 7 ' On April 17, 1963, a fire destroyed a
building that was insured by Buckeye Union Fire Insurance
Company.172 Buckeye, along with a building owner, brought a suit
against the Detroit Edison Company for negligence and breach of
implied warranties of fitness and merchantability regarding the
electricity supplied by Edison.13 The trial court held that electric-
ity is not a good or commodity to which implied warranties would
attach because of its properties or character.' A Massachusetts
court similarly refused to acknowledge electricity as a good in New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Boston Edison Co.'17 A New Balance
athletic shoe factory in Boston was severely damaged by a fire
caused by an electrical power surge emanating from equipment
owned and operated by Boston Edison Company. 176 New Balance
had asserted a claim for breach of the warranties under sections
313-315 of Article 2 of the U.C.C. Boston Edison moved for, and the
court granted, summary judgment on the warranty claims. 177 This
was a case of first impression in Massachusetts. 78 Consequently,
the New Balance court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. 171
168. Id. at 700-01.
169. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1989).
170. 196 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
171. Id. at 318.
172. Id. at 317.
173. Id.
174. Id. The trial court went on to state that the sale of electricity is a service and
therefore the U.C.C. does not apply. Id. The court stated that this was a case of first
impression and that, until some general principles evolve, the expansion in this area should
proceed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 318.
175. 1996 WL 406673, *3 (Mass. Super. 1996).
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *2.
179. Id.
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The court rejected the reasoning of the court in Helvey stating that
it was troubled by the sweeping implications that this analysis may
have on public utilities. 180 The court stated that the Helvey court
went too far in its analysis.' For these reasons, the New Balance
court held that electricity is not a good as defined by the U.C.C.,
and therefore the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. did not
apply.
182
In Navarro County Electric Cooperative v. Prince, the plaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to sue a utility for a violation of the
U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability for sale of a good
under the Texas Business and Commerce Code.8 3 The plaintiff
lived in a mobile home beneath high voltage electrical transmission
lines.' 8" The wires did not directly carry electricity into plaintiff's
home.8 5 While adjusting a television antenna beneath the wires,
plaintiff received a shock, causing injuries.'86 Prince sued Navarro
County Electrical Cooperative on an implied warranty theory.' 87
The Court of Appeals of Texas held that the transmission of
electrical energy along high-voltage lines, which eventually lead
into a transformer, was not goods within the meaning of the state
commercial code.' The court reasoned that the legislature, in
passing the implied warranty statute, meant to confine its
applicability to tangible manufactured or produced products that
normally might be found in bulk quantity or in packaged goods.189
When applying those requirements to electric energy, the court
found that electricity could not be classified as a fungible good nor
could it be adequately packaged or labeled. 90 The court found that
the sale of electricity would more fittingly be termed the rendition
of a service. 9'
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *3.
183. 640 S,W.2d 398 (Tex. App. 1982).
184. Id. at 398.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 399.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 400.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Texas Business and Commercial Code states that:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (1) pass without objection
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Electricity has been found to be "tangible" for purposes of
subjecting it to taxation.'92 Legislation in several states also defines
electricity as tangible.'93
The word "intangible" from its latin roots means something that
cannot be touched or perceived by touch. Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary (3d ed. 1993). Electricity can be touched, and
when a person does so and thereby completes an electrical
circuit, it may be the last earthly sensation he or she feels."M
in the trade under the contract description; and (2) in the case of fungible goods,
are of fair average quality within the description; and (3) are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used; and (4) run, within the variation
permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit
and among all units involved; and (5) are adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require; and (6) conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(b) (West 2003). Plaintiff used these requirements to
say first, that the electricity was not fit for the purpose for which it was to be used. Navarro,
640 S.W.2d at 399. Second, the plaintiff contended that the implied warranty extended to the
container of the product, the wiring, and that it was unfit for transporting electricity. Id.
Plaintiff testified that the current jumped from the transmission line to the antenna. Id.
192.
The General Assembly when using the word tangible in referring to personal
property had in mind the ordinary and popularly understood meaning of such
term as indicated in Webster's first definition thereof, which is "Capable of
being touched; also, perceptible to the touch; tactile; palpable."
From the evidence it appears that although energy and mass are closely
interrelated, indestructible, equivalent, interchangeable, directly proportional
to and may be equated with each other, yet energy as such cannot be separated
from mass or matter and stored, weighed, transported, handled, liquified,
solidified, photographed, touched or otherwise perceived by the senses in its
own right or capacity separate and apart from mass or matter.
Farrand Coal Co. v. Halpin, 140 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ill. 1957) (citation omitted).
193. Kansas' statute states, for example, that "'[piroperty which is consumed' means
tangible personal property which is ... used ... or dissipated within one year." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-3602 (1987 & Supp. 2002). Electricity qualifies as such property. New Mexico
defines tangible personal property to include electricity. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3 (Michie
Supp. 2003). Arizona states that, "'Iplurchase' means any transfer, exchange or barter,
conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means, of tangible personal property for
a consideration, including transactions by which the possession of property is transferred but
the seller retains the title as security for payment." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-5151 (West
1999 & Supp. 2003). Though not specifically deemed tangible property, Louisiana has not
explicitly excluded electricity or other utilities from its tangible property definition. See LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, § 4301 (West Supp. 2003).
194. Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 75 S.W.3d 725, 728 n.6 (Mo. 2001). In
Florida statutes, "[tiangible personal property' means all goods, chattels, and other articles
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On the other hand, decisions in several other states declare
electricity to be intangible. 9 ' "Electricity is rather an intangible
asset and the word 'property' is perhaps not the most apt word by
which to describe the supply of electrical energy thus sought to be
acquired for the use of the city."'96 The California Board of
Equalization considers electricity to be an intangible in the
deregulated modern era.19 If electricity is considered an intangible,
it cannot be a good, pursuant to the U.C.C.
Some courts are altering the characterization when electricity
passes through the retail meter.'98 These metering distinctions may
of value ... capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the article
itself." Davis v. Gulf Power Corp., 799 So.2d 298, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
[e]lectricity has the characteristics of tangible personal property described" in the statute).
195. See Miller v. City of L.A., 197 P. 342,343 (Cal. 1921); People v. Menagas, 11 N.E.2d
403, 405 (Ill. 1937) (referring twice to electrical energy as being intangible).
We are convinced that electricity is not tangible personal property under the
1993 Definition. The 1993 Definition provides that qualifying machinery must
be used either "for manufacturing ... tangible personal property ... or for the
generation of electricity."... If the legislature had considered electricity tangible
personal property, it would not have drafted a specific provision for the
.generation of electricity." Because the Legislature used the disjunctive term
"or" in the 1993 Definition, we find that generating electricity is not
manufacturing tangible personal property.
N. States Power Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, No. 6639, 1997 WL 66759, at *2 (Minn. Tax Ct.
Feb. 14, 1997) (footnotes omitted). Although decisions applying the tax laws support the
court's conclusion that electricity does not constitute tangible personal property, there is
some tension between this conclusion and cases decided under the U.C.C. This is worthy of
mention because courts often look to the U.C.C. for guidance in interpreting the tax laws. See
Mynsberge v. Dep't of State Revenue, 716 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). InMynsberge, both
petitioner and respondent, Indiana Department of State Taxation, moved for summary
judgment in petitioner's appeal from respondent's final determination denying petitioner's
claim for refund of paid gross retail sales taxes. Id. at 631. Indiana imposes an excise tax
(gross retail or sales tax) on certain sales made within the state. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-2.5-
2-1(a) (Michie 2001). This tax is not imposed on all sales taking place within Indiana, but
rather on only those sales that constitute "retail transactions." Monarch Beverage Co. v.
Dep't of State Revenue, 589 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992). The Indiana General
Assembly has also enacted a number of exemptions from the gross retail tax. See IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-2.5-5-1 to 6.2.5-5-38.2 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003).
196. Miller, 197 P. at 343.
197. See Corporate Franchise Hearings Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (April 17, 2002),
available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/041702.pdf. Electricity cannot be
classified as tangible personal property. Electricity cannot be traced to a destination and
cannot be stored for future use and is therefore intangible. In this regard, the California
Taxpayers Association has alleged that characterizing electricity as tangible property would
create a tax incentive for out-of-state firms not to sell electricity to California. See id.
198. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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create two separate rules for adjudicating electric market disputes.
Wholesale electricity transactions and damages would be assessed
as services transactions, not involving a product or a good, and
therefore governed by common law. Conversely, retail electricity
transactions and damages would be assessed as goods transactions,
therefore governed by the U.C.C.
Characterizing electricity as a service does not relieve a utility
or other provider of liability, it merely imposes different decision
rules on contracts and purchases, rather than strict products
liability or U.C.C. implied warranties.199 It seems several states
hold utilities and other enterprises dealing in electricity to a higher
duty to exercise the utmost care to protect customers and the
public and to prevent destruction of life and property. It may be
particularly vexing to attempt to apply damages remedies under
the U.C.C. to electricity transactions. The U.C.C. damages
remedies infer either a resale or market value to the electric good.
However, since electricity can be stored, if at all, for only a fraction
of a second before it perishes, the actual good has no long-term
resale or remarket value. The U.C.C., nonetheless, assumes some
such value in its damages' formula.
B. Electricity and Tort
Tort law governs situations where electricity injures someone or
damages property. In tort law, strict liability can be imposed under
state precedent on all manufacturers or distributors of defective or
inherently dangerous products. 00 In a deregulated market, injuries
and damages related to electricity can still occur, and retailers,
wholesalers, brokers, marketers, and utilities can be sued, as
illustrated by the energy crisis in California." 1 Courts here, again,
cannot agree as to which legal category electricity belongs.
199. See, e.g., G & K Dairy v, Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485,491 (W.D. Ky.
1991). In cases where the existence of a duty is unclear, the question is a question of law for
the court.
200. To invoke strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
plaintiff must prove he or she purchased the product from someone engaged in the business
of selling the product, the product was defective, the product caused harm to the plaintiff or
his or her possessions, and the manufacturer or distributor put the product into the stream
of commerce. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
201. See supra Part I.
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State courts resolve the tort characterization of electricity
differently, with the majority of states determining that electric-
ity is a product and a minority of states holding that electricity
is a service. Most state courts that determine electricity is a
product define "product" as any object possessing intrinsic value,
capable of delivery, and produced for introduction into trade or
commerce." 2 These courts find that electricity is a commodity that
can be manufactured, transported, and sold.20 '
Correspondingly, as with electricity contracts, some courts find
that the distribution of electricity is a service while the actual
electricity itself is a consumable product. In Otte v. Dayton Power
& Light Co.,24 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that electricity is
not a "product" for strict liability purposes. 20 5 The plaintiffs bought
a dairy farm and operated it for several years.206 In 1982, the
plaintiffs noticed that milk production declined by twenty-five
percent, one-half of the cows contracted udder infections, and the
cows were acting strangely.2 7 Stray neutral-to-earth voltage had
been released onto their property and the cattle were apparently
affected when they came into contact with grounded electrical
devices. 20 ' The plaintiffs sued the utility for negligence, breach of
contract, and strict liability.2 9 The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected
the plaintiffs strict liability claim, holding that electricity is not a
"product" within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.210 The court defined "product" as "anything made
by human industry or art. Electricity appears to fall outside this
definition ... because electricity is the flow of electrically charged
particles along a conductor.... [The defendant did] not manufacture
electrically charged particles, but rather, set[] in motion the
necessary elements that allow[ed] the flow of electricity."211 The
202. See infra notes 226, 234.
203. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
204. 523 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1988).
205. Id. at 838-39.
206. Id. at 836.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 837.
210. Id. at 838-39.
211. Id. at 838.
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Ohio decision held that "[s]uch a system is ... a service."212 Most of
the court opinions, however, do not address the critical physical
properties of electricity that make it a product.
Some courts hold that electricity is only a product once it is sold.
These courts typically determine that electricity is sold once it
passes through the consumer's meter.1 ' Oddly, electricity that is
still in power lines typically is considered a service. 1 4 Conse-
quently, some of these courts have been reluctant to impose strict
liability on utilities where injuries occurred on the utility side of
the consumer's retail meter.
Yet, other courts impose strict liability on utilities largely based
on public policy reasons." 5 These public policy reasons include
212. Id.
213. The courts that have labeled electricity a product "have been consistent in holding
that the electricity must have been placed into the stream of commerce before § 402A strict
liability can attach." Schriner v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128, 1133-34 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) ("[Ilf electricity in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous passes through
the meter of a user or consumer and into the stream of commerce, causing physical harm ....
the doctrine of strict liability in tort may be applied against the public utility...."); see Smith
v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo. 1987) ("[Alt least until the electricity
reaches a point where it is made available for consumer use, it is not a 'product' that has
been 'sold' or otherwise 'placed in the stream of commerce' for the purpose of strict products
liability under § 402A."); Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Wis. 1979)
(holding power company strictly liable for damage caused by electricity traveling through the
utility's lines into the plaintiffs house at a voltage between 1000 and 4000 volts). The point
at which electricity enters the stream of commerce, losing its character as a service and
assuming that of a product, has been subject to dispute. Some jurisdictions consider
electricity to have left the utility's control only after it has passed through the customer's
electric meter, the point where the customer's charges are generally computed. See Mancuso
v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 232 Cal. App. 3d 88, 100 (1991) ("Electricity has been deemed to enter
the stream of commerce when it leaves the transmission lines and passes through the
consumer's meter."); Curtiss, 1997 WL 702690, at *6 ("[Als a practical and legal matter the
acceptance of electricity as a product has been very rare. The concept of strict liability for the
use or misuse of electricity has not found a solid home in the area of product liability case
law.... [Ellectricity is not a 'product' .... "); Pub. Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349,355
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("Electricity is considered to be placed into the stream of commerce when
it reaches its destination in a home or factory."); Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. 710 S.W.2d 338,
342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Prewitt, C.J., concurring) ("[The majority did] not decide if strict
liability in tort applies to sellers of electricity placed into the 'stream of commerce,' but the
opinion reviews causation as if strict liability does apply."); Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 842 ("[Sltrict
liability in tort for damages caused by [stray voltage] is not a cause of action that may be
asserted against a public utility."); Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc., 469 N.W.2d
595, 601 (Wis. 1991) (noting that the lower court held that stray voltage is not a product).
214. See supra note 213.
215. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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providing a shortcut to liability where negligence is present but
hard for injured parties to prove, creating economic incentives to
improve product safety, and spreading the risk of loss among all
who use the product by making manufacturers internalize these
ultimate costs in product prices. In contrast, a number of courts
reject the public policy argument as arbitrary, illegitimate, and
insufficient to support the imposition of strict liability in a highly
regulated industry, such as electric power. This argument is
vitiated by recent deregulation in the states.
1. Electricity as a Good: The Product Inquiry
Strict liability may attach to make a nonnegligent manufacturer
liable for injury caused by a product (or good) placed in the stream
of commerce.216
A plaintiff bringing a strict products liability action need not
prove negligence, recklessness, or intention to harm by the
manufacturer or distributor of the product, thus facing a lower
legal burden of proof to win a lawsuit at trial.217 Hence, injured
plaintiffs who sue any electric industry participant in tort will ask
the court to characterize electricity as a product or good in order to
take advantage of this lessened burden of proof. Utilities or other
accused defendant electricity market participants, on the other
hand, strive to avoid supplier liability and will argue that electric-
ity constitutes a service. Courts do not impose strict products
liability on services.218
Most states have yet to resolve the issue of whether electricity
is a product for strict products liability purposes. The majority
of state courts reaching the issue have held that electricity is
a product rather than a service.2 19 At least eight states have
determined electricity to be a product, including California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas,
216. See, e.g., Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 419
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that utility company's liability is limited to instances of
("'willful neglect' or 'willful'); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1986).
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Allied Props. v. John A. Blume & Assoc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Ct. App.
1972); see, also, Fogo v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 137 Cal. Rptr. 417, 422 (Ct. App. 1977) (deeming
the sale of blood a service and so outside of strict products liability actions).
219. See supra notes 204, 213.
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and Wisconsin.220 At least two other states-New York and
Ohio-consider electricity a service rather than a product.221 This
result could favor the defendant electricity market participant.
Where plaintiffs sustain no actual losses, but only allege
economic losses, can they recover? In Bamberger & Feibleman v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,222 the plaintiffs attorneys as-
serted that Indianapolis Power & Light was liable under the
Indiana Product Liability Act for economic losses arising from the
interruption of electrical service. 2  In 1996, the Court of Appeals
of Indiana held that electricity can be a "product" but must be in a
marketable and marketed state at the time it causes the injury in
order to be treated as a "product" under strict liability.224 The test
maintained that electricity was only placed into the stream of
commerce once it "reaches its destination in the home or factory."225
A product, according to one California court, "means any object
possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assem-
bled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for
introduction into trade or commerce."226 In Pierce v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., lightning struck several utility company transformers,
two of which were located on the plaintiffs property, causing the
plaintiffs home to lose electricity.227 The utility company came to
the plaintiffs property and replaced the transformers, but did not
test the replacement transformers before installing them.22' As the
crew from the utility company was installing one of the transform-
ers, it exploded causing a rupture in the gas line located on the
220. See supra note 213.
221. See infra notes 251-62 and accompanying text.
222. 665 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
223. Id. at 935.
224. See id. Two law firms sought damages resulting from the closure of their offices
during an electric power outage. Id. at 937. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not state its
reasons for determining electricity was a "product," but rather focused its analysis on
whether electricity was placed into the stream of commerce at the time the injury occurred.
Id. The court cited the court's analysis in Petroski that provided a test for determining when
electricity is placed into the stream of commerce. Id. (citing Petroski v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)). The Court ofAppeals ofIndiana held that the
electricity in this case never reached its destination. Petroski, 354 N.E.2d at 747.
225. Bamberger, 665 N.E.2d at 937.
226. See Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 n.4 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,717 (1979)).
227. Id. at 285.
228. Id.
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plaintiff's property.229 The plaintiff went to shut off the propane
gas and received a serious shock from the propane gas tank's shut-
off valve.23° The shock tightened her hand around the valve, which
prevented her from letting it go.' About ten to twenty seconds
later, the plaintiff fell onto the propane tank, the electricity blew
her hand off the valve, and she tumbled away from the tank and
down a six-foot embankment.3 2
The plaintiff was injured by the fall and brought suit alleging
negligence and strict liability for defective products.23  The court
relied on Petroski and Ransome in support of its finding that
electricity was a "product." The court defined "product" as any
object or possession of intrinsic value, capable of delivery, and
produced for introduction into trade or commerce.2 34 The court
stated that the electricity did have intrinsic value and it was in the
process of being released into the stream of commerce when the
defendant allowed it to escape into the plaintiff's residence in an
unsafe form.
2 35
The Pierce court also addressed the issue of whether electricity
must be a "good" for contract law purposes if it is a "product" for
tort law purposes.23 s Without any extensive analysis, the court
stated that in light of its finding that electricity is a "product" for
purposes of strict liability, it assumed that electricity is a "good" for
purposes of the U.C.C.2 37 This is a critical logical nexus that few
opinions to date have broached. The court stated that the plaintiff
could have brought a successful implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose claim in conjunction with its strict liability
claim.
8
The California court reasoned that "[e]lectricity is a commodity
which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported and
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 290-91.
235. Id. at 291-92.
236. Id. at 293-94.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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sold," and as such can only be classified as a product.23 s Interest-
ingly, having used physical characteristics to justify its decision,
the court refused to dwell on electricity's physical properties and
identify which specific properties of electricity constitute a
product.2 40 This court's failure to address the technical characteris-
tics of electricity is the norm, rather than the exception, in
electricity litigation.
In a leading Wisconsin case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated that it "need not be concerned with ... [the] accurate [,
technical] descriptions" of electricity.2 4' The distribution of
electricity may be a service, but the actual electricity, in its
ordinary use, is a consumable product, according to the Wisconsin
court.24 2 This product-electricity--caused the injuries leading to
a strict products liability suit, rather than the fact of its distribu-
tion.243 Moreover, because the court believed the ordinary user
contemplated electricity as a product, the court construed it as
one.
244
The court, however, failed to fully comprehend the tenuousness
of one's ability to actually control and confine electricity. Tracking
exactly where any individual electron travels is impossible. As the
defendant utility company in a California case argued, electricity
is a force, like the wind, with the potential to do work.245 Thus, if
"control" is a benchmark physical characteristic of a product, then
it is hard to reasonably characterize electricity as a product,
created and controlled until use and consumption.
2. Public Policy Considerations
Instead of concentrating on technical definitions of electricity,
some courts imposing strict products liability on utilities and
suppliers rely on public policy reasons to support their decisions.
For example, the California Pierce court stated that it did not
239. Id. at 290.
240. Id.
241. See Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis. 1979).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 650.
244. Id. at 643.
245. See Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1985).
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definitively depend on definitional arguments to determine
whether electricity constituted a product or a service.246 Instead,
and more significantly, the court held that public policy reasons
support the imposition of strict products liability,247 including:
(1) to provide a shortcut to liability where negligence may be
present but is difficult to prove,
2 4
(2) to provide an economics incentive for improved product
safety,249
(3) to induce the reallocation of resources toward safer prod-
ucts, and
(4) to spread the risk of loss among all who use the products.25°
Public policy considerations, however, can cut both ways.
Favoring suppliers of electricity and other accused electricity
market defendants, an Ohio court rejected any public policy-
minded justification for the imposition of strict products liability.251
According to that court, public policy considerations lack legitimacy
in a highly regulated environment.252
246. Id. at 288.
247. Id.
248. A negligence standard requires a plaintiff to present a jury with evidence of a
complex electrical system, requiring knowledge beyond that of the average juror.
249. Some courts believe that a utility can best position itself to discover and correct
defects, and strict products liability creates incentives to use and develop better products
before injuries occur. In fact, utilities can spread the cost of injuries to all consumers, rather
than the blameless victims.
250. In light of this rationale, some courts have suggested that utilities, instead of raising
prices, could also protect against strict liability actions by either purchasing insurance or
implementing a form of self-insurance. The consumer then enjoys the right to rely on the
apparent safety of the electrical product, while the seller retains the risk since it creates that
risk by placing the defective product into the market. Also, courts have rejected the utilities'
argument that since a utility lies at the mercy of public regulation, the utilities are somehow
restricted from reducing the electricity's risk. In practice utilities are limited in how far they
can alter electric delivery systems because of limits on how that cost can be passed on to the
public. Yet, in spite of both arguments, courts do not need the strict products liability
doctrine to ensure cost-spreading and increased safety, or to overcome problems of proof.
Negligence actions fulfill the same public policy purposes, but without making the leap to the
strict products liability doctrine. Negligence actions impose on utilities, generators, and
distributors the responsibility to monitor and inspect the service of electricity without the
unreasonable liability imposed by strict products liability law. Many courts, however, err on
the side of caution, subjecting electric participants to enormous liability.
251. See Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1988).
252. See id.
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In other industries, manufacturers may allocate the risk of strict
products liability by raising consumer prices to reflect this legal
risk. In a regulated environment, however, the transmission and
distribution system owner cannot raise its prices at will and pass
on the risk to consumers." Utilities must petition their respec-
tive utility commission for a rate increase before any such risk-
allocation can occur.25 Furthermore, in the Ohio example, the
damage resulted from stray voltage, 5 which several courts
have explicitly deemed a natural and unavoidable by-product of
electricity transmission."' Although utilities may be incapable of
making an inherently safer product to prevent these types of
harms, 257 in such cases, liability could be avoided for public policy
reasons.
The Ohio court's public policy reasoning may begin to lose some
of its legitimacy in light of deregulation and the onset of open retail
competition. Once states complete deregulation, utilities, genera-
tors, and marketers will face the same incentives and disincentives
as other industries. Nevertheless, the transmission and distribu-
tion function, for the intermediate term at least, will remain a
regulated monopoly.
Similar to the Ohio court's reasoning, a New York court found
public policy reasons insufficient to impose strict products
liability.258 In that case, a healthy tree fell on several power lines,
causing abnormally high voltage to pass into the plaintiff's
house. 9 Surprisingly, the court determined that imposing strict
liability would have little, if any, impact on the defendant's future
conduct. 2"° The utility could not control the likelihood of trees
falling on lines, absent eliminating all trees located near lines.26'
Ruling in favor of the utility, the court dismissed the case.262
253. See id.
254. Cf id. (noting that "the public utility does not operate in a free market").
255. See id. at 838.
256. See, e.g., G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
257. See Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 842.
258. See Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 628,631 (App. Div. 1992).
259. Id. at 629.
260. See id. at 632.
261. See id.
262. Id.
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3. The Meter: When Is Electricity Transformed from a Service to
a Good?
Strict products liability actions or lawsuits, favored by injured
plaintiffs, require defendant electric industry participants to place
the electricity product into the stream of commerce-or more
simply, to sell it. To determine whether electricity has been sold,
some courts consider whether the electricity has passed through a
consumer's meter, reasoning that by then it has been sold and the
utility can levy charges.263 The states making such a distinction
include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin.
Kentucky courts have found this a crucial distinction, refusing to
impose strict products liability to injuries occurring upstream of
the retail meter, outside the home or business. Other states, such
as Colorado, Michigan, New York, and Indiana have flatly rejected
the application of strict liability, because the electricity had not
yet flowed through the retail meter. In a 1976 case in Indiana, a
fourteen-year-old boy suffered serious injuries when he touched
an electric distribution line.2 4 The line was located in the upper
branches of a tree where he often played.265 The boy brought an
action for negligence and strict liability, arguing that the public
utility was a manufacturer of a defective product, it placed that
product into the stream of commerce, and that he was in the zone
of foreseeable harm from such a defect (as required by § 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts).266 The court concluded that
strict liability cannot be imposed on the utility because the product
263. See C.G. Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347,350 (W.D.
Ky. 1994).
264. Petroski v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 747. The trial court found that there was no negligence on the part of the public
utility. Id. at 739. On appeal, the Petroski court relied on Helvey, holding that electricity is
a "product" under section 401A. Id. at 747; see Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d
608, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). In addition, the Petroski court stated that "a literal 'sale' of
goods is not necessary for the application of 402A." Petroski, 354 N.E.2d at 747. The test is
only "whether the product has been placed in the stream of commerce.... [Ulntil the
electricity reaches its destination in a home or factory, it is transmitted by equipment over
lines under the exclusive control of [the utility]." Id. The utility transmission lines "are not
part of the end product," therefore, the utility "had not yet placed the product in the stream
of commerce" while the electricity is in the lines. Id.
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was not placed into the stream of commerce." 7 This analysis
ignores that much of the electricity in commerce is traded at the
wholesale level before reaching the consumer.
On the other hand California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin have applied strict liability at a point near to where
electricity had flowed through the meter.268 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that the doctrine of strict liability in tort applied to
electricity when the electricity left the possession of the defendant
in a defective condition as to be unreasonably dangerous.269
At the point electricity passes through a meter, it has been
reduced to a voltage suitable for ordinary use, in contrast to the
higher voltages found at a generation station or in transmission
lines. Following this rationale in Georgia, a product's title need not
have passed, nor the purchase price paid, for a product to enter the
stream of commerce.27 °
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that electricity was a
"product" within the meaning of their strict liability statute.2 7' The
decedent was towing a shrimp boat when a metal stanchion on the
boat came into contact with an overhead power line. 272 When the
267. Petroski, 354 N.E.2d at 747.
268. See, e.g., Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Wis. 1979). In
Ransome, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant on a product liability theory
claiming that at the time the electricity left the defendant's control, it was unreasonably
dangerous. Id. at 648-49. The defendant claimed that the lightning was an act of God and a
superseding intervening cause of the fire. Id. at 649. The trial court stated that the sale of
electricity occurs at the meter and may be considered a service, but the electricity itself is
a consumable product. Id. at 643. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed with the trial
court's holding that electricity is a product for strict liability purposes, stating that for the
plaintiff to prevail he must prove the electricity, when it left the defendant's possession, was
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 647. Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "defective condition" as any "condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Id.
at 649. Thus, the Wisconsin test of whether a product contains an unreasonable defect
depends upon the reasonable expectations ofthe ordinary consumer about the characteristics
of the product. See id. This is an objective test, not dependent upon the subjective knowledge
of the particular injured consumer.
269. Id. at 648-49.
270. See Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 471 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ga. 1996). The
supreme court also recognized that certain factual circumstances will require flexibility in
determining whether the electricity actually passed through the meter and entered the
stream of commerce. See id. at 856-58.
271. See id. at 855.
272. See id.
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decedent stepped onto the dock, the electricity grounded through
his body, the fuses did not blow, and he was killed.273 The supreme
court stated that electricity has been deemed a product for
strict liability purposes not merely because it can be produced,
confined, controlled, transmitted, and distributed, but also because
it is artificially manufactured, can be measured, bought and sold,
changed in quantity or quality, delivered wherever desired, and is
subject to larceny. 4 The court affirmed the appellate court
decision, which held that electricity is a product, but because the
electricity had not passed through the meter, there was no sale as
required by the statute.7 Georgia courts consider the relinquish-
ment of control over the electricity and its marketability as key
factors to be considered as to when it becomes a product.7
California courts also looked at whether the electricity had been
metered.277 They have found that while still in the distribution
system, electricity is a service, not a product. 8 Electricity becomes
a product, for the purposes of strict liability, once it passes through
the customer's meter and into the stream of commerce.
7 9
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. See Zepp v. Mayor of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). In Zepp, plaintiff
rural residents appealed an order of the Clarke Superior Court (Georgia) which awarded
summary judgment in favor of defendants, mayor, and city council in an action disputing the
rates charged for water that plaintiffs purchased from the city. See id. at 674-75.
We can see no appreciable difference between the sale of water and the sale of
electricity when it comes to determining whether the sale of either commodity
is a sale of goods. Water, like electricity, is a thing; it exists; it is "fairly
identifiable" as a movable at the time of identification to the contract of sale. (In
fact, we think water is even more identifiable as a movable than electricity.) In
this regard we adopt the reasoning of the Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, ...
court: "Logic would indicate that whatever can be measured in order to
establish the price to be paid would be indictive of fulfilling both the existing
and movable requirements of goods."
Id. at 677-78. Sales of electricity are not sales of services because electricity (1) does not
essentially relate to activities conducted by individuals for the benefit of others and (2) is
purchased for its "physical characteristics."
277. See Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Ct. App. 1991).
278. See id.
279. See id. at 307. The Court of Appeals of California held that the sale and delivery of
electricity was the sale and delivery of a "product" for strict liability purposes once it is
delivered. Id. at 308. The plaintiff owned and operated a furniture shop to which electric
service was provided by the defendant utility. Id. at 302. Lightning struck a transformer
causing the transformer to explode, causing one of the meters in the plaintiffs shop to
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
These diverse and inapposite reasonings illustrate the inability
of courts to agree upon a cogent and well-reasoned physical or
reality-based explanation for their legal interpretations of rights
associated with a standardized commodity or service. While the
metering distinction may provide an easy handle for courts, it is a
conclusion unsupported and at odds with the physical nature and
flow of electricity. Plainly, the electricity consumed by the con-
sumer is not necessarily the same electricity that a particular
producer energizes or produces, places in commerce, controls, and
sells. As one court recently noted:
More fundamentally, none of the utilities can show that,
through the use of this equipment, the utility makes something
new and different, whether it generates the electricity or buys
the electricity from others. Though volts and amperes may
change during the transmission and distribution, not every
change is "manufacturing." ... The total amount of electric
energy does not change very much from the point of generation
to the points of use. Electric energy is sold by its producers and
distributors in quantities of power over a time period, com-
monly expressed as "kilowatt-hours" or "megawatt-hours." A
kilowatt of power can be 100 volts at 10 amperes, or it can be
1,000 volts at one ampere. The product is the same; only its
measurements change. By either measure it is the same
product, and nearly the same total amount of product. The
essential character of electricity-the aggregation of subatomic
particles that utilities can generate, transmit, distribute,
measure and sell-is not changed by the equipment at issue
here. Nothing is added and nothing is subtracted in the
transmission and distribution process." °
explode resulting in a fire that destroyed the premises and its contents. Id. The plaintiff sued
the defendant on negligence and strict liability theories. Id. The Mancuso court cited Pierce
and Ransome in support of its holding that electricity is a product within the meaning of
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A strict liability. Id. at 305-10. The court based its
holding on language from Pierce that found that electricity is a commodity and language from
Ransome, which found that electricity itself, in contemplation of the ordinary user, is a
consumable product. Id. at 307.
280. Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 75 S.W.3d 725,729 (Mo. 2001) (citations and
footnote omitted). Petitioner utilities sought a sales tax exemption for certain equipment
used in the transmission and distribution of electricity. See id. at 729. The utilities petitioned
for review of the decision of the Missouri Administrative Commission in favor of respondent
Missouri Director of Revenue. See id. at 725.
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A change in voltage of the electricity occurs at the point of
transformation, not at metering. Thus, metered electricity merely
serves as a measure and method of charging the consumer for
consumption. In actuality, electricity does not become a product by
passing through a meter; rather it is merely measured and remains
unchanged. Making a distinction that identical electricity somehow
is transformed from a service to a good or product at the meter is
wholly misplaced. The physical reality is at odds with the jurispru-
dence.
IV. FEDERAL TANGO: FERC STEPS AROUND THE LEGAL NATURE OF
ELECTRICITY
Both FERC and several states have stumbled around a determi-
nation of whether electricity is a good or a service. These first
steps have not always been convincing. However advanced, they do
constitute precedent on this key issue.
A. General Principles and Conflict of Laws
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale electricity
transactions in interstate commerce."1 By impliedly adopting
the U.C.C. or applying U.C.C. principles without modification to
seven adjudicated power transactions to date, the Commission
may inadvertently be establishing that electricity is a good, thereby
creating precedent for power contracts that will carry forward
in a deregulated environment.282 FERC adopted the U.C.C. rule
uncritically without any analysis, and in some cases appears to
have done so contrary to common sense.
Common threads evolve in Commission cases dealing with
wholesale transactions across different energy media. Notably, the
Commission has jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act283 as well
as under the Federal Power Act,284 as each has been amended.
In electric power contract disputes subject to FERC's jurisdic-
tion, the Commission first analyzes whether to exercise primary
281. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(bXl) (2000).
282. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
283. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b)(1).
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2000).
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jurisdiction.8 5 In their discretion, the Commission generally
considers:
(1) whether the Commission possesses some special expertise
which makes the case peculiarly appropriate for Commission
decision; (2) whether there is a need for uniformity of interpre-
tation of the type of question raised by the dispute; and, (3)
whether the case is important in relation to the regulatory
responsibilities of the Commission."6
If the Commission has expertise over the issue, such as disputes
over rates or costs, it will exert primary or concurrent jurisdic-
tion.28 7
The Commission next makes a conflict of law determination
comparing state law and general principles, usually based on
Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, a Fifth Circuit case that ultimately applied
the U.C.C. to a natural gas dispute.28 This becomes an exercise
where the Commission looks to state law to see whether it has
adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C. FERC posits that as "all states
except Louisiana have adopted the U.C.C., variations between
state law and general principles are likely to be few." " In the
absence of a conflict between federal general principles and state
law, the Commission generally will claim to apply state law.
290
When the Commission invariably applies, utilizes, or refers to the
U.C.C. in a decision, it is purporting to apply state law. FERC is
not bound (nor is it necessarily logical) to apply state law in its
decisions. Rather, FERC typically applies federal law and creates
a federal common law by its decisions. FERC adopts state U.C.C.
principles by implication, without ever stating a rationale in any
reported FERC decision for adopting state law to ground a federal
decision. FERC thereby creates federal common law by uncritically
and impliedly adopting state U.C.C. terms without modification.
Since nearly uniform (U.C.C.) state law thereby becomes federal
285. See Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,026, at 61,101 (1990).
286. Id. (citing Ark. La. Gas Co., 7 F.E.R.C. 1 61,175, at 61,322).
287. See id.
288. 789 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1986). InPennzoil, the Commission applied U.C.C. principles
to gas rate contracts filed with the Commission. See id.
289. Id.
290. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. 1 61,043, at 61,091 (1982).
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law, federal general principles will not diverge from state law when
FERC makes such a comparison.
FERC, however, never analyzes the fundamental issue in any
decision: whether electricity is a good or a service under either
state law or the so-called federal general principles. Since natural
gas is a good and FERC regulates gas, FERC reflexively regulates
electricity as a good without comparing either state law on this
matter-where electricity often is not deemed a good-or the true
nature of electricity itself.
B. The Magnificent Seven: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
The seven FERC decisions that have applied the U.C.C. to
electricity cases do so in a robotlike manner, with no analysis or
eventual justification. For example, in Commonwealth Electric
Co. v. Boston Edison Co.,291 Boston Edison Company requested a
rehearing of the Commission's order that required Boston Edison
to refund Commonwealth Electric Company plant addition
interest (PAI) expenses charged under their formula rate.292
FERC took official notice of the First Circuit's decision29 cited
in Boston Edison's second rate supplement.294 The First Circuit
initially explored whether it should give deference to the
291. 46 F.E.R.C. T 61,253 (1989).
292. In Commonwealth Electric Co. v. Boston Edison Co., the Commission granted the
Commonwealth's request for summary judgment and found the following:
(1) that the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Unit Sales Agreement (agreement)
between Boston Edison and Commonwealth did not provide for collection of
these charges; (2) that Boston Edison and Commonwealth through their course
of performance since 1980 have not modified the agreement to provide for
recovery of plant addition interest expenses; and (3) that the contractual statute
of limitations barring relief in billing disputes not challenged within one year
was invalid.
Id. at 61,756-57.
293. Id. at 61,759 (accepting Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1988),
under 18 C.F.R. § 385.508(d) (1988)). The First Circuit case involved a similar complaint by
a different customer against Boston Edison who sought review of FERC's order requiring
Boston Edison to refund PA costs to thirteen municipal agencies. Boston Edison Co., 856
F.2d at 362. Boston Edison argued to the First Circuit that FERC had misinterpreted the
supply contracts and disregarded the contractual claims limitation period. Id. at 372.
294. See Boston Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. at 61,757. FERC rejected Boston Edison's two
late-filed supplements dated August 18, 1988 and October 12, 1988 because they were
unauthorized to waive the thirty-day statutory time limit to file requests due to a
"jurisdictional limitation" of section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act. Id.
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Commission's decision,295 analyzed the Commission's choice of law,
which ignored a choice of law provision in the contract,296 and
agreed with FERC in granting summary relief because the parties
did not originally intend to pay Boston Edison for PAI expenses.
297
However, the First Circuit held that FERC erred in disregarding
the agreement's claims limitation clause.298 When FERC initially
accepted the contract for rate filing,299 it placed the claims limita-
295. Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 363. The First Circuit analyzed its standard of review.
"Generally speaking, we have accorded deference to agency expertise in contract
interpretation cases where the agency's interpretation 'has a reasonable basis in the contract
terms, the [relevant] Act's policies and the Board's expertise' ...." Id. (citing NLRB v. C.K
Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 1977)).
When we scrutinize these agreements in light of the relevant principles of
contract law, without ceding special deference to the agency's interpretation,
our reading of them vis-a-vis the PA] point comports exactly with FERC's. For
that reason, we need not decide today how much, if any, deference should be
accorded to an agency's resolution of a "pure" question of contract law under
less certain circumstances.
Id. at 364. In response to the commission's statement that agencies almost always "exercise
some measure of expertise when interpreting contracts germane to their administrative
fields," Boston Edison asserted Texas Gas Transmission Corp. V. Shell Oil Co., where agency
decisions based on pure questions of law may be reviewed de novo. See id. at 363; Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960).
296. Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 364, 371. Boston Edison argued that the Commission
erred by not citing Massachusetts case law, where paragraph D-5.2 of the contract stated
that by mutual consent, Massachusetts law would govern state law questions of
interpretation and performance. Id. at 365. The First Circuit found Boston Edison's
argument unavailing because the Commission applied an equivalent standard to
Massachusetts law. Id. at 367. Additionally, Lucie v. Kleen-Leen, Inc. stands for the
proposition that, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible when
introduced to "add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract." 499 F.2d 220,
2210 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
297. Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 367. As the First Circuit stated:
Reviewing a Contract carefully crafted between sophisticated business entities,
the Commission had no choice but to give effect to its plain meaning.... It
follows inexorably, therefore, that FERC's rulings (1) finding that the plain and
unambiguous language of the Contract foreclosed recovery of PAI, and (2)
excluding extrinsic evidence on the point were, as a matter of law,
unimpugnable.
Id. at 367-68.
298. Id. at 364, 371-374. FERC's original order refused to give effect to the agreement's
claims limitation clause. See Questor Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 62,320 n.ll (1988). The
First Circuit stated that "the clause in no way involved a usurpation of the commission's
jurisdiction or an abridgment of its independent statutory responsibility."Boston Electric Co.,
856 F.3d at 374.
299. The Federal Power Act requires a "regulated energy seller" to file all of its rates and
charges, and all contracts that affect or relate to the rates, charges, or services, with FERC.
1892
20041 THERMODYNAMICS, MASS, AND ENERGY 1893
tion clause under the protection of the filed rate3"° and the Mobile-
Sierra doctrines .301 The First Circuit remanded for a correction of
orders to exclude refunds barred by the limitations period.30 2
Course of performance also became a key element of the case.
FERC applied the U.C.C. course of performance rule without ever
analyzing, or expressly finding that (1) electricity was a good, (2)
the U.C.C. applied, or (3) which state's version of the U.C.C.
governed the case.
Course of performance evidence has more probative value under
the U.C.C. than under the common law pertaining to services. 3
Contrary to Boston Edison's argument,0 4 the Commission pre-
cluded extrinsic evidence, and held that evidence of course of
performance should be viewed in light of the plain meaning of the
agreement.0 5 Here FERC applied the U.C.C. citing to the model
statute, which unless adopted by a particular state, has no legal
effect, and did not even cite the Massachusetts version of the
See 16 U.S.C. § 824d) (2000). The parties in Boston Edison Co. set their rates by filing rate
schedules with the Commission. See Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 371-72. The filed rates
must be "just and reasonable," and unless challenged, they become legal rates. 16 U.S.C. §
824d(a). This is known as the "filed rate" doctrine. FERC may determine an initial rate or
charge if the rates are unjust, unreasonable, preferential, or discriminatory, but cannot
amend rates retrospectively. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
300. See supra note 299.
301. Boston Edison argued that by disregarding the parties' claims limitations clause the
Commission had altered the contract because the clause was protected by the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine. See Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 371. Derived from the paired decisions in United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) and Federal Power
Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
determined that a contract between parties governs the legality of a rate filing. Boston
Edison argued that the claims limitation clause is part of the filed rate, the bargain struck
by the parties, and therefore protected by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. See Boston Edison Co.,
856 F.2d at 371.
302. See Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 372.
303. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
304. In the order at hand, Boston Edison argued that the U.C.C. allowed the Commission
to consider evidence of the parties' course of performance to modify written agreements.
Commonwealth Elec. Co., 46 F.E.R.C. 161,253, at 61,759. The fact that Commonwealth paid
for the PAI expenses evidenced an intent to allow Boston Edison to recover those charges.
See id.
305. Id. n.15. In a footnote the Commission stated that "elven assuming arguendo that
the parties' course of performance differs from the plain meaning of the written agreement,
in our analysis we would still consider the written agreement. Boston Edison did not present
convincing evidence that the parties agreed to amend or repudiate the specific language of
the original written agreement. Id. at 61,759.
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U.C.C. 30 6 FERC granted Commonwealth summary judgment and
refunded unauthorized charges for plant expenses. °7
A second time, FERC mechanically applied U.C.C. course of
performance rules regarding electricity sales. Village of Jackson
Center involved an Ohio contract dispute3°" between Dayton Power
& Light Company (DPL)30 and municipal utilities (the Municipals)
over rate schedules and costs of purchased power.31" The judge
sought to determine whether the mutual intent of the parties was
to include purchased power costs in addition to generation costs
for regulation service.3 1" Despite the Municipals' assertion,3 2 the
judge applied the U.C.C. to find that the express language of the
306. See id. at 61,759 n.15.
307. See id.
308. 91 F.E.R.C. 63,013, at 65,123, 65,124 (2000). In 1994 the parties entered into a
Power Service Agreement (PSA) with five different rate schedules: firm power, short-term
power, firm transmission service, short-term transmission service, and regulation service.
Id. A conflict developed over the fifth rate schedule when Dayton Power & Light Co. allegedly
overcharged for regulation service during the summers of 1998 and 1999. Id. at 65,124. Some
of the municipal utilities party to the contract either paid what they thought was a fair fee
for regulation service or did not pay at all. Id.
309. Id. at 65,123. DPL is a public utility in Ohio that serves residential, commercial,
industrial, and government customers. DPL serves eleven municipal corporations in Ohio
including the villages ofJackson Center, Versailles, Arcanum, Eldorado, Lakeview, Mendon,
Minster, New Bremen, Waynesfield, and Yellow Springs, Ohio, and Tipp City, Ohio. Id.
310. Id. at 65,124. The Municipals filed the original complaint against DPL on December
8, 1999, alleging that DPL had breached the PSA's pricing provisions. DPL filed a breach of
contract suit on December 10, 1999 in Ohio state court for failure to pay for services. See
Village of Jackson Ctr., 90 F.E.R.C. 61,287, at 61,756 (2000). In the Commission's Order
Establishing Hearing Procedures and Regulatory Fairness Act Notice, the Commission found
the corresponding PSA sections sufficiently ambiguous to deny the parties' request for
summary disposition, and set an evidentiary hearing to determine the contract
interpretation before an administrative law judge. See id. at 61,758.
311. See Village of Jackson Ctr., 91 F.E.R.C. at 65,131. Neither party challenged the
administrative law judge's jurisdiction in presiding over the contract dispute over the
interpretation of rate schedules for wholesale transmissions. Id. at 65,124. The parties
framed the issue as follows: "Does Rate Schedule E of the PSA between DPL and the
Municipals permit DPL to include the cost of purchased power in calculating its charges for
Regulation Service during off-peak periods and during on-peak periods within the 10% or 1
MW threshold?" Id.
312. Id. at 65,126. The Municipals argued that the term "out of pocket" expenses in the
PSA's Rate Schedule E, sections 2.3 and 2.2, for Regulation Service only included generation
costs, not purchased power expenses. See id.
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contract,313 industry practice,314 and extrinsic evidence of the
parties' course of conduct during negotiations3 15 supported DPL's
position. 316 The parties contractually agreed on a pricing struc-
ture that would let DPL recover the difference in costs between
generated and purchased energy.317
On the factual issue, once FERC applied the U.C.C. rule, the
Municipals argued that their agents' conduct31i did not establish a
course of conduct, rather that "a course of performance between
two individuals who were not involved in the negotiations ... is not
a course of performance at all."319 In response, the FERC adminis-
trative law judge cited the U.C.C. to hold that "'course of conduct'
refers to the behavior of the parties to the agreement, not to the
individual negotiators."3 0 Notably, the judge again cited the
unenacted model form of the U.C.C. as general contract law, rather
313. Id. at 65,129. Schedule B stipulated that out of pocket costs include purchase power
costs. See id. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Schedule E reference section 2.311 of Rate Schedule B
which includes out of pocket expenses. See id.
314. Id. at 65,128 n.7. The Commission's Operation and Maintenance Expense Chart of
Accounts, Uniform System of Accounts, 18 C.F.R. § 500 et seq. (2003), provides that power
production expenses include both generated and purchased power. Village of Jackson Ctr.,
91 F.E.R.C. at 65,127.
315. Village of Jackson Ctr., 91 F.E.R.C. at 65,131. The Rate Schedules were negotiated
by energy specialists. See id. During the original negotiations, the parties agreed to a
Regulation Service rate whereby DPL would recover out-of-pocket costs plus ten percent. See
id. FERC held this amounted to a course of performance under the U.C.C. See id.
316. Id. at 65,128. DPL argued that Rate Schedule E referred to rate schedule B for short-
term energy charges. See id. at 65,131. Purchased power costs were included even though
they were not listed specifically in Schedule B's list of costs. See id. The Municipals
acquiesced to purchased power costs by paying on the contract for one year. See id. This
amounted to a course of performance under the U.C.C. See id.
317. Id. at 65,133. Since the Municipals were not in favor of being charged market-based
rates for purchased power costs, they set a limit of $100 per MW. See id. at 65,133 n.18.
Likewise, if the price purchased power exceeded the limit, DPL would have shouldered the
costs. See id.
318. Id. at 65,132. In September of 1998 the Municipals requested their agent, Mr.
Migliore, to investigate high charges from DPL in June and July. See id. Mr. Migliore and
Mr. Crusey, the DPL representative, discussed and specifically referenced purchased power
prices and the fact that regulation energy charges included purchase power costs. See id. As
such, the Municipals had constructive notice of any information conveyed to Mr. Migliore.
See id.
319. Id. (quoting Municipals' Brief at 38).
320. Id. at 65,132 (citing U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (1989)). The parties to the PSAs were DPL
and the various Municipals who were responsible for performing the contract, not two
individuals in the organizations. See id. The two agents, however, were responsible for
administering the contract and establishing a course of conduct. See id. at 65,132.
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than specific state U.C.C. provisions, to support the validity of the
contract provisions.3 2'
The third FERC case to apply the U.C.C. backhandedly to an
electricity dispute applied the U.C.C. to open price terms, where
the U.C.C. rule differs significantly from the common law applied
to service contracts. In Central Illinois Public Service Company
(CIPSCO), the Commission applied section 2-305 of the U.C.C. to
determine whether a contract between CIPSCO, and its wholesale
customers was an open price term contract. 22 CIPSCO applied
for an increase in wholesale rates with the Commission based on
estimated costs.3 23 The cities of Flora and Greenup in Illinois (the
Cities) filed a motion with the Commission to reject CIPSCO's
rate increase and to request a refund for the amount of increased
revenue they had paid under the modified rates. 24 Under the
parties' agreement, the rates were established for the first ten
years of their twenty-year contract, and the parties would mutually
agree on the rates and charges for the second ten years. 25 CIPSCO
argued that by paying for the rate increases, the Cities acquiesced
to their successive rate filings with the Commission and subse-
quently modified the contract. 26
321. Id. at 65,132-33.
322. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. 161,043, at 61,089 (1982).
323. Id. at 61,082. CIPSCO had three classifications for its wholesale customers: W-1 for
Cooperatives, W-2 for Municipals, and W-3 for Partial Requirements Municipals. Id. Rates
for each of the classifications were increased; however, the rate for W-1 was increased to a
lesser extent. Id. at 61,089. The proposed rate for W-1 Cooperatives was agreed to by its
customers. See id. FERC suspended W-2 and W-3 rates until after hearings to address the
issue of whether the rates were just and reasonable, and whether CIPSCO had discriminated
against these two groups. See id. The cities alleged that CIPSCO had held secret negotiations
that resulted in a "sweetheart" deal with the cooperatives, and that the discriminatory rates
would affect the Cities' ability to compete with the cooperatives. Id. at 61,084. In the initial
decision, the presiding Administrative Law Judge ordered CIPSCO to refund retroactively
the difference between W-1 rates and the discriminatory W-2 and W-3 rates. Cent. Ill. Pub.
Serv. Co., 14 F.E.R.C. 1 63,047, at 65,155 (1981).
324. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,083. The cities filed the Motion to
Reject on January 22, 1982. Id. at 61,083. The cities of Casey and Newton, Illinois filed a
similar complaint against CIPSCO on April 27, 1982 in Docket No. EL82-15-000. Id. The
Commission consolidated the complaints and considered the new complaint as a motion.
325. Id.
326. Id. CIPSCO did not dispute that it had not complied with the terms of the contract.
See id. CIPSCO's answer to the Casey-Newton complaint on May 21, 1982 raised a new
defense that the contracts were indefinite and therefore unenforceable, or constituted "open
price term" contracts which required a reasonable price. See id. at 61,091.
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The Commission did not address the issue of whether it should
decide the contract dispute or defer to a state court, but rather
relied on the fact that the conflict was based on wholesale rates, a
matter wholly under its jurisdiction under the Federal Power
Act. 27 The Commission concluded that the contracts were open
price term contracts as defined by the U.C.C. and were therefore
valid and enforceable. 2 To support its decision to apply the Code
instead of "traditional" state law to the contract dispute, the
Commission cited Pennzoil, where the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
Commission's application of "general principles of contract law" as
within its jurisdiction.3 29 The judge stated:
Consistent with Pennzoil, we believe the U.C.C. represents the
prevailing "general principles of contract law," and that it is
proper to apply the principles set forth in the U.C.C. in ruling
on the contracts here in dispute. Since Illinois has adopted the
U.C.C., including section 2-305 in unmodified form, there is no
divergence between state law and general principles.3 0
The Commission will follow state law when state law and
"general principles" differ. 31 In every state except Louisiana,
however, the state's U.C.C. generally is consistent with the model
U.C.C.3 2 The Commission concluded that the sale of electrical
energy is directly analogous to the sale of natural gas, and
therefore is within the purview of section 2-105(5) of the U.C.C.:
327. Id. at 61,091-92 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981)). The
court held that in the absence of significant conflict between federal interests and the use of
state law in the interpretation of contracts, "the appropriate contract law to apply is the law
that would govern the parties['] dealings were there no regulation at all of the contract's
subject matter." Id. at 61,091 (quoting Pennzoil Co., 645 F.2d at 387).
328. Id. at 61,091; see U.C.C. § 2-305 (1989). The U.C.C., which allows parties to conclude
a contract without settling the price if they so intend, modified "traditional" common law that
considered price "agreements to agree" typically unenforceable and indefinite. If the parties
fail to agree on the price, the U.C.C. sets the "reasonable price" at the time of delivery.
U.C.C. § 2-305.
329. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,092 (citing Pennzoil Co., 645 F.2d at 360).
Notably, the court in Pennzoil had placed the burden on the parties "to inform [the
Commission] if the state law is ... different from ... general principles." Pennzoil Co., 645 F.2d
at 387.
330. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,092.
331. Id. at 61,092.
332. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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"Since the Uniform Commercial Code applies to natural gas sales
as the sale of goods ... and all states except Louisiana have adopted
the U.C.C., variations between state law and general principles are
likely to be few." 333
The reach of the U.C.C. rule was dispositive: Even though the
rates were not specified for the second ten years of the contract, the
Commission held that the contracts were not indefinite because the
parties intended to conclude the contracts and be bound.334 The
prices were intended to be mutually agreed upon by the parties,
subject to the Commission's approval.335 The Commission ordered
CIPSCO to refund all excess rates collected prior to the date of the
order, and ordered the Cities to pay the W-2 rate.3 6
Pennzoil was influential again at FERC regarding the parol
evidence rule, where the U.C.C. rule differs significantly from
the common law rule.337 In Arkansas Power & Light Company
(AP&L),33 the Commission granted reconsideration of its order
that had denied the Missouri Cities' request to reject AP&L's rate
filing with the Commission.339 Over objections from the Missouri
Cities, 340 the Commission interpreted the contract between the
Missouri Cities and AP&L to permit unilateral rate changes.34'
As the issue concerned AP&L's wholesale customers, the parties
did not contest the Commission's jurisdiction over the rate-related
contract dispute.342 In considering this application for a rehearing,
the Commission explored the Pennzoil decision that impliedly
upheld the Commission's jurisdiction in decidingMobile-Sierra-hke
333. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,092.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. Id. at 61,094.
337. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
338. 20 F.E.R.C. 61,013, at 61,033 (1982).
339. See id. The Commission denied the Missouri Cities' motion to reject AP&L's rate
filing. See id. On May 5, 1982, the Commission denied the Missouri Cities' motion dated April
5, 1982 where the Missouri Cities set out four requests for relief and asked the Commission
to grant a stay of the March 3, 1982 order "pending a hearing regarding the parties intent
with respect to the Mobile-Sierra contract question." See id. at 61,034.
340. Id. at 61,034. The Missouri Cities disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of
the contract language to allow AP&L to file revised service rates. See id.
341. Id. The Commission affirmed its view that the plain language of the contract
permitted unilateral rate changes under section 205 of the Federal Power Act. See id.
342. See id.
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contract disputes.343 In addition to reviewing the plain language of
the agreement, the Missouri Cities urged the Commission to
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent in relation to the
contract provisions. 44
To support their proposition, the Missouri Cities cited Pennzoil,
345
wherein the court cited official comments to sections 2-205 and 2-
202 of the U.C.C., and allowed extrinsic evidence to explain or
interpret the terms of the contract even though the contract was,
on its face, unambiguous. 46 Pennzoil not only cites to the U.C.C.,
but to the official comments of the U.C.C. 47 The Commission in
Arkansas Power & Light Co. did not cite to Missouri or Arkansas
state law or make a state-law determination.348 In applying federal
law, the Commission applied precedent that specifically cited to
the unenacted model version of the U.C.C., which nowhere has the
effect of law.349
The Commission allowed the Missouri Cities to present relevant
extrinsic evidence to explain or interpret the contract terms.
However, the Commission did not proceed through the steps
required by U.C.C. section 2-202 to make this determination under
the Code; it merely announced a conclusion. 35 ' The U.C.C. requires
a detailed analysis of factors to determine which type of parol
evidence may be introduced. 52
In Golden Spread Electric Cooperative,353 the Commission
applied the U.C.C. to determine assignment of contract rights. The
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. See id. (discussing Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also,
Lucie v. Kleen-Leen, Inc., 499 F.2d 220, 221 (7th Cir. 1974).
346. Ark. Power & Light Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,034 (citing Pennzoil Co., 645 F.2d at 388).
In Pennzoil, the parol evidence rule did not preclude the introduction of extrinsic evidence
of the commercial and regulatory context of the contract to show the parties' intentions, even
where the contract language was plain and unambiguous. Pennzoil Co., 645 F.2d at 388.
347. See id.
348. See Ark. Power & Light Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,034.
349. See id. The Commission ordered a reconsideration of its order dated March 3, 1982,
pending a decision on the issue of the Missouri Cities' and AP&L's intent regarding the terms
of their contract, to determine whether the contract allowed unilateral rate changes. Id. at
61,034, 61,035.
350. Id. at 61,034.
351. See id.
352. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1989).
353. 40 F.E.R.C. 1 61,348 (1987).
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assignment of property rights does not significantly vary between
the U.C.C. and general common law/services jurisprudence, as with
legal questions involved in the prior cases. Southwestern Public
Service Company (SPS) filed a request for a rehearing of the
Commission's order that upheld the validity of a contract assign-
ment to Golden Spread Electric Cooperative (Golden Spread) from
several of its member cooperatives (the cooperatives). 54 The
cooperatives agreed to purchase from Golden Spread and assigned
to Golden Spread their full requirements agreements with SPS. 55
In the June 18, 1987 order, the Commission rejected SPS's
challenge to its jurisdiction. 56
The Commission has jurisdiction to decide issues necessary to
their regulatory authority, albeit incidental or "not directly within
the scope of our regulatory authority."57 Despite objection from
354. See id. at 62,045. In the previous order, Golden Spread submitted its full
requirements agreements for sales to to the cooperatives. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 39 F.E.R.C. 161,322 (1987). The Commission accepted the agreement for filing whereby
Golden Spread agreed to sell to the cooperatives who, in turn, assigned to Golden Spread
their full requirements agreements for purchases from SPS. See id. at 62,021. SPS would sell
to Golden Spread, which would sell to the cooperatives. See id.
355. See id. SPS originally filed with the Commission its full requirements agreements
with the cooperatives, as required by the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000). See
Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 39 F.E.R.C. at 62,021.
356. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc. 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,045. SPS argued that Golden
Spread was not a utility involved in interstate sale of electricity. See id. As Golden Spread
had no electrical facilities to sell electricity, SPS argued that Golden Spread was not a public
utility under the Commission's jurisdiction pursuant to sections 201(b)(1) and (e) of the
Federal Power Act. See id.; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b)(1), (e) (2000). The Commission held that
Golden Spread's facilities would be its "corporate organization, contracts, accounts, and
records when those facilities are used in the sale of electricity." Golden Spread Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 39 F.E.R.C. at 62,022. In the later order denying SPS's request for a rehearing, the
Commission asserted the following conclusions:
We hold (1) that we have jurisdiction to decide whether the assignments to
Golden Spread were valid, (2) that we properly asserted jurisdiction in this case
despite the concurrent jurisdiction of the Texas courts, (3) that we properly
applied Texas law in upholding the validity of the assignments, and (4) that we
properly decided the assignment issue without a hearing.
Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,046.
357. Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,046. Otherwise, the Commission
would not have been able to exercise its authority under section 205 of the Federal Power
Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000). The Commission cites Pennzoil Co. u. FERC, 645 F.2d 360,
387 (5th Cir. 1981), where the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's concurrent jurisdiction
with state and federal courts over contract disputes that fall under the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717 (2000). The Commission also cited Zachary v. FERC, 621 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.
1980), where the Fifth Circuit held that the Commission can assert jurisdiction under the
1900
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SPS358 and Golden Spread's assertion that the Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction over the assignment,"5 9 the Commission
asserted concurrent jurisdiction over the assignment issue.3 60
Even though the underlying contracts were contracts for service
by a jurisdictional utility (SPS) and within the Commission's
jurisdiction, FERC somehow applied the U.C.C., which pertains
only to goods.3 6' The Commission found no controlling federal
Natural Gas Act over even an incidental contract issue if it is necessary to a ratemaking and
policy decision. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,046.
358. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,045. SPS contended that the
assignments were invalid and that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the assignments.
See id. SPS cited the Commission's three-part "Arkla" test from Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Company v. Hall, 7 F.E.R.C. 61,175, at 61,322 (1979), to show that the Commission should
not assert jurisdiction. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,045:
Whether the Commission should assert jurisdiction over contractual issues
otherwise litigable in state courts, depends, we think, on three factors. Those
factors are: (1) whether the Commission possesses some special expertise which
makes the case peculiarly appropriate for Commission decision; (2) whether
there is a need for uniformity of interpretation of the type of question raised by
the dispute; and, (3) whether the case is important in relation to the regulatory
responsibilities of the Commission.
Id. (quotingArk. La. Gas Co., 7 F.E.R.C. at 61,322). SPS argued that even if the Commission
had jurisdiction, it should decline jurisdiction in deference to state law. See id.
359. See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,046. Alternatively, "Golden
Spread contend[ed] that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the assignment issue
because the full requirements agreements are jurisdictional contracts and because the issue
affects jurisdictional rates." Id. Golden Spread relied on Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986), "in which the Supreme Court held that the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction over questions affecting wholesale electric rates." Golden Spread Elec.
Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,046. Even if the Commission did not have exclusive jurisdiction,
the Commission could assert jurisdiction under the "Arkla" test. See supra note 358.
360. Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. at 62,047.
Resolution of the assignment issue is necessary to the exercise of our regulatory
authority because, if we did not decide the assignment issue, it would be
unclear whether we could assert jurisdiction over Golden Spread. Only if the
assignments were valid could we assert jurisdiction, because without the
assigned agreements Golden Spread would not qualify as a public utility within
the meaning of the Federal Power Act .... Thus, without deciding the
assignment issue, we would have been unable to exercise our responsibilities
under section 205 of the Federal Power Act.
Id. at 62,046-47 (citations omitted). The Commission did not attempt to assert exclusive
jurisdiction as under Nantahala, but rather relied on concurrent jurisdiction under Pennzoil
and Zachary. See id.
361. See id. at 62,047. The Commission has authority to regulate the terms and conditions
of electric rates and to determine that the assignment issue was "important in relation to the
regulatory responsibilities of the Commission." Id. at 62,045 (quoting Ark. La. Gas Co., 7
F.E.R.C. at 61,322). In support of its position, the Commission also held that to suspend its
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interest against applying "established law" to the assignment
issue,362 which it concluded without analysis was Texas' version of
U. C.C. section 2-210,36 consistent with its past practice of address-
ing contract law questions as necessary.364 Despite objection from
SPS, 365 the Commission held that the assignment of the coopera-
tive's full requirements agreements with SPS were valid under
both the U.C.C. analysis and Texas law.366 With respect to the
assignment of contract rights, no significant substantive differ-
ences exist between the U.C.C. and general common law provi-
sions, unlike the two prior FERC cases.
C. The Impossible Dream: FERC Applies the U. C. C. to Services
To underscore the inapposite reflexes of FERC jurisprudence,
quite oddly, FERC even applied the U.C.C. to decide a contract
issue involving transmission service, rather than sale of the
electricity itself. Transmission service is typically understood to be
decision out of deference to a Texas court decision would violate section 205 of the Federal
Power Act, which required the Commission to decide Golden Spread's rate filing within sixty
days. See id. at 62,047 (noting the Commission's responsibilities under 16 U.S.C. § 824d
(1982)).
362. Id. at 62,047 (citing Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d at 360, 387) ("[The appropriate
law for the Commission to apply to a contract issue is, in the absence of significant conflict
between federal interests and the application of state law, the law that would apply if the
subject matter of the contract were unregulated.").
363. See id. "Unless otherwise agreed, all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned
except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, or
increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance." Id. (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
2.210 (Vernon 1968)).
364. See id. at 62,047 (citing Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. 61,043, at 61,091
(1982) (applying section 2-305 of the U.C.C. to a contract dispute)).
365. See id. at 62,045. SPS had argued that under Texas law, contracts involving
extension of credit and long-standing personal relationships, as between SPS and the
cooperatives, were "exceptions to the general rule that contracts are assignable." Id. at
62,045. SPS sought a factual determination of whether the parties intended the agreement
to be assignable and whether Golden Spread would be able to perform as the cooperatives
performed prior to the assignment. See id. at 62,045-46.
366. Id. at 62,048. The Commission held that the assignments were valid under both the
U.C.C. analysis and the analysis applied by the Texas courts. See id. The Commission further
held that full requirements agreements do not prohibit assignments and the assignment
would not materially alter SPS's position. See id. The Commission ordered that SPS would
have the same obligation to provide the same service to Golden Spread as it had for the
cooperatives. Id.
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a rate, terms for use of a line, and the capacity to move power. This
is akin to a rental or use charge, or a fee for a transportation
service.
In Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency (SMMPA) v.
Northern States Power Co. (NSP),367 SMMPA368 filed a complaint
alleging that NSP 6 9 had adopted new contract interpretations and
altered long-standing practices in relation to their three trans-
mission contracts. 370 The Commission, finding jurisdiction over
the wholesale sales issue under the Federal Power Act, was
required to decide four areas of dispute, one of which was the
correct transmission losses under the three agreements." 1 The
Commission agreed that both parties were required to use the level
367. 73 F.E.R.C. 61,350 (1995). An administrative law judge heard the proceedings in
two phases and issued an Initial Decision on Phase II on November 12, 1992. See N. States
Power Co., 61 F.E.R.C. 63,010 (1992). SMMPA also sought a declaration that NSP would
have to comply with the Commission's filing requirements as stated in section 205(d) of the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1994), before changing its schedule of charges.
Docket No. EL 91-43-000 (June 26, 1991). See N. States Power Co., 61 F.E.R.C. at 62,063.
368. "SMMPA is a municipal corporation ... of Minnesota, organized in 1977 for the
purpose of supplying electric power to its members. SMMPA consists of 18 member
municipalities, each of which owns and operates an electric utility system in Minnesota." N.
States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at 62,064.
369. "NSP is a public utility ... that sells power and energy and operates a transmission
system in parts of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota." Id. NSP delivered power to
SMMPA under three contractual agreements. Id. at 62,063.
370. Id. at 62,063, 62,065. FERC described the three contracts as follows:
On November 18,1981, NSP and SMMPA entered into a Shared Transmission
System Agreement (STS Agreement), which provid[ed] for the use of a shared
transmission system (STS).... On April 27, 1982, NSP and SMMPA entered into
a second agreement, namely the SMMPA Outlet Agreement, which require [d]
NSP to transmit a portion ofSMMPA's ... power .... On December 22,1982, NSP
and UMMPA entered into a transmission agreement (UIMMPA Outlet
Agreement), under which NSP (was] required NSP to transmit [a portion of
UMMPA's share of output] to NSP's interconnections ....
Id.
371. Id. The Commission explained that:
The principal issues in dispute concern: (1) whether NSP is contractually
obligated to honor SMMPA's schedules of power deliveries to other control
areas; (2) whether SMMPA is entitled to operate, and NSP is required to deliver
power to, a control area at Rochester; (3) what information, if any, should
SMMPA and NSP be required to provide to each other so that each may be sure
that the provisions of the three transmission agreements are being followed by
the other party; and (4) what are the correct transmission losses under the
three agreements.
Id. Neither party argued that the Commission was not the proper forum but recognized that
under the Federal Power Act the Commission can hear cases involving rate issues. See id.
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of losses mutually agreed upon 3" and that SMMPA 73 was contrac-
tually proscribed from unilaterally revising the level of losses.374
The Commission sought to establish a reasonable loss factor for the
STS Agreement 375 since one of the sections was sufficiently
ambiguous .376
FERC found that because both parties had agreed to use a loss
factor of 3% from November 1982 until May 1, 1986, contrary to
their STS contract provision,377 their actions constituted a "course
of performance" that modified the contract provision.378 The
Commission applied the U.C.C.'s definition of "course of perfor-
mance" to the parties' conduct, quoted the unenacted model version
of the U.C.C., and cited the corresponding Minnesota provision.3 79
372. Id. at 62,075-81. The initial loss factors for the STS Agreement, and the SMMPA and
UMMPA Outlet Agreements were 7%, 3%, and 1.2%, respectively. Id. at 62,081.
373. NSP argued that SMMPA had breached its contractual agreements by unilaterally
adopting its own loss amounts. Id. at 62,076. After May 1, 1986, the contract provided that
the parties intended to mutually agree on loss factors that reflected actual losses. Id. at
62,080. However, on August 1, 1990 SMMPA unilaterally lowered the level of losses from
4.2% to 3% under the STS agreement, and from 3% to 1.2% under the SMMPA Outlet
Agreement. Id. at 62,066.
374. Id. at 62,080. NSP also argued that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine precluded the
Commission from modifying the loss factors established by their contracts, unless public
interest demanded otherwise, and because neither party argued that the factors were unjust
and unreasonable. Id. at 62,076, 62,082. Thus, an attempt to change the loss factors
retroactively would violate the filed rate doctrine because the loss factors are rate provisions
that can only be changed under section 206 of the Federal Power Act. See id. at 62,079.
375. Id. In its hearing order, the Commission established August 25,1991 as a refund date
from which to determine the justness and reasonableness of the loss factors. Id. at 62,084.
"Under section 206 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1994), absent dilatory behavior by NSP,
which is not the case, we may change the loss factors only during the 15-month refund period
and prospectively." Id. at 62,084 n.43.
376. Id. at 62,077. Section 6.04 of the STS agreement created a 7% loss factor unless and
until the Coordinating Committee changed it. See id. However, the contract also stated that
"actual transmission losses" should be used, "which both parties agree have been well below
7% for many years." Id.
377. Section 6.04 of the STS Agreement stipulated initialtransmission losses would be 7%.
See id. at 62,077. The record, however, indicated that both parties agreed to use a 3% factor
from the commencement of STS service in November 1982 until May 1, 1986. See id. The
STS Agreement also required a Coordinating Committee to approve and establish level of
losses for the STS Agreement periodically. Id.
378. Id. at 62,080-81. The Commission rejected NSP's argument that the losses should
remain at 7% from 1982 because both parties mutually agreed on the 3% losses for three and
one-half years. See id.
379. Id. at 62,080; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-208(1) (2002); U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1989). The
Commission determined that both parties' "course of performance" modified the "initial" loss
factor of 7% initially stated in the contract. N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at 62,080. In a
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It thus applied the U.C.C. to a contract for transmission services,
utilizing a provision where the U.C.C. diverges from the common-
law rule for services.3 s°
The Commission also determined that the STS transmission
contract was analogous to an "agreement to agree" where the
parties agreed to conclude a contract even if a price, or loss factor,
was not determined, and applied the U.C.C. to govern such
matters.381 Here again, the application of the U.C.C. rule changed
the outcome: An "agreement to agree" is enforceable under the
U.C.C., but not typically enforceable in a services contract.
Moreover, the application of the U.C.C. allowed the court to insert
"reasonable" prices even where not settled by the parties. To
determine a reasonable rate on which the parties intended to
agree, the Commission once again quoted from the unenacted
model version of the U.C.C. and cited the relevant Minnesota
provision.38 2 The contract was enforceable under the U.C.C., but
perhaps would not have been enforceable under common law. 3
footnote the Commission referred to section 2-208(1) of the U.C.C.:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of
the agreement.... The U.C.C., including this provision, has been adopted by
Minnesota.
Id. at 62,080 n.37 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-208(1)).
380. During the periods that the parties did not agree, the loss factor would remain at the
level that would be determined by their course of performance. Id. at 62,080. After May 1,
1986 and until 1992 the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the proper level of
losses under the STS agreement, and the level of losses was changed on two different
occasions. See id. at 62,066. On May 1, 1986, the parties used losses of 4.5% and on January
1, 1989, the parties used losses of 4.2%. See id. The new loss factors were used without the
STS Coordinating Committee's approval. See id.
381. See id. at 62,080. "In this context, the contract in question can be considered
analogous to an 'agreement to agree' and is cognizable under section 2-305 of U.C.C.. Id. at
62,080 n.39; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-305. FERC quoted Minnesota's U.C.C. section 2-
305, which provides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time of
delivery if ... (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to
agree ....
MINN. STAT. § 336.2-305; see N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at 62,080 n.39 (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 336.2-305).
382. See N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at 62,080 n.39.
383. See id. Although the Commission did not go through the same U.C.C. analysis for the
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FERC also has employed the U.C.C. to invoke "trade usage" in
the interpretation of the performance of the parties. Seminole
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light (FPL) involved
a contract dispute over indirect costs listed in the parties' 1982
Interconnection Agreement." 4 The Commission interpreted the
agreement between the parties wherein Seminole reimbursed
FPL for operation and maintenance expenses for use of facilities
required by the parties' interconnection.385 The Commission
considered whether they should exercise primary jurisdiction..6 or
require the parties to seek judicial resolution of the contractual
dispute.387 The Commission exercised primaryjurisdiction because
this was a dispute over ratemaking terms, the outcome depended
on the construction of the O&M provision, and the indirect costs
were a special expertise of the Commission.8 8 Neither party
challenged the Commission's jurisdiction.
Outlet Agreements, its decisions were similar, and also based on its authority to decide the
rate factors. See id. The Commission fixed a loss factor of 2.3% for the STS, SMMPA, and
UMMPA Outlet Agreements effective as of the date of the order. See id. The Commission
applied the 2.3% loss factor for the STS Agreement during the fifteen-month refund period
from August 25, 1991 through November 24, 1992. See id. at 62,080. The loss factor would
then revert to the 3% contract loss factor until the date of the order, where the loss factor
would revert to the "just and reasonable" level of 2.3%. See id. For the SMMPA and UMMPA
Outlet Agreements the Commission held that the loss factors prior and subsequent to the
August 25, 1991 fifteen-month refund period were the contract loss factors, 3% and 1.2%,
respectively. The loss factor during the refund period and after the date of the order was
2.3%. Id. at 62,084.
384. 53 F.E.R.C. 61,026, at 61,098 (1990).
385. Id. at 61,098. The Agreement provided that FPL could charge Seminole for specified
indirect Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. See id. Seminole alleged that from 1986
until 1989 FPL had overcharged $265,000 for indirect costs that were not included in their
agreement. See id. FPL contends that under the O&M agreement it could recover any
indirect costs from normal procedures. See id.
386. See id. at 61,101. In stating that the decision to exercise primary jurisdiction was
under their discretion, the Commission cited Southern Co. Services, Inc., 37 F.E.R.C.
61,256, at 61,652 (1986). See Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,101.
387. Under the "Arkla" test, the Commission considered the following: "(1) whether the
Commission possesses some special expertise which makes the case peculiarly appropriate
for Commission decision; (2) whether there is need for uniformity of interpretation of the type
of question raised by the dispute; and, (3) whether the case is important in relation to the
regulatory responsibilities of the Commission." Ark. La. Gas Co., 7 F.E.R.C. 61,175, at
61,322 (1979).
388. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,101. "First, neither party has challenged
the exercise of our jurisdiction. Second and more important, the ratemaking terms and the
costs in dispute are matters within the Commission's special expertise, making the case
peculiarly appropriate for a Commission decision." Id.
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FERC did not analyze whether it should apply state or federal
law or whether the transaction involved goods or services. The
Commission purported to look to the plain language of the
agreement and the parties' intent in creating the agreement.389 In
support of Seminole's position, the Commission interpreted the
O&M provision to limit indirect costs to those "specifically attribut-
able to each project" 9O as generally represented by the costs listed
in the O&M clause.391 The Commission agreed with FPL that
Seminole's interpretation was inconsistent with the U.C.C.'s usage
of trade.392 Despite the trade usage, FPL did not attempt to recover
these costs from Seminole until 1986, 39' although the provision
specifically listed costs that FPL could charge. 94
In seven cases, FERC has applied the U.C.C. uncritically to
resolve disputes. It has done so to apply U.C.C. rules on course
of performance, trade usage, open price terms, parol evidence,
389. In interpreting the parties' intent, FERC considered the language of the contract, the
contract's purpose, and the circumstances surrounding the "execution and performance."
Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 1981); Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53
F.E.R.C. at 61,100. The Commission considered extrinsic evidence to explain or interpret the
contract language. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,100.
390. Id. at 61,101. Seminole argued that the O&M provision limited FPL's indirect costs
to those "specifically attributable to each project." Appendix E to the Agreement covered
O&M costs. "For the purposes of this agreement, operation and maintenance costs shall
mean all expenses incurred by [FPL] specifically attributable to each project and properly
recordled ...." Id. n.30. Prior to 1986, Seminole paid indirect costs in the O&M: payroll taxes
and insurance, pension and welfare costs, stores loading, and engineering and overheads. In
1986 there was a change in indirect costs: "engineering and overheads" was dropped and
three more were added: 1) "direct supervision and engineering," 2) "accounting,
administrative, etc.," and 3) "related expenses." Id. at 61,104.
391. Id. at 61,103. At the time of the agreement, these types of indirect costs in the second
sentence were recognized by the Commission's accounting regulations as standard utility
costs. See id.
392. Id. at 61,100; see U.C.C. § 1-205 (1989). FPL asserts that at the time of their
agreement, indirect costs were regarded as standard utility costs thatwere routinely covered
by utilities.
393. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,104. FPL's prior course of conduct was
consistent with the Commission's interpretation and did not contradict the O&M provision.
394. Id. at 61,103. Despite the "routine recovery" of these costs the provision did not refer
to all costs, only to "normal loadings ... specifically attributable to each project" and lists the
specific costs that FPL could charge. Id. In addition, prior drafts of the O&M referred to
administrative and general costs, which were later omitted. Id. Some of the indirect costs
charged by FPL since 1986 were recoverable. The Commission ordered FPL to reimburse
Seminole for certain unauthorized indirect costs charged since 1986. Id. at 61,104. FERC
found post-1985 costs for "direct supervision and engineering" to be recoverable, but not
"accounting, administrative, etc." and "related expenses." Id.
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assignment of contract, and transmission rights. In the first four
of these, the U.C.C. results in a significantly different decision
than under the general common law applicable to services. This
difference could determine the outcome of the case and would
create precedent.
The final matter above involves application of the U.C.C. to
transmission which is generally conceded as a services contract.
FERC applied the U.C.C. with no analysis in any of the opinions as
to what is the nature of electricity or the transmission service
involved, or the intent of the parties in the contract. FERC
personnel report that they have never engaged in such an analysis.
FERC also purports to compare whether this U.C.C. general
principle conflicts with state (U.C.C.) law, without ever engaging
in an analysis as to whether that particular underlying state law
treats electricity as a good or a service, and thus whether the
U.C.C. would even apply."9 5 If a body of U.C.C. law is applied
uncritically as a general principle in seven cases, does it by sheer
inertia become federal common law?
V. THE REALITY OF MODERN ELECTRIC ENERGY
For almost 200 years, scientists regarded electric charge as a sort
of fluid, like water. It was at the end of the eighteenth century
when the possibility that electricity did not consist of a smooth,
continuous fluid, but rather of small particles, started occurring to
many scientists. Even Benjamin Franklin had once written that
the "fluid" consisted of "particles extremely subtle."396 Neverthe-
less, a great deal of evidence had to be accumulated before
revealing the nature of atoms and electromagnetic forces.
The electron was discovered about a century ago, in 1897. Today
it is recognized that electricity does consist of movement of
individual electrons. Any large charge behaves like a continuous
fluid in the same way sand pours like a fluid, and water in a glass
is usually regarded as a fluid, even though water consists of
individual molecules. Although electrons may flow in the transmis-
395. Telephone Interview with staff member, FERC (May 2002).
396. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S EXPERIMENTS: A NEW EDITION OF
FRANKLIN'S EXPERIMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON ELECTRICITY (I. Bernard Cohen ed., 1941).
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sion of electric power, they do not have to: One can transmit large
amounts of power in radar beams or laser beams through empty
space, where there are no electrons to flow.
The amount of energy from an electron that moves from one wire
to another is the product of the electron charge times the potential
difference between the wires. The potential difference is measured
in volts. With a big voltage difference, few electrons need flow. To
minimize the current in the wires, power companies use the largest
voltabers they can, often many hundreds of thousands of volts, for
long-haul transmission.
One needs many more electrons to carry the same amount of
power at the lower voltages used by the consumer at the end of the
line. "Transformers" take power coming in the form of a small
amount of current at high voltage, and transform it into a nearly
equal amount of power at lower and less dangerous voltages but
higher currents. What is sold by electrical utilities is energy.
The electrons are always there in the wires, whether or not power
is being transmitted. They are in normal random thermal motion
in the wires of the transmission line in close orbit around their
nuclei when no power is flowing. Electrons are not consumed; we
use their energy, which normally is about half electric and half
magnetic. The energy is carried by electric and magnetic fields,
whose squared values give the energy density (joules per cubic
meter) in space. The electric and magnetic fields are made by the
moving electrons.
VI. THE REAL DEAL: THE CURRENT LEX
As often with changing technologies, the law struggles to
determine exactly how to characterize something that is physically
ethereal. Electricity has been harnessed and sold for 125 years.397
However, in the highly regulated past, the common law courts have
seldom confronted directly or carefully the question of exactly what
"is" this modern phenomenon of electricity. With courts and private
contracts replacing a significant portion of the traditional role
previously assumed by executive branch regulators of electric
utility monopolies, this legal determination becomes critical.
397. See, STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 4, app. A at 259-74.
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The essential role of electricity in the U.S. economy was painfully
evident in California. With just a very slight supply deficit at key
hours and the inability to tap the reservoir of existing California
on-site distributed generation, Californians saw their rates go up
dramatically, incurred billions of dollars of long-term debt, endured
rolling blackouts, and were forced to work without electricity.
398
A. E=MC2
What is electricity, really? Electricity is a moving electrical
charge. It is the movement of that charge, not the charge itself,
that provides electric energy's ability to do work.399 Generating
electricity does not create any electrons, contrary to popular
assumption. 00 A generator does not create nor put electrons into
the transmission system." 1 The electrons that constitute usable
electricity are ab initio in the copper that composes the transmis-
sion and distribution system. °2 Their content is constant and
remains unchanged before, during, and after electricity is "gener-
ated. 4 °3
The copper atoms in the wire are comprised of electrons circling
the protons and neutrons in the copper atom nucleus.40 4 They are
in close orbit around the nuclei when no electric generation is
present. °5 A conventional electric generation facility, by creating
398. See supra Part I.
399. E-mail from Will Happer, Professor, Princeton University Department of Physics, to
Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School (Apr. 24,2003) (on file with
author).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. The light and heat produced have exactly the same energy as has been transported
into the device from the electromagnetic fields. The motion of the electrons in transmission
lines or appliances is of minor significance compared to the energy transported by the fields.
Id.
404. The electron is negatively charged at a value equal to the positive charge of the
proton. In a conductor, like copper, the electrons are weakly attracted to the atom and are
easily forced away to neighboring atoms. VAN VALKENBURGH, BASIC ELEcTRIcITY 1-7 (John
F. Rider 1992) (1954).
405. Unless the wire is conducting current, there are just as many electrons going forward
as backward in the wire, the electrons have frequent collisions with the other electrons and
with atoms in the wire, and they transport no charge. When current flows through a wire to
transmit power, there are slightly more electrons with velocities in the current direction than
1910 [Vol. 45:1839
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an electromagnetic field, causes the electrons in one copper atom
to jump to the next copper atom, seriatim. This sets up a high
velocity, charged jump of electrons from atom to atom along the
copper strand at approximately the speed of light.
This constant movement causes the total number of electrons to
remain constant. It is the movement of copper electrons from
copper atom to atom within the electrical field that is electricity.
40 6
Electricity is the potential difference in electrical charge between
two atoms.40 7 As this movement of electrons moves through a
408 409 410 moe nt fcomputer, microwave oven, or light, the movement of
opposite it. There will be an average drift velocity that is very much smaller than the Fermi
velocity. Consider a typical American household circuit that can carry 1=15 amps of current
before blowing out a fuse. The diameter of the wire is about 0.1 cm so its cross section is
about A=0.0079 cmA2. The density of electrons in copper is approximately N=8.5xOA{22)
cmA{-3) (one electron per copper atom), and the electron charge is e-1.6x10A(19} C. So one
can fred the drift velocity from the formula I-eNvA, or v=I/(eNA) = 0.14 cm/sec. This is a
miniscule velocity compared to the random Fermi velocity. An electron moving at the drift
velocity would take more than three minutes to move one foot down the wire. At the same
time, the electric and magnetic fields that transmit the electrical power are moving down the
wires at nearly the speed of light. The field velocity is slowed down slightly by a few tenths
of a percent by the "dielectric" effects of the electrical insulation. E-mail from Will Happer,
supra note 399.
406. The kinetic energy of moving electrons is mv^2/2, where m is the electron mass. The
changes in this kinetic energy are negligibly small compared to the changes of energy
associated with the creation or annihilation ofelectromagnetic-field energy. Almost all of the
electrical power is carried by the electric and magnetic fields that race down the wires at
nearly the speed of light. Id.
407. This potential difference is a "volt."
408. Electrical power is used for many purposes in a computer, from running the motors
of fans and hard disk drives, to accelerating the electrons for the cathode ray tube of the
monitor, to switching the transistors in the central processing unit (CPU). As CPUs do more
and more mathematical operations per second, they consume more and more electrical
power. The CPU is mounted on a heat sink that gets rid of waste heat to the circulating air.
The secret for getting high-performance computers is getting the waste heat out fast
enough.E-mail from Will Happer, supra note 399.
409. Most of the electrons in food are so strongly attached to the atoms and molecules that
they cannot speed up or slow down. The electric fields of a microwave oven heat up the food
by pushing on the ions in the food. The most abundant ions are positive sodium and
potassium ions and in acidic foods like vinegar, hydrogen ions. The charge of the positive ions
is compensated by an equal and opposite charge of negative ions, mainly chloride,
bicarbonate, and in the case of vinegar, acetate ions. Id.
410. An incandescent lamp is a thin tungsten wire surrounded by an inert gas like argon
and enclosed in a glass envelope to protect it from the air. As in any metal, the electrons in
tungsten are a Fermi gas, but they bump into each other and into the tungsten atoms so
frequently that there is a lot of resistance to current flow down the wire. If you flow a modest
amount of current in the wire (half an amp), the wire will heat to several thousand degrees
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electrons meets resistance that retards this movement, but in
doing so, the resistance translates the movement to light, heat, or
mechanical function.
When we turn "off" a switch, we stop the electromagnetic field
movement of electrons at the switch. When the switch is turned
"on," that movement continues through the switch to the appliance
and the resistance the appliance offers. The energy used as
resistance in the appliance is offset by a diminution of the system's
electromagnetic field to conserve energy.
It is critical to understand that the generation of electricity does
not create, produce, or inject into the wires any new electrons.
Rather, it causes copper electrons already in the copper wire
orbiting, their copper nuclei to engage in a high-speed linear wire
dance to leap from atom to atom. Stop the magnets at the genera-
tor from spinning, and the electrons settle down to their normal
close orbital routines. Therefore, generation merely transmits
electrons from atom to atom at much-accelerated velocity. Thus,
there is no "consumption" of electron matter. A transmission or
transport function typically would be regarded legally as service.
Electric generators put more force flow of electrons into the grid
to compensate for the resistance of running that current through
consumers' appliances. 411 That current, not the mass or matter of
the electrons that are moving, is what creates and constitutes
usable electric energy.
and emit light, as well as infrared radiation that one cannot see. The electric field is mainly
heating the electrons, not the tungsten ions. Both the light and the infrared radiation
emitted by the lamp are themselves forms of electromagnetic energy, but they have much
higher oscillation frequencies than the 60 Hz power used to produce them. They propagate
through free space with no need for any wires or electrons. Id.
411. Current is movement of subatomic particles already in a conductive medium.
[Vol. 45:18391912
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412The components of electric energy are both matter and energy.
But no matter is transferred or consumed in an electricity sale;
consumers do not consume or destroy the electrons. Rather the
speed of the movement of those electrons/matter is delivered to a
customer-not the physical ownership of the electrons themselves.
A consumer uses the electric system to cause the copper atoms in
the interior wiring in the consumer's premises to shed and gain
electrons to and from adjoining atoms in the wire. He uses the
electric grid to speed up the motion of electrons present in the
copper wiring on the premises. This hooks him into the electromag-
netic field that is electricity.
This electricity is an electromagnetic force or wave containing
energy. A wave can move quickly with large amounts of energy,
although each particular electron moves much more slowly as part
of that wave. Because the work is done by the wave, it is not the
individual electron, or the "matter of fact" that is critical.413 It is
rather the wave or motion that constitutes energy.
412.
Electricity is physical and material because, microscopically, it consists of the
flow and "pressure" of a material entity, namely electrons, and macroscopically,
it can be sensed (felt, tasted, seen, and heard), measured, weighed, and stored,
and is subject to the universal laws of nature.... Without electrons, electricity
cannot be transmitted. Though electrons themselves are very small and
lightweight, they are one of the basic constituents of matter; common matter
like hydrogen and iron consists of electrons, protons, and neutrons in roughly
equal number. Thus, there is nothing more physical and material than an
electron. Since electricity itself consists of the flow of a material object,
electricity is physical and material.
In re Appeal of Pacificorp, Ca. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 90027 1, 7 (Sept. 12, 2002)
(emphasis added) (definition of electricity submitted by Professor Joel Fajans, University of
California at Berkeley Department of Physics).
The electric power distribution system is quite complicated. In essence,
however, it can be reduced to a circuit consisting of a power source, a
transmission line and a load .... The power source must be capable of supplying
a current at a reasonable voltage, and can be, among other things, a battery, a
hydroelectric plant, or a gas fired turbine generator. The transmission line can
be as simple as a pair of wires like those in a household power cord.... A load is
the generic name for devices that use the electricity to perform a useful service.
Id.
413. E-mail from Dr. David Fair, Intel Enterprise PCI Express Initiative Manager, Intel
Corporation, to Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School (Feb. 4,
2004) (on file with author). The author is indebted to Dr. Fair for his feedback on some of
the issues in this subsection.
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Moreover, ownership and movement of each particular electron
cannot be physically traced. All that can be measured is input and
output from the system as a whole: the force put into the grid, and
the force elsewhere appropriated. What happens between these two
points of measurement on a transmission grid operates by the laws
of physics.414
So what is electricity? Electricity is itself a contradiction. It is
both matter and energy. It is a type of low-frequency radio wave
which is made of protons. It is a mysterious force which looks like
blue-white fire and yet cannot be seen. It moves forward at the
speed of light, yet it vibrates in the AC cord without flowing
forwards. It is totally weightless, yet it has a small weight. When
electricity flows through a light bulb's filament, it creates light and
heat. Yet no electricity is ever consumed or destroyed by the light
bulb, and every bit of it vibrates out of the filament and back down
the other wire.
Modern physicists might assert that there is little distinction
between energy and matter. There is little concrete difference
between forces and particles. However, there is a legal continental
divide along these differences, and the law requires that a choice
be made.
B. Polar Opposites: Analogy to Gas and Telecommunications
Analogy is the bridge on which the law often crosses a divide to
a new frontier. The poles of this divide are demarcated by natural
gas and telecommunications. Which is a closer physical analogy to
electricity: (1) natural gas or (2) telecommunications and cable
television service? The former is adjudicated legally as a good, the
latter a service.
1. Physical Realities
There is an immediate reflex to analogize electricity to natural
gas. Both are regulated by FERC and both are energy inputs in our
society. Telecommunications is regulated by the Federal Communi-
414. The electricity propagates pursuant to Kirchofl's Law. See FERREY, INDEPENDENT
POWER, supra note 4, ch. 8.
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cations Commission (FCC) and is an ultimate end-use unto itself,
unlike energy. Thus, if natural gas is a good, electricity might
similarly be a good. As it turns out, such distinctions are superfi-
cial.
Natural gas is definitively characterized as a good: It is com-
prised of hydrocarbon molecules that are containable, inherently
storable, measurable, trackable, and are per se the delivered
product. Electricity, by contrast, is the access and interconnection
to a contained energized wave on a closed circuit, but does not
transfer and "consume" identifiable units, molecules, or matter.
Access to the energy in this circuit is leased for a period of time.
Leases of time and access, unlike the sale of natural gas molecules,
typically would be regulated as service transactions.
Electricity differs physically as well as statutorily from natural
gas in that electricity is a more expensive-to-produce, derived form
of energy. It is also difficult to store, moves at speeds that approxi-
mate the speed of light,41 and has regional markets. Natural gas,
on the other hand, can be stored efficiently, is traded in a nation-
wide market, is traded as a commodity, is governed pursuant to
the Natural Gas Act by FERC, and moves from fifteen to twenty-
five miles per hour.416 Even the terminology is different: Electricity
is "transmitted," while natural gas is "transported." The latter
concept is much more tangible and physical. Both potentially can
cause serious injury under certain circumstances.
Telecommunications and telephone transmissions are surpris-
ingly similar to electricity. Telecommunications travel in electro-
magnetic waves through microwave transmissions which them-
selves travel through space, over copper wire, or fiberoptic cable.
Telecommunications and television broadcasts41 utilize the
electromagnetic spectrum, as does electricity. The telecommunica-
tions network operates propelled by electricity: It transmits in the
415. Elizabeth Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV.
27, 62-63 (1996).
416. Id.
417. A television signal is an electromagnetic wave from an antenna transmitted through
space at the speed of light. The consumers' antennae receive small amounts of power (a few
millionths of a watt). In this signal are binary integers of information for transmission of
picture and sound. E-mail from Will Happer, supra note 399.
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electromagnetic spectrum, for the purpose of a sound and/or video
image.
Phone conversations are measured by the units of time (and
distance, a proxy for the amount of capital used in the service) the
user is connected to a network, exactly as electricity transactions
are billed. One leases time on the electric network, and thereby
diminishes its capacity. This "time" dimension in the denomination
of the electric sale (or lease) is not shared with natural gas, oil, or
other energy sources, where the commodity itself is sold and
possession passed.
It could be argued that it is merely pragmatic, and not of critical
importance practically or legally, that telecommunications and
cable television services (both legally considered services) also are
measured in increments of time and distance. However, rather
than distinguishing them from electricity, this reveals an elemen-
tal similarity: Electricity and telecommunications both could be
denominated and transacted as a flat-fee sale rather than denomi-
nated and billed differentially by time. In many developing nations,
electricity to rural customers is sold based on a flat monthly charge
dependent upon the size of the customer circuit, which limits how
many light bulbs or appliances can be connected at a given time.4 I8
Similarly, many phone plans also now feature unlimited calling for
a flat fee.
Electricity, television, and telecommunications transactions do
not involve the transfer of exclusive legal possession of a tangible
"good," as do oil or natural gas sales. There is no physical flow of a
containable volume of matter when electricity and telecommunica-
tions are involved. One is truly accessing a network, and one
diminishes the common capacity or utility of that network by one's
interconnection and use. With electricity, the velocity/voltage of the
network is replenished and held constant by providing more
generation to maintain overall system voltage. Electric generation
maintains system velocity of movement; it does not create new
electrons for sale. Therefore, despite superficial similarities to
418. This is observed from the author's experience working for the World Bank and United
Nations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Thailand, India, and Vietnam over the past
decade.
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fossil fuels, electricity has as much or more in common with
telecommunications and television services.
There are two legal poles between which electricity must be
evaluated. At one pole stands telecommunications and television
transmission and at the other pole stands fossil fuels. It is settled
that telecommunications is regarded as a service and not a "good"
or commodity.419 Similarly, audio and visual television communica-
tions have been deemed to be a service rather than a good or
commodity.42 °
2. Tangibility
In some instances, courts have construed "commodities" under
the federal antitrust statutes as equivalent to a "good." In dicta,
some courts in telecommunications matters have utilized an
analogy for purposes of contrasting the nature of telephone service
with electricity. In National Communications Ass'n, the court
rejected a plea to analogize long distance voice telecommunications
services to electricity because electricity is not "tangible," without
the court providing any further explanation as to what is or is not
"tangible."421
In City of Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light Co., the court
found that electricity is a commodity entitled to the antitrust pro-
tection because the dominant nature of electricity is "tangible."422
The court, quite tellingly, confessed that "the tangible-intangible
419. See MCI Telecominn. Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658,664 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding long
distance telephone calls did not constitute "commercial activity" within the meaning of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Daleure v. Kentucky, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 173,449
(6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2001), 51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 513 (Oct. 17, 2001) (finding telephone
services were not "goods" pursuant to Robinson-Patman Act); Nat'l Communications Ass'n,
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding long distance
voice communication services were not commodities to which the Robinson-Patman Act
applied but instead were "services).
420. See Rankin County Cablevision v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 692 F.
Supp. 691, 692-93 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that cable television service was not a
commodity); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1114
(S.D. Miss. 1976) (discussing the purchase and sale of television signal programming and
finding that no sale or purchase of any tangible commodity was involved for purposes of
Robinson-Patman Act, which "only relates to the sale of tangible commodities and not to
services"). Many of these decisions occurred within the context of antitrust litigation.
421. Nat'l Communications Ass'n, 808 F. Supp. at 1135-36.
422. 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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distinction assists little in the case of electricity .... [Tihis analysis
is somewhat facile and incomplete. "42S The parties wishing to call
electricity a commodity argued that electrons can be sold, and that
the dominant purpose in purchasing electricity is for its physical
properties as opposed to any legal interest and personal services
one acquires with its purchase. 24 This argument might apply at
the retail level; however, with electricity futures being traded as a
commodity and electricity being hedged like a financial instrument,
this "physical properties" distinction made by one of the parties in
1980 may not apply as much to the deregulated electricity model.
The City of Gainesville court was critical of a Fourth Circuit
panel and a single judge of the Fifth Circuit assuming that
electricity is a commodity or good without any careful analysis. 25
Curiously, the City of Gainesville court held that it would be
anomalous if coal, gasoline, and natural gas were deemed to be
commodities and electricity was not. 26 For antitrust purposes,
other forms of energy have been determined to be commodities
within the scope of federal antitrust statutes, including coal,427
gasoline,'28 and natural gas. 29 Clearly, the court in City of
Gainesville wanted to apply antitrust law to the very significant
commerce that occurs with electricity, and was only able to do so
by assuming that all forms of energy should be treated similarly for
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1282 (citing Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co.,
184 F.2d 552, 559 (4th Cir. 1950)); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d
672, 679-80 (5th Cir. 1968) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
426. City of Gainesville, 488 F. Supp. at 12. The court found that it would be odd that
Congress should intend "that one form of manufactured energy [electricity) be exempt from
these antitrust laws while others [coal, natural gas, and gasoline] are not." This statement
ignores the physical difference in how the fossil fuels can be stored and are sold by units of
their volumes, whereas electricity cannot be stored and is sold by the amount of time and
level at which one hooks into an energized network.
427. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (assuming coal within
Clayton Act as a commodity).
428. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963) (treating automobile gasoline as within
Clayton Act); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp 280, 284-86 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
affd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (holding automobile gasoline and other petroleum products within
Clayton Act).
429. B & W Gas Inc. v. Gen. Gas Corp., 247 F. Supp. 339, 344-45 (N.D. Ga. 1965)
(assuming natural gas is covered by the Clayton Act).
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purposes of determining the intent of Congress under a specific
antitrust statute.430
The legislative history indicates that members of the House
Judiciary Committee sought unsuccessfully to amend the defini-
tions to define antitrust "commodities" to include "services."43 '
Therefore, with the application of antitrust statutes to electricity,
unlike the application of common law, there is legislative history
that services are not included. The legislative history of the federal
antitrust statutes plays a role not found with the common law.
In applying contract or tort common law to a variety of disputes,
which may happen to involve energy, there is no legislative intent,
specific definitions, or statutes upon which to rely. Moreover, all
fifty states will apply their or others' choice of law rules to these
disputes, and will inevitably result in varied and nuanced interpre-
tations of what is a good and what is a service. Therefore, while
interpretations of the legislative intent in antitrust or other federal
statutes concerning what is a good for application of that specific
statute is of interest, it is not particularly illuminating of what a
"thing" truly is under the common law.
A pair of circuit court cases demonstrate the courts' general
failure to recognize the numerous similarities between electricity
and telecommunications services. In City of Kirwood v. Union
Electric Co., the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court to find
that because "[ellectric power can be felt, if not touched, produced,
sold, stored in small quantities, transmitted and distributed in
discrete quantities," it is therefore a commodity subject to the
430. The fossil fuels are forms of energy that have very distinct mass and volume: They
can be independently packaged, transported outside of the pipeline network, and sold by
their inherent volumes. In comparison, electricity is not routinely stored outside the
transmission system and is not sold by inherent physical volumes, but rather by units of time
connected to an energized network. Moreover, there is more need for uniformity when
applying a particular congressional statute, such as the Robinson-Patman Act or the Clayton
Act, which regulate anticompetitive conduct in certain major industries. There, ifone energy
industry's anticompetitive conduct is regulated, so should be a similar or parallel energy
industry's conduct. In theory, one would not want to sanction anticompetitive conduct in the
natural gas industry, while absolving it from similar federal statutes in the national electric
energy industry. With antitrust or other statutes, there is a specific statutory intent and
legislative history that can be fathomed as well as specific definitions of the regulated
"thing."
431. See City of Gainvesville, 488 F.Supp. at 1281.
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Robinson-Patman Act.432 Again, the court's summary conclusion is
somewhat facile. Electricity is not "stored in small quantities"
except in batteries, in which case batteries themselves become a
good. 433
In Metro Communications Co. v. Ameritek Mobile Communica-
tions, Inc.,4 the Sixth Circuit held that "cellular telephone service
is very different from electricity. It cannot be produced, felt, or
stored, even in small quantities. The [cellular] plaintiffs do not buy
a quantity of it, store it and resell it to their customers. They
simply provide customers with access to the service." 4 5 The agent
involved in the litigation merely acted as an intermediary between
the provider of the telephone service and the user, but technically
did not buy a block of services and take the risk of reselling that
block to the customers. The Metro Communications tribunal found
this to be a critical distinction because the agents did not do the
buying and selling.""
The distinction the court made in Metro Communications is
interesting in that what makes telecommunications a service goes
to the role that a party plays in the transaction, and not what the
"thing" is itself. This distinction, however, is neither compelling nor
practical. If one were to analogize telecommunications to electric-
ity, this would mean that electricity might be a service for those
intermediary marketers, brokers, middlemen and aggregators-a
significant component of the new deregulated electricity mar-
ket-while electricity could be a good for the wholesalers and
retailers of electricity.
In Metro Communications, the court found it dispositive that
telephone service cannot be "produced, felt, or stored,"437 while
432. 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982). Relying on City of Gainesville, the court
summarily found that electricity was a commodity at least for purposes of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Id. at 1182.
433. Rather, when electricity is "stored" it is usually done by raising water back up to the
top of a dam using electric pumps. This "storage" is in the form of potential energy (water at
the top of the dam) in a physical state rather than storage in any form of"electricity." The
new electricity storage technologies of compressed air energy storage and superconducting
magnetic energy storage also do not store electricity in an "electric medium," but rather do
so in other media. See FERREY, INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, ch. 2 § 20.
434. 1993-1 Trade Cas. CCH 70,105 (6th Cir. 1993).
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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electric "goods" implicitly can be. 4 8 This comparative conclusion of
the court simply is not factually true. Electricity is not produced or
stored, and telecommunications are felt.
Electric energy is not "produced" in a conventional physical
sense; it is a transformation of other sources of energy (typically
fossil fuels) in the universe to accelerate the movement of preexist-
ing copper electrons already in close orbit around their nuclei.
Electricity is analogous to phone service in that phone service uses
electrical impulses (either through microwave or copper wire
transmission) to transfer voice or data communication through a
transmission system to a remote location. Electricity and telephone
communication are transmitted in a physical sense using the
electromagnetic spectrum, involving similar physical mechanisms.
It is also misleading for a court to conclude that telephone
services cannot be "stored" as electricity can. Electricity (movement
of electrons) is not inherently stored physically, but must be
transformed to chemical energy packaged in a battery or other
medium for subsequent discharge of stored chemicals back into
electricity. Similarly, telecommunications data can be stored-
again not inherently, but in data storage and retrieval sys-
tems-for discharge and delivery at a subsequent time. Computers
and the Internet do this daily.
It is also not a particularly meaningful distinction for a court to
base a decision on a finding that electricity can be "felt." It cannot
be felt as physical mass or a volumetric presence. One can experi-
ence a sensory reaction after coming in contact with an electric
force or field, but one does not see or describe spatially the physical
presence of electricity. Correspondingly, telephone service, while
the court describes it as not "felt," can be heard, and is therefore,
in fact, "felt." Hearing a telephone communication is a physical
vibration of sound pressure waves in air against the sensitive
receptors of the human inner ear. While this is a different sense
than touch with fingers, it nevertheless is felt by the body. Does
this necessarily make something that cannot be grasped any more
tangible? Gravity and magnetism can be felt and harnessed or
manipulated, but does that make them "goods" if they are somehow
sold and purchased? If telecommunications is not tangible, and
438. Id.
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natural gas is tangible, electricity bears at least as much similarity
to the former as to the latter.
C. Weights and Blends: Hybrid Good and Service
It can be argued that there truly are blended elements of both
good and services in what is transacted in a wholesale, and
particularly a retail, electric transaction.439 Several courts have
concluded that electricity is indeed a hybrid of good and service.44 °
Where courts confront a transaction involving both goods and
services in a single contract, they must determine whether the
goods or services dominate in the transaction. This then deter-
mines, respectively, whether the U.C.C. or the general common law
will govern the legal relationship.44'
There are numerous tests that courts have applied to determine
whether a transaction that involves both goods and services is
governed by the U.C.C.442 The "predominantly service test"
439. This blend would occur only if a state determined electricity to be a good, while
finding transmission and distribution to be a service, and stranded cost recovery a financial
intangible. In those states where electricity is deemed a service, no blend would result.
440. "While the distribution ofelectricity through a system of towers, poles, and wires may
well be considered a service, the electricity itself is a consumable product." Houston Lighting
& Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761,766 (Tex. App. 1986). "The distribution might well
be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordinary user, is a
consumable product." Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis. 1979).
441. Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Gruppo Agusta, 288 F.3d 67, 72 (3d Cir. 2002) ("When
a contract is for goods and services, a court must determine which aspect of the contract, the
goods or the services, predominates. In making this determination, a court must examine the
whole transaction and look to the essence or main objective of the parties' agreement.")
(citation omitted); Palmetto Linen Serv., Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. S. Contracting of Charleston, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 107, 109
(D.S.C. 1994)). The U.C.C. governs where the contract's "predominant thrust is a transaction
of sale with labor incidentally involved." Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166
F.3d 1177, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("New York courts apply the 'predominant purpose' test.");
Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
in hybrid contracts, the predominant factor, the thrust and the purpose govern whether the
U.C.C. or common law applies); A.T. Kearney, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 73 F.3d 238,
243-44 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that while electricity transmission and distribution would be
a service, the ordinary user contemplates electricity as a consumable product once it has
been sold and delivered through a consumer's meter and this predominates); Mass. Cash
Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Sys. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 404, 418 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the
predominant factor, thrust or purpose of the contract determines which law applies).
442. See Crystal L. Miller, Note, The Goods/Services Dichotomy and the U.C.C.:
Unweaving the Tangled Web, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 717, 720-32 (1984) (noting four tests
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examines the intent and the objective of the parties to determine
if the transaction is primarily for services. 44' Conversely, courts
have created a "predominant factor" or "thrust" test, to determine
if the sale of goods is the predominant factor.444 Courts also utilize
a "final product" test and consider if the end product is a product
or a service.445 Courts have also employed a "policy test" that
creates a characterization of the transaction on a case-by-case
basis. 446 According to the federal court jurisprudence, the issue of
whether in a particular transaction involving both goods and
services, one or the other predominates or is the "thrust" of the
contract, "is an issue of material fact, which must be resolved at
trial."447
Where electricity sales may contain both elements, the legal
inquiry is: What dominates in the intentions of the parties? Courts
that purport to aid courts when analzing hybrid contracts).
443. Id. at 721-23. Courts applying this test examine the structure and language of the
contract and the nature of the services to discern the intent of the parties. Perlmutterv. Beth
David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 794-95 (N.Y. 1954). This test is limited to situations where the
services are essential to the contract and unique to the particular circumstances. See Miller,
surpa note 442, at 722. For example, a helicopter owner sued an engine overhaul company
for breaching warranty provisions under the U.C.C. The court reasoned that the parties
primarily intended the performance of a service (engine overhaul) and not a good (delivery
ofreplacement parts). T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Helicopter Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 548
(E.D. Ky. 1982). Although the service may produce a good, the desired service is the
predominant factor in the contract. Miller, supra note 442, at 723.
444. Miller, supra note 442, at 723-25. The predominant factor test examines whether the
thrust of the transaction was the sale of goods or the rendition of services. Courts examine
the parties' intent as revealed in the contract or the circumstances surrounding its execution.
See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding contract to deliver and
install bowling equipment is one for goods); Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 370 A.2d 547,
549-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (applying the Bonebrake test and holding that a
contract for overhead doors was one for goods despite installation services); see also
Paramount Aviation Corp., 288 F.3d at 72-73 (discussing that under New Jersey law a
contract is governed by the U.C.C. when the goods predominate); Scott v. Dixie
Homecrafters, 125 F.Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (setting forth that when a contract
is predominantly for goods, with labor incidental to that contract, the Alabama Commercial
Code applies); ITT Corp. v. LTX Corp., 732 F. Supp. 1225, 1234-35 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding
production and assembly of cable assemblies to be governed by the U.C.C.).
445. Miller, supra note 442, at 726-27. This test evaluates the definition of"goods" under
the U.C.C. and examines whether the final product is movable, tangible and identifiable. If
the product is clearly a good, so long as it is movable, identifiable and tangible, the U.C.C.
governs, regardless of the amount of service involved in completing the contract.
446. Id. at 728-29. This test is a policy-based, case-by-case test, which is inconsistently
applied.
447. IMC Chems. Inc. v. NIRO, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (D. Kan. 1998).
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can choose to utilize a quantitative or qualitative methodology to
make this determination. First, courts may simply sum the mone-
tary value of the service components and sum the monetary value
of the tangible goods involved in the transaction, to see which is
the dominant quantitative element.448 Second, courts may attempt
to determine whether the buyer selected the particular seller of the
good or service more because that party was licensed or capable of
providing those particular brands or types of goods, or more
because they wanted the particular qualitative service provided by
the seller.449 Similarly, the court might inquire whether the seller
sought to distinguish itself based on its service component or the
goods it vended.
When one applies either of the hybrid-dominant tests to an
electricity transaction, each militates in favor of finding electricity
to be a service. The first judicial test-analyzing the monetary
weight of the good and service components purchased at the retail
level in an electricity transaction-reveals the following compo-
nents, which can vary and fluctuate over time, region, and
provider:
* the electricity commodity: 2.5€-4.5€/KWh;
* the electricity service;
* transmission and distribution of the electricity: 4c/KWh;
* renewable, conservation, or low-income surcharges:
0.3c/KWh;
* stranded cost recovery: 1.5c/KWh.450
448. Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. NAPCO, Inc., 991 F.2d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1993)
(itemizing the value of the equipment, which was eclipsed by the value of the service, to
conclude that it fell outside of the scope of the U.C.C.).
449. See, e.g., ParamountAviation Corp., 288 F.3d at 72-73; A.T. Kearney, Inc. v. Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp., 73 F.3d 238, 243 (9th Cir. 1995).
450. These tariffs are typical for Boston Edison Company in Massachusetts. The stranded
cost component is a ten-year charge that terminates in 2007. See Electric Schedule of Rates,
available at http://www.nstaronline.comlss/customer_ service/rates/schedule.asp (last visited
Jan. 29, 2004). It is of note that in a wholesale transaction, the electric commodity will be the
dominant factor compared to any transmission costs of that commodity, in most cases. Most
of the legal debate, however, will evolve around retail transactions in restructured retail
markets, where the courts will play an increasingly important role in lieu of regulators.
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The dominant weight of the financial components of a retail
electricity transaction are the transmission and financial services,
rather than the electric commodity, even assuming, arguendo, that
the electric commodity is deemed a good. Under this analysis, the
transmission and financial service component dominates the
weight of the transaction, and the U.C.C. would not apply.
It is clear that retail electricity involves both the sale of the
energy (whether that be deemed a good or a service) and a
transmission and distribution service, as well as certain financial
and administrative services. Analogizing to another utility is
instructive on this issue. The sale of water is certainly more
"tangible" than the sale of electricity: Water molecules are actually
transferred to, and thereafter consumed by the purchaser, whereas
no electric electrons are consumed.4 " Nonetheless, a number of
courts have found the provision of water to be a hybrid contract
which is dominated by the service component, and thus did not
apply the U.C.C.:
Water is a unique product and is essential to human health and
well-being. Here, the city did not create or manufacture the
water. Rather, the city, by a system of reservoirs, captured the
water from brooks, streams, and rainfall. It treated the water
and then distributed it to its citizens. Although the city charged
a sum for the water, that rate reflected the cost of storage,
treatment and distribution. Thus, it is clear that the predomi-
nant factor, thrust, or purpose of the activity was the rendition
of services and not the sale of goods.452
Similarly, electricity involves capture and treatment of the
electrons in the system, as well as a significant distribution
function. Moreover, unlike the water molecules, which are a finite
commodity whose title and possession is actually transferred,
electric system electrons are not transferred in the same way to the
consumer at the point of sale. Water is more tangible both physi-
cally and legally than electric sale. This analogy reflects that if
451. By contrast, a waste water treatment system is often deemed to be predominantly
the sale of the hardware, rather than the associated service. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Weston & Sampson Eng'rs, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 688, 690 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Waste
Stream Envtl., Inc. v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm., 15 Mass. L. Rep. 723 (Super. Ct. 2003).
452. Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 775 N.E.2d 770, 784 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
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water is deemed a service in terms of its predominant factor,
electricity would also seem to be predominantly a service.
The second judicial test, which evaluates the parties' intent, in a
deregulated electric market (which constitutes the market
currently in approximately twenty states), a typical consumer's
selection of a particular competitive provider will likely be based
upon (1) the particular pricing and terms they offer for the electric
sale, (2) the service reputation and reliability of the provider, and
(3) the financial stability and resources of the provider. 53 Because
electricity is generally not differentiated by most consumers as a
distinguishable or branded product in today's market,45' the type
of electrons or commodity is not a reason that a consumer would
choose a particular supplier. In fact, the electric commodity is
completely standardized as to uniform system frequency, voltage,
ancillary services and other key physical characteristics by the
requirements of the integrated grid operator or the distribution
utility.45
5
Therefore, under this second analytic test, it is not the provider's
distinctive brand or type of electricity, but rather the financial and
service capabilities of the provider, that are the key factors in an
individual consumer decision selecting its retail electricity
supplier. To date, providers/sellers have sought to distinguish
themselves principally based on reliability. Therefore, the service
elements would dominate, and the U.C.C. would not apply to a
bundled transaction even if the electric commodity were deemed a
good by state tribunals. If the state deemed the electric commodity
a service, then the bundled retail sale would also be deemed a
service. In an unbundled transaction, the electric commodity would
be evaluated alone as a good or service.
453. Indeed, suppliers have failed to perform in California and in other states. In those
thirty states that have retained monopoly utility supply of electric power, there is no choice
of supplier and consumers make no election.
454. The one exception to this is for "green" or renewable energy products. In many states
there are efforts to fashion the creation of eligible renewable energy products, and to "brand"
these as distinct products or services for sale. This has occurred in a number of states
including Massachusetts, Texas, California, Virginia and elsewhere. For a general discussion
of these issues, see generally Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to
Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 109
(2002).
455. See FERREY, INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, ch. 8.
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CONCLUSION
Careful analysis gives strong voice to the conclusion that retail
electricity transactions in a deregulated market in twenty states
and a bundled regulated market in thirty states today are more
dominated by service considerations. Yet few courts in adjudicating
contract rights have yet engaged in careful analysis. In part, this
is a result of attorneys who do not carefully form and advance
these issues for the courts. In fact, in California, despite tens of
billions of dollars now at stake, some attorneys have overlooked
these outcome-determinative issues.
The fact that electricity is "sold" also is not dispositive: Telephone
service is sold and cable television service is sold. Yet, both are
indisputably services. Similarly, both cable television and tele-
phone service are transmitted, in the electromagnetic spectrums
and can be "distributed in discrete quantities."'56 Telephone service
is distributed and sold in quantities as discrete as one minute
intervals, while electricity is billed in no smaller than hourly
intervals (as a kilowatt hour of service). If telephone service
quantities under court precedent are "discrete," then certainly
electric quantities are "discrete" also.
Distinctions made by various tribunals finding electricity similar
to fossil fuels and dissimilar to telecommunications and television
services have some superficial appeal. There is a tendency, perhaps
because FERC regulates both gas and electricity, while the FCC
regulates telecommunications services, for courts to assume that
two very different energy forms regulated by a single agency,
FERC, must legally be assumed to be the same thing.457 In the case
of FERC, which not only makes substantive law but may be viewed
by some courts as wielding influential "agency" expertise relative
to energy matters, electricity reflexively is treated as a good
456. City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982).
457. It is interesting that among the fifty states, all of whom regulate to some degree the
retail aspects of natural gas, electricity, and telecommunications services, the same state
agency typically regulates telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity. Therefore, any
tendency of the federal courts to wish to achieve a certain symmetry in applying federal
antitrust and other laws breaks down when looking at the simultaneous regulation of these
same utilities occurring at the state levels. For a discussion of the regulatory rubric at the
state level, see FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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because natural gas is a good. This FERC position evolved appar-
ently without careful analysis of the comparisons or differences
from a policy, physical, or legal perspective.5 s
Indeed, ease and habit make illogical and inappropriate legal
doctrine. Merely because FERC is the federal agency regulating
electricity and natural gas (along with fifty state agencies), the
FERC determination to apply uncritically 459 the U.C.C. to both
electricity and gas disputes is not helpful. Under more careful
examination, these dichotomies are more semantic than they
are absolute. The nature of electricity can be deconstructed to
transactional elements that bear more resemblance to telephone
service than to the sale of natural gas commodities or goods.
These distinctions between electricity and other services made by
various courts, while provocative, work a judicial convenience and
do not achieve a definitive or transcendent resolution. Since this
determination typically is outcome determinative-the very choice
of whether to call something a good, a commodity, or an article of
commerce as opposed to a service-it is made with full understand-
ing of the implications it has for which party prevails.
In an unbundled, deregulated market where the electric
commodity can be purchased individually, the electric commodity
as either good or service stands alone. Physical reality indicates
that electricity has attributes of a service. In that majority of
states where electricity is still bundled in a transaction including
transmission and distribution services, even if the power compo-
nent were deemed by a state to be a good, the other service
components of the bundled transaction would still dominate the
hybrid transaction.
With the implosion of the California energy market and the
collapse of many of the major wholesale and retail independent
providers of electricity, this often-overlooked choice of law factor
may arbitrate billions of dollars of contract and deal disputes.
Because of the long-term relevance of such disputes, this issue
deserves new and urgent consideration, as well as principled
resolution based on physical reality.
458. Telephone Interview with FERC staffmember, supra note 395. FERC staffindicated
that no analysis had been performed, no current staff could recall on what basis electricity
has been treated as a "good," but that it was convenient.
459. See supra Part IV for a discussion of FERC doctrine.
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APPENDIX
A. Formation, Content, and Modification of Contract
1. The Statute of Frauds
There are more than a dozen important differences between the
common law and the U.C.C. 46° One of the biggest distinctions is the
requirements of the statute of frauds. At common law, electricity
contracts not to be performed fully within one year, electricity
contracts involving a suretyship or guarantee of payment, and, in
some states, contracts involving an electricity agency or broker
relationship in the procurement of electricity, fall within the
statute of frauds and require written evidence to be enforceable.4"'
Common law requires writings with common reference, containing
all material terms that evidence the signature of the party against
whom the contract would be construed. 462
In contrast, section 2-201 of the U.C.C. provides that in order for
a contract for the sale of goods over $500 to be enforceable, there
must be "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made."4 3 All that is required is the signature of the
party who is to be bound, the quantity of the good, and that it be a
contract for the sale of goods.46 4 The price, time, and place of
payment or delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any
460. Some of these were set forth in the table in Part II.
461. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110, the following contracts
must be evidenced by a writing in order to be enforceable: (1) a promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another, including the promise of an executor or administrator
to answer for the obligations of the decedent out of the administrator's own pocket; (2) a
contract to transfer an interest in real property; (3) a contract to answer for the duty of
another; (4) "a contract made upon consideration of marriage;" and (5) "a contract that is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
462. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1989). As to contracts within the statute of frauds-other than
those governed by U.C.C. § 2-201-the writing must contain "substantially the whole
agreement and all its material terms and conditions, so that one reading it can understand
from it what the agreement is." Mentz v. Newwitter, 25 N.E. 1044, 1046 (N.Y. 1890).
463. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
464. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 298-99 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1).
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particular warranties may all be omitted.465 According to the first
official comment to section 2-201 of the U.C.C., "[aill that is
required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the
offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction."466 Moreover,
under the U.C.C., unlike the common law, "[a] writing is not
insufficient because it incorrectly states a term agreed upon;" 467 if
the quantity is understated, however, "recovery is limited to the
amount stated."468
The U.C.C. also has a so-called "two merchants" exception, which
is one of the most remarkable features of section 2-201.469 "When
it applies, it makes a writing efficacious against a non-signer.
" 47 0
The U.C.C. two merchant rule assumes that "the recipient will
shortly give 'written notice of objection to [the] contents' of such a
message" if he does not wish to be bound by a writing that satisfies
the statute of frauds against the sender.471 "The consequence of
failing to do so ... is to 'take away from the party who fails to
answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds."472
What binds one merchant to the electricity deal for statute of
frauds purposes, therefore, works to bind the other party, unless
he provides a seasonable objection. The common law has no such
reciprocity-the contract can be binding against one party, while
the other has a statute of frauds defense. Under the U.C.C.,
contracts for specially manufactured goods and contracts fully
performed or admitted to are not subject to the statute of frauds. 73
465. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1.
466. Id.; see also FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 464, at 298-99.
467. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
468. Id. § 2-201 cmt. 1.
469. U.C.C. section 2-201(2) provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving
it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1)
against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within 10 days after it is received.
470. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 464, at 300 (emphasis omitted) ("It proceeds on
the principle that a regular player in the commercial world will not stand silent upon the
receipt of a message indicating its assent to an agreement that it did not make.").
471. Id. at 300 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-201).
472. Id. at 300-01 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 3).
473. See U.C.C. § 2-201.
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The statute of frauds also requires the signature of the bound
party to the contract.474 What qualifies as a signature to satisfy the
requirement of the statute has evolved throughout the years and
today a "signature is any mark, written, stamped or engraved that
is placed by a party anywhere on the writing with intent to assent
to and adopt (authenticate) the writing as the party's own."45 As
Calamari and Perillo further explain:
Where the terms necessary to satisfy the statute are in two or
more documents and only one is signed by the party to be
charged ... [ilf the unsigned document is physically attached to
the signed document at the time it is signed, or if one of the
documents by its terms expressly refers to the other, there is no
problem; the Statute is satisfied.476
The requirement to produce a writing to authenticate a power deal
is, therefore, much more easily satisfied if electricity is deemed a
good.
2. Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule differs at common law and under the
U.C.C. The parol evidence rule "excludes evidence of certain terms
agreed upon prior to [or contemporaneously with] an integrated
writing, whether the terms are written or oral."477 This rule is
474. See id. § 2-201(1).
475. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 210 (3d ed. 1999). For example,
initials and rubber stamps are sufficient. "A letterhead can be a signature, except that if the
Statute says 'subscribed,' instead of'signed,' some courts have held that the writing must be
signed at the end." Id.
476. Id. at 211. Many contracts are expressed in multiple, detached documents and if only
one of them is signed, the statute is satisfied if the detached documents are incorporated by
reference. Absent that, "there is basic disagreement as to what constitutes a sufficient
connection permitting the unsigned papers to be considered as part of the statutory
memorandum." Henry L. Fox Co. v. William Kaufman Org., Ltd., 512 N.Y.S.2d 851,853 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 136 (1989). "Even when this is not true, the unsigned
document is part of the memorandum if the documents by internal evidence refer to the same
subject matter or transaction." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 211.
477. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 187. The theories advanced to justify the
rule are (1) "[ilf the parties intended] the writing to be final and complete, they intend to
supersede their prior agreements"; (2) "sound policy requires that prior and contemporaneous
oral agreements are suspect" if not included in the writing, and (3) that "the writing deserves
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relevant to electricity contracts where there are numerous pre-
formation statements, warranties, assertions, and statements that
may induce entry and execution of a power sale agreement by a
party. Just looking at the Enron bankruptcy, one can see that
representations of a company's financial status can be misleading.
Whether these exchanges are or are not evidentiary in determining
the exact obligations undertaken by a party to a contract is a
matter of the parol evidence rule. 78
The actual intent of the parties should be sought in determining
whether the parties intended total or partial integration.'79 Even
if there is a determination of a total integration, "consistent
additional terms" are still admissible at common law (1) if the
alleged agreement is made for separate consideration, (2) if the
offered additional terms are not within the scope of the integration,
or are collateral, or (3) if the offered terms might naturally,
ordinarily, or normally be omitted from the writing that does
exist.480
In deciding whether prior representations constitute part of an
electric power deal, the first determination regarding admission of
parol evidence is whether the writing represents the final embodi-
ment of all elements of the parties' intended agreement.'8 ' The
final written embodiment of the deal "need not be in any particular
form and need not be signed. " 48 2 Any relevant evidence (even if it
is itself parol evidence) is admissible in most jurisdictions to
determine this question of fact. 483 "[Tihe more complete and formal
a preferred status against potential perjury" regarding oral aspects of an alleged agreement.
Id.
478. See id.
479. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (1981). "When the parties to a
written contract have agreed to it as an 'integration'-a complete and final embodiment of
the terms of an agreement-parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its terms....
When only part of the agreement is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, but parol
evidence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not reduced to writing .... "
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968); see also N. Am. Sav. Bank v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 65 F.3d 111 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Missouri law); Hathaway v. Ray's Motor
Sales, Inc., 247 A.2d 512 (Vt. 1968).
480. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmts. b-d.
481. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1989); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 139 (3d ed. 1987) (noting that the Williston and Corbin tests "assert that the
existence of a total integration depends upon the intention of the parties").
482. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 143.
483. See id.
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the instrument is, the more likely it [is] that it is intended as an
integration" in written form of the entire agreement.484
The U.C.C. embodies another view. The U.C.C. approach"creates
a presumption that a writing is only a partial integration. This
presumption is overcome if the parties actually intend the writing
to be a total integration ..., or if it is certain that parties similarly
situated would have included the term in the writing ...
Exclusion of only those terms that "certainly" would have been
included by the parties in the writing is not as limiting a screening
tool as that employed by common law precedent. 411 This means that
more parol evidence can be admitted by the court under the U.C.C.
than under the rule of common law.487
If electricity is deemed a good, more parol evidence in the making
of the deal can be admitted than if electricity is deemed a service,
because the court will consider the contract under the more
generous U.C.C. parol evidence rule. In addition to parol evidence,
484. Id. Once it is determined that a writing is a final embodiment of the deal, the second
question is whether the writing is complete so that it is a total integration, exclusive ofparol
evidence. Id. at 145. Williston, Corbin, and the U.C.C. have articulated distinct views on this
question. Professor Williston's view has three rules. First,
[ilf the writing expressly declares that it contains the entire agreement of the
parties in what is usually referred to as a merger clause, this declaration
conclusively establishes that the integration is total unless the document is
obviously incomplete or the merger clause was included as a result of fraud or
mistake.
Id. at 147 (citations omitted). His second rule states, '[iln the absence of a merger clause, the
determination [of whether the writing is a total integration] is made by looking to the
writing. Consistent additional terms may be proved if the writing is obviously incomplete on
its face ...." Id. at 148 (citations omitted). Williston's third rule states, "[wihere the writing
appears to be a complete instrument expressing the rights and obligations of both parties,
it is deemed a total integration .... " Id.
A varying approach in determining the completeness of a writing is Professor Corbin's
view. Professor Corbin "is determined to search out the actual intention of the parties" on the
issue of intended total integration rather than searching for some objective or presumed
intent. See id. at 149. He states that"all relevant evidence," including parol evidence, should
be taken into account in making this threshold determination. Id. Thus, he would admit
evidence of prior negotiations. Furthermore, he states that a merger clause is only one of the
factors to be considered in determining whether there is a total integration.
485. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 189; see also Cosmopolitan Fin. Corp. v.
Runnels, 625 P.2d 390-95 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the U.C.C. permits
consideration of a "wider range of extrinsic evidence" to determine the actual intent of the
parties).
486. See Cosmopolitan Fin. Corp., 825 P.2d at 395.
487. See id. (noting that the U.C.C. standard allows the court to consider more evidence).
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the court can always consider evidence of course of dealing,"8
course of performance,489 and trade usage49 ° in interpreting a
U.C.C. contract. 49' One's past conduct and industry norms con-
stantly inform interpretation of any U.C.C. deal.
492
If a U.C.C. contract is not complete and exclusive, but only a final
embodiment of the deal, consistent additional terms and evidence
can be admitted to interpret the contract.49 3 "When the parties to
a written contract have agreed to it as an 'integration'-a complete
and final embodiment of the terms of an agreement-parol
evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its terms."494
The U.C.C. will permit a party to use the parties' conduct, their
past dealings, and industry norms to gain a favorable interpreta-
tion of a contract. This allows "context" evidence not always
admissible under the common law and creates an exception to the
parol evidence bar to interpret contract intent and language
ambiguities in an electricity contract for sale of goods.
3. Contract Formation
The law surrounding electric contract formation and indefinite-
ness also differs significantly between the U.C.C. and the common
law. Indefiniteness is a basis to negate enforcement of an otherwise
properly formed contract.495 Indefiniteness can occur when parties
488. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1989).
489. See id. § 2-208 cmt. 1.
490. See id. § 1-205(5). The U.C.C. defines "usage of trade" as "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Id. § 1-
205(2).
491. Id. § 2-202(a).
492. See id.
493. Id. § 2-202(b). What is "consistent" is a matter of different interpretation in the
courts. See CALAMARI & PERILO, supra note 481, at 155.
494. Masterson v. Sinc, 436 P.2d 561,563 (Cal. 1968). "When only part of the agreement
is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, but parole evidence may be used to prove
elements of the agreement not reduced to writing." Id. Certain courts hold that the test of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not
whether the instrument appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but
whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the
instrument is reasonably susceptible. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645-46 (Cal. 1968).
495. See CALAMAXI & PREILLO, supra note 481, at 53.
1934
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leave material terms open or not fully specified.49 This will occur
when market participants do not completely explicate all key terms
in an electricity sale negotiation and transaction.
497
First, the common law approach the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, requires mutual assent for contract formation.498 "The
manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the
form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance
by the other party." 99
A term need not be set forth with the utmost specificity; it is
enough that the agreement is sufficiently clear for the court to
determine the respective obligations of the parties. 00 Indefinite-
ness (uncertainty) problems arise in three categories: (1) "[wlhere
the parties have purported to agree upon a material term but left
it indefinite (not reasonably certain)," (2) "[wlhere the parties are
silent as to a material term," and (3) "[wlhere the parties have
agreed to agree later as to a material term."501
In the first situation, when the parties have purported to agree
on a material term but have left it indefinite, common law provides
496. See id.; see also Soar v. Nat'l Football League Players' Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1287, 1290 (1st
Cir. 1977) ("While an enforceable contract might be found in some circumstances if one or
more of such questions were left unanswered, ... the accumulation in the instant case of so
many unanswered questions is convincing evidence that there never was a consensus ad
idem between the parties.").
497. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 53; see also Hill v. McGregor Mfg. Corp.,
178 N.W.2d 342, 553-55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
498. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1989).
499. Id. § 22(1); see also id. § 22(2).
500. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 53. According to the RESTATEENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981): The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy. The Restatement states that "[elven though a manifestation of intention is sought
to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms
of the contract are reasonably certain." Id. § 33(1). "The fact that one or more terms of a
proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not
intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance." Id. § 33(3). What constitutes
"reasonable certainty" depends on "the subject-matter of the agreement, the purpose for
which it was entered into, the situation and relations of the parties, and the circumstances
under which it was made." See Marcor Hous. Sys., Inc. v. First Am. Title Co., 584 P.2d 86,
88 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Ward v. Ward, 30 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1934)).
501. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 54; see also Lawrence v. Jones, 864 P.2d 194,
197-98 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that indefinite nature of material security provision
made contract unenforceable); Werner v. Norwest Bank S. Dakota, 499 N.W.2d 138, 141
(S.D. 1993) (finding no contract existed because of the lack of essential terms). However,
omitting a non-material term does not imperil an otherwise properly formed contract.
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no room for judicial implication or gap-fillers and, therefore, the
agreement is void.5 °2 In the second situation, when the parties are
silent as to a material term, "there is a strong possibility that a
term may be implied from surrounding circumstances or supplied
by a court using a gap-filler."" 3 In the third situation, when the
parties agree to agree, "[tihe traditional rule is that an agreement
to agree ... does not result in a binding contract."0 4 Some courts
enforce agreements to agree, or at least require good faith efforts
of the parties to agree subsequently. 55
This formalistic common law approach differs greatly from the
U.C.C. standard. The U.C.C., as to indefiniteness, provides that "a
contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract." 6 Furthermore, "[e] ven
though one or more terms are left open a contract for the sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy."0 7 In other words, under the U.C.C., the court
can cure the indefiniteness on any reasonable basis and enforce the
contract.
Also under the U.C.C., an agreement for electricity sale which is
otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract is not made invalid
by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified
by one of the parties.0 ' This allows contracts in which price,
quantity, or other material terms in an electric sale can be subject
to contingencies or one party's specifications. However, any such
specifications "must be made in good faith and within the limits set
502. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 54-55.
503. Id. at 56.
504. Id. at 63. Because the parties have manifested an intention to fill the gap themselves,
the gap-filler mechanism may not be used.
505. See id. at 63-65 (discussing modem case law).
506. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1989). The official comment to U.C.C. section 2-204 states: "The
more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude
a binding agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter despite
omissions."
507. Id. § 2-204 (emphasis added).
508. Id.; see also Southwest Engineering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18 (Kan.
1970)(holding that even the absence of a fairly important term, such as the terms of payment
does not necessarily make a contract fatally indefinite).
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by commercial reasonableness."509 The use of any quantity estimate
in an agreement becomes the midpoint of a reasonable quantity
range for sale of electricity. 5 0 It will be typical that many electric-
ity contracts are "requirements contracts" where the quantity will
be determined by the reasonable needs of the buyer. Thereunder,
the buyer would take its electric quantity exclusively from the
supplier.
4. Option Contracts
Option contracts and a variety of hedge "put" and "call" options
characterize electricity markets. Options create opportunities to
buy or supply electricity. The U.C.C. and common law differ in
their treatment of option contracts.
Option contracts create an offer irrevocable for a period of time.51'
An offer can be made irrevocable or an option created by mutual
consideration, by statute, or by part performance or tender of
performance under an offer for a unilateral contract, under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel or by a sealed instrument.512
Irrevocable offers may be "terminated by lapse of time, death or
destruction of a person or thing essential for the performance of the
contract and supervening legal prohibition of the proposed
contract."
5 13
509. U.C.C. § 2-311(1).
510. Id. § 2-305(1). Section 2-305 of the U.C.C. is a specific provision which deals with the
indefiniteness of a contract price. It states:
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by
the parties and they fail to agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some
agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency
and it is not so set or recorded.
Id. § 2-305(1). Subsection 2 states that "[a] price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price for him to fix in good faith." Id. § 2-305(2). However, subsection 4 holds that
when the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed
or agreed there is no contract. Id. § 2-305(4).
511. See Harden v. Dep't of Taxes, 352 A.2d 685, 687 (Vt. 1976) (stating that an option is
merely an agreement to hold open a specific offer to a specific party for a stated time).
512. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 121-22.
513. Id. at 124 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 35A, 48 cmt. d (3d ed.
1987)).
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Under the majority common law position, option electricity
contracts need new, mutual, and distinct consideration to be
enforceable.514 The U.C.C., however, empowers an offeror to create
an irrevocable offer for the sale of goods without consideration.515
Under the U.C.C.:
The requisites are ... (a) the offeror must be a merchant; (b) the
offer must be in a signed writing; (c) if the language of
irrevocability is on a form supplied by the offeree, the offeror
must sign twice-once to make the offer and once more to
separately sign the clause providing for irrevocability; (c) the
writing must contain language of irrevocability; (e) the period
of irrevocability may not exceed three months. 16
Without separate consideration (or estoppel), the common law in
a majority of jurisdictions states that an option is gratuitous and
that an offer is not irrevocable and may be withdrawn.517 Electric-
ity options, therefore, require separate mutual consideration if
electricity is deemed a service. The U.C.C. does not require such
mutual consideration.
514. That is because an option contract must meet the normal requirements for the
formation of a contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981).
515. The U.C.C. states: "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurances that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time," but not
to exceed three months. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1989).
516. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 118. Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. section
2-205 states:
This section is intended to apply to current "firm" offers and not to long term
options, and an outside time limit of three months during which such offers
remain irrevocable has been set. The three month period during which firm
offers remain irrevocable under this section need not be stated by days or by
date. If the offer states that it is "guaranteed" or "firm" until the happening of
a contingency which will occur within the three month period, it will remain
irrevocable until that event. A promise made for a longer period will operate
under this section to bind the offeror only for the first three months of the
period but may of course be renewed. If supported by consideration it may
continue for as long as the parties specify. This section deals only with the offer
which is not supported by consideration.
517. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 122.
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5. Acceptance
What constitutes a valid "acceptance" of an electricity contract
also varies between the common law and the U.C.C. Contracts
require a procedural two-step choreography: With a valid accep-
tance of an offer, a contract is formed.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[a] cceptance
of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made
by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer."518 At
common law in many jurisdictions, "[a]n offer can be accepted by
the rendering of a performance only if the offer invites such an
acceptance" (i.e. unilaterally).5 19 Unless stated otherwise, "it is
essential to an acceptance by promise either that the offeree
exercise reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of acceptance or
that the offeror receive the acceptance seasonably."520
At common law, in many jurisdictions it matters whether an offer
contemplates a bilateral or unilateral contract.521 The acceptance
must be by promise or by conduct as appropriate under the terms
of the offer.522 Thus, words or conduct matter precisely as dictated
by the type of offer. The U.C.C. differs from the common law
Restatement in that the U.C.C. allows that any offer to enter into
contract "shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances" (by words or
performance).523 This eliminates the common law bilateral/
unilateral distinction because either words or conduct can be
appropriate under the circumstances to manifest an acceptance for
a U.C.C.-governed contract.
6. Additional Terms
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the U.C.C. greatly
differ in their treatment of additional or varying terms inserted by
518. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1).
519. Id. § 53(1).
520. Id. § 56.
521. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 78 (discussing varying jurisdictional
views). The necessity of giving notice is less obvious if the offer proposes a "unilateral"
contract and invites acceptance by means of performance and not a promise. See id. at 78-79.
522. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 32.
523. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1989).
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an offeree into an acceptance, in response to the terms of an offer.
The majority common law position requires an acceptance to be
substantially a mirror image of the offer.52 4 The common law also
requires that the manner and mode of acceptance is reasonable and
as reliable as the mode of communication of the offer.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[a] reply to
an offer which purports to accept but is conditional on the offeror's
assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not
an acceptance, but is a counter-offer." 25 "An offeree's power of
acceptance is terminated by his making of a counter-offer, unless
the offeror has manifested a contrary intention."52 Thus, at
common law, strict technical conformance in substance, mode, and
manner of an acceptance is critical to forming a contract.
27
Additional terms, therefore, cannot be inserted into an agreement
by the offeree as part of the acceptance, as they instead void any
formation of the agreement under the common law.
The U.C.C. has a very different and more flexible approach. It
provides that:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance
is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.5"
524. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 101-02.
525. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59; see also In re Pago Pago Aircrash, 637
F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir. 1981); Rorvig v. Douglas, 873 P.2d 492, 495 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
"A counter-offer is defined as an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same
matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain differing from that proposed
by the original offer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(1).
526. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39.
527. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 481, at 101-02; see, e.g., Gyurkey v. Babler, 651
P.2d 928, 931 (Idaho 1982); Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co., 371 P.2d 74, 77 (Or. 1962).
528. U.C.C. § 2-207(1). For there to be an effective definite expression of acceptance, there
must be an offer on the table. If the initial document is the seller's price quotation, subject
to acceptance by the buyer, there is no offer. Such provisions bode ill for the seller in the
battle of the forms. If the buyer follows up with a purchase order, the latter will be deemed
the offer. See, e.g., Brown Mach. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 411 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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Thus, between nonmerchants, as in a retail electricity sale, the
other additional terms are mere proposals for additional terms,
which are not incorporated unless subsequently assented to by the
offeror. This would apply to a transaction where at least one
consumer/nonmerchant was involved in an electricity contract.
Between two or more merchants,529 such as characterizes a
wholesale electricity transaction, such additional terms become
part of the contract automatically unless the parties materially
alter it, unless the offeror initially limits acceptance to the express
terms, or after seeing such terms "seasonably"530 objects.5 3 ' Also, if
conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract, such
contract is sufficient for a transaction in goods under the U.C.C. to
"establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract."
53 2
It is, therefore, much easier to form an electricity sale contract
under the U.C.C., notwithstanding nonconforming terms in the
acceptance. Imprecise acceptance may still form a contract, but one
must then sort through the resulting substantive terms of the deal.
7. Modification
Rules on modification are yet another area where the U.C.C. and
common law conflict. For modification, the common law majority
opinion holds that new mutual consideration is required for each
529. The U.C.C. defines a "merchant" as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104.
530. "An action is taken seasonably if it is taken at or within the time agreed or if no time
is agreed at or within a reasonable time." Id. § 1-205(b). A reasonable time for taking an
action "depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action." Id. § 1-205(a).
531. U.C.C. section 2-207 states:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: (a)
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they
materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Id. § 2-207(2).
532. Id. § 2-207(3).
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such modification.533 Therefore, a change in an electricity services
contract is not enforceable unless it is supported by new mutual
consideration. Under the common law minority position, "consider-
ation is only a test of the enforceability of executory promises ....
Under the U.C.C., however, agreements modifying a contract
need no new consideration to be binding.5 31 Such modification can
be oral.536 The U.C.C. provides that for the modification (with or
without consideration) to be effective, it must be signed in two
situations: (1) where the agreement as modified is required to be
in writing under the statute of frauds, 37 and (2) where a writing is
required under section 2-209(2).538 Under the U.C.C. a signed
contract that states that it cannot be modified or rescinded except
by a signed writing will be honored, notwithstanding that such a
provision is contrary to the common law. 539 Separate signature of
533. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 (1981). Any "peppercorn of
consideration" is sufficient:
[Any consideration for the new undertaking, however insignificant, satisfies
this rule.... For instance, an undertaking to pay part of the debt before
maturity, or at a place other than where the obligor was legally bound to pay,
or to pay in property, regardless of its value, or to effect a composition with
creditors by the payment of less than the sum due, has been held to constitute
a consideration sufficient in law.
Levine v. Blumenthal, 186 A. 457, 459 (N.J. 1936) (citations omitted); see also Ray v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 626, 628 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding address requirement for non-
renewal notice had been modified by practice); Mulberry-Fairplains Water Ass'n v. N.
Wilkesboro, 412 S.E.2d 910, 915 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "unlike common law, a
modification under Article 2 needs no new consideration to be binding").
534. Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 634 (R.I. 1974).
535. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.").
536. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (warning, however, that oral modifications are limited by the
statute of fraud).
537. See id.; id. § 2-201 (statute of frauds).
538. U.C.C. section 2-209(2) provides: "A signed agreement which excludes modification
or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except
as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be
separately signed by the other party." Id. § 2-209(2). The clause that starts with the words
"except as between merchants," describes a situation where a merchant sends a form that
contains the provision excluding oral or unsigned modifications or rescissions. In such a case,
a nonmerchant who signs the form at the bottom is not bound by the provision unless, in
addition, the nonmerchant signs the clause separately. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 3. If the case
involves two merchants, no separate signature is required. Id.
539. U.C.C. section 2-209(4) is an exception to this rule, which provides that "[allthough
an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2)
... it can operate as a waiver." Id. § 2-209(4). Thus, even if the modification is not a signed
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this specific limitation of oral amendment must be accomplished in
a consumer contract under the U.C.C.
5 40
B. Warranties, Breach, and Remedies
1. Course of Performance
How one conducts oneself in the early stages of performance of an
electricity sales agreement sets a pattern that is significant in
interpreting remaining performance obligations. The effect of
course of performance in a contract varies somewhat between the
U.C.C. and the common law.
Under the common law applied to services, the threshold for
interpreting course of performance5 41 is implicated "[wihere the
agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of perfor-
mance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great
weight in the interpretation of the agreement."5 42
The U.C.C. creates an interpretive hierarchy. The U.C.C.
statutorily provides that express terms shall "control" course of
performance,143 and that course of performance shall "control"
writing it can still operate as a waiver. See id. The normal rule with respect to a waiver is
that a waiver is retractable unless there is an estoppel. See id. § 2-209(5).
540. Compare U.C.C. section 1-306 which provides that any "claim or right arising out of
an alleged breach may be discharged in whole or in part without consideration" by a written
waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party. Id. § 1-306. This section
makes consideration unnecessary to the effective renunciation or waiver of rights or claims
arising out of an alleged breach of a commercial contract where such renunciation is in
writing and signed and delivered by the aggrieved party. Id.; see JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.33 (5th ed. 2003). CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 475, at 149.
541. Course of performance is prior conduct of a party in performing earlier elements of
the subject agreement.
542. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981). Section 2-208(1) of the U.C.C.
uses the same language, except it states:
Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for
objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced
in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1989) (repealed 2001).
543. See section 203(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which uses the phrase
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course of dealing or usage of trade.5 " Thus, under a contract,
stated terms dominate past conduct under the instant agreement
(course of performance), which in turn dominates conduct under
past deals (course of dealing), which in turn dominates industry
norms (usage of trade)-but all, in order of hierarchy, can be
employed to interpret obligations if electricity is deemed to be a
good.545
As Calamari and Perillo noted:
At early common law, in order to establish a usage, including a
trade usage it had to be (1) legal, (2) notorious, (3) ancient or
immemorial and continuous, (4) reasonable, (5) certain, (6)
universal and obligatory. Under the U.C.C., the trade usage
need not be ancient or immemorial or universal or certain.
Reasonableness is also eliminated and substituted is a require-
ment against"unconscionable contracts and clauses.5 46 Instead
of being notorious, the U.C.C. requires that the usage have
regularity of observance ... with respect to the transaction in
question.57
Under the U.C.C., conduct of the parties, and within the industry
generally, constantly informs the parties' performance obligations
with electricity goods. With electricity services, under the common
law, conduct and industry practices are less dispositive.
2. Assurances
The California crisis illustrates that performance insecurity and
breach are major issues in some deregulated electricity markets.5
The right to seek assurances also has different requirements at
common law and under the U.C.C. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, where the obligee has "reasonable grounds
"given greater weight" versus the term 'control" in U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (repealed 2001).
544. See U.C.C. § 2-208(2).
545. "A course of dealing and course of performance can be established by the testimony
of the parties.... Trade usage, however, is usually proved by expert witnesses." CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 475, at 198.
546. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 169.
547. Id.
548. See supra Part I.
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... to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-perfor-
mance ... the obligee may demand adequate assurance of due
performance ... 649 The demand need not be in writing.""'0 The
obligee may treat the obligor's failure to provide assurance within
a "reasonable time" as a repudiation. 5 ' There is no limit on what
may be interpreted as "reasonable."
The U.C.C. also allows a demand for assurance, but its treatment
varies from the common law in that when reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to performance, either party may in
writing demand adequate assurance of due performance.5 2
Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-609 states that:
Three measures have been adopted to meet the needs of [both
parties] in such situations under the U.C.C. First, the aggrieved
party is permitted to suspend his own performance and any
preparation therefor, with excuse for any resulting necessary
delay, until the situation has been clarified.... Secondly, the
aggrieved party is given the right to require adequate assur-
ance that the other party's performance will be duly forthcom-
ing.... [Flinally, this section provides the means by which the
aggrieved party may treat the contract as broken if his reason-
549. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).
550. Id. § 251 cmt. d.
551. See id. § 251.
(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a
breach by non-performance that would of itself give the oblige a claim for
damages for total breach under § 243, the obligee may demand adequate
assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance
for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives
such assurance. (2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor's failure
to provide within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as is
adequate in the circumstances of the particular case.
Id.
552. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1989). The court in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976), held that "to trigger
applicability of the statute ... the expectation of due performance on the part of the other
party entertained at contracting time no longer exists because of reasonable grounds for
insecurity arising."
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able grounds for insecurity are not cleared up within a reason-
able time. 5 3
Such reasonable time may not exceed thirty days.554
3. Standards of Performance
Whether performance under a contract needs to be exact or
merely substantial depends upon defining an electricity sale as a
common law transaction in services or a U.C.C. transaction in
goods. The majority common law opinion holds that express
conditions and implied-in-fact conditions must be fully performed,
but constructive conditions need only be substantially performed
where the performance obligation is on the obligee.55 5 Substantial
performance and material breach are the opposite sides of the
same coin.156 If a party has substantially performed, any breach by
this party can only be nonmaterial. 57 Conversely, if a party has
committed a material breach, this party's performance cannot be
substantial.558 Thus, if one party has not yet performed at all,
substantial performance has not been rendered, but a material
breach has not necessarily occurred.559
553. U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 2. Implicit in this notion is that the insecurity must be based on
matters not known to the party demanding assurance at the time of the contracting, and as
to which the risk was not assumed. See Field v. Golden Trianble Broad., Inc., 305 A.2d 689,
696-97 (Pa. 1973) (finding 'no change in circumstances" to justify "reasonable grounds for
insecurity"). Additionally, "'suspend performance' under this section means to hold up
performance pending the outcome of the demand, and includes also the holding up of any
preparatory action." U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 2.
554. See U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
555. PERILLO, supra note 540, § 11.13.
556. See id. § 11.18.
557. See id.
558. See id.
559. See id.
[T]o ascertain whether or not a breach is material the factors to be considered
are: (1) to what extent, if any, the contract has been performed at the time of
breach. The earlier the breach the more likely it will be regarded as material.
(2) A willful breach is more likely to be regarded as material than a breach
caused by negligence ...; (3) A quantitatively serious breach is more likely to be
considered material.
Id. Courts will also consider the consequences for both the breaching and aggrieved parties
relating to hardship and damages. See id.
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Substantial performance is only recognized and legally significant
under the common law. 60 Under the common law, it is often
meaningless to "restitute" or give back services already delivered.
Therefore, substantial performance is a reasonable level of
performance where mutual restitution of a service is not feasible.
Substantial performance short of complete performance is still a
breach, but a nonmaterial breach. 6'
The U.C.C. provides, however that "if the goods or the tender of
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept the whole; or (c) accept any
commercial unit or units and reject the rest."162 This so-called
"perfect tender" rule is directly contrary to the common law concept
of substantial performance, but is undermined by exceptions and
qualifications. The seller has a countervailing right to cure
defective performance within a reasonable time that is always at
least as long as the time for performance if performance occurs
before the specified time, 63 or upon failure to make an effective
rejection, 64 or upon the buyer's acceptance of the goods. 65
560. "[Tihere can be no recovery on the contract as distinguished from quantum meruit
unless there is substantial performance. This is undoubtedly the correct rule at common
law." Plante v. Jacobs, 103 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Wis. 1960).
561. "[Wlhen a covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both sides and a breach
may be compensated for in damages, it is to be regarded as an independent covenant, unless
this is contrary to the expressed intent of the parties." Hanks v. GAB Bus. Serv., Inc., 644
S.W.2d 707,708 (Tex. 1982) (quoting World Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Eagle Broad. Co., 162 S.W.2d
463, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 1942)).
562. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1989).
563. See id. § 2-508. If a nonconforming tender is made,
and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably
notify the buyer of [the seller's] intention to cure and may then within the
contract time make a conforming delivery. (2) Where the buyer rejects a non-
conforming tender which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be
acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably
notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.
Id.
564. See id. § 2-605. Section 2-605 of the U.C.C. also limits the power of the perfect tender
rule, by providing that in order to make an effective rejection, the buyer must seasonably
notify the seller of the rejection and state all defects that are discoverable by reasonable
inspection. Id.
565. See id. § 2-606. The buyer's acceptance also impairs the scope of the perfect tender
rule. Once a buyer has accepted goods, rejection is no longer possible, although revocation
of acceptance may be an available alternative. See id. Section 2-606 provides:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer (a) after a reasonable
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Revocation of acceptance under the U.C.C. is grounded in
material breach rather than in perfect tender. Materiality of the
breach under the U.C.C. is based on a personal standard of
substantial impairment. Therefore, a "buyer may revoke his
acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity
substantially impairs its value to [the buyer]."56 For purposes of
the sale of electricity, traveling at almost the speed of light, tender
must be exact and perfect if electricity is a good. Substantial
performance is satisfactory if electricity is a service.
4. Impossibility
Performance is excused if it is impossible or impracticable. The
California example illustrates that chaotic electricity markets will
cause parties to look for excuses to justify nonperformance of their
obligations. 7 The common law and the U.C.C. treat the defense of
impossibility or impracticability similarly.56 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 261 states that "[wihere a party's
performance is made impracticable without his fault by the
opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the goods are
conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-conformity;
or (b) fails to make an effective rejection ... but such acceptance does not occur
until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or (c) does
any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful as
against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him. (2) Acceptance of
a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
Id.
566. Id. § 2-608. As the comments to this section further elaborate:
For this purpose the test is not what the seller had reason to know at the time
of contracting; the question is whether the non-conformity is such as will in fact
cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no
advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances.
Id. § 2-608 cmt. 2. This standard of "substantial impairment" in U.C.C. revocation resembles
the standard of performance under the common law.
567. See supra Part I.
568. Some courts have tended to treat defenses of impossibility and impracticality as
questions of law rather than fact. See, e.g., Cent. Kan. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 102
F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating determination of existence of performance is
question of law); Butler Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Americold Corp., 850 F. Supp. 952, 956 (D. Kan.
1994) (determining whether the doctrines of impracticality or frustration will excuse a breach
is a matter of law for the court). But see Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650,
653-54 (1 th Cir. 1988) (upholding trial court's decision to send performance impracticability
question to jury).
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occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render
that performance is discharged, unless the language or the
circumstances indicate the contrary." 69 Under the common law,
"[wihen the impracticability of a performance is temporary or
partial, the promisor is obligated to perform to the extent practica-
ble unless the burden of performance would be substantially
increased." 7 °
The U.C.C. enacts statutory rules with respect to temporary and
partial impracticability that comport with the common law rule,
but the U.C.C. is somewhat more specific.571 Temporary impractica-
bility under the U.C.C. provides that if the seller expects to be late
in tendering delivery of the good and if the lateness is excusable
because of the impracticability, the seller must seasonably notify
the buyer of the expected delay. 72 Allocation is the key concept for
partial impracticability under the U.C.C. Where the seller's
capacity to perform is affected, "he must allocate production and
deliveries among his customers but may at his option include
regular customers not then under contract as well as his own
requirements for further manufacture.5 73
5. Warranties
One of the most significant differences between the common law
of contracts and the U.C.C. is the warranties that automatically
569. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 261 (1981). Similarly, the U.C.C. states that:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part ... is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in
good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
570. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 475, at 260.
571. See U.C.C. § 2-615; see also E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429,438
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (noting the doctrine of impracticability has its roots in the common law but
the courts have looked to the U.C.C. for guidance on the doctrine's strict construction).
572. See U.C.C. § 2-615(c) ("The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be
delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated
quota thus made available for the buyer.").
573. Id. § 2-615(b).
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modify the sale of goods under the U.C.C. These warranties might
apply to the quality, quantity, and uniformity of delivered electric-
ity. Quality guarantees can be created implicitly or automatically
in a sale of goods under the U.C.C." 4 but not for the sale of a
service under the common law.
No common law/U. C.C. distinction exists for warranties that are
express-that is, a description, affirmation of fact, or promise with
respect to the quality or future performance of the goods that
becomes part of the basis of the bargain."' The affirmation may be
in words or by sample or model.576 An affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or merely of the seller's opinion of the goods is
not a warranty.
577
Other warranties are implied by law. For example, one automati-
cally implied U.C.C. warranty is a warranty that the goods shall be
"merchantable" if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind, unless the warranty is effectively disclaimed.578 Goods
to be merchantable must "pass ... under the contract description"
and be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."5 79
A second implied U.C.C. warranty is the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.5"' It is automatically created:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless conspicuously
excluded or modified ... an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose. 8'
574. See id. § 2-314.
575. See id. § 2-313(1) ("It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention
to make a warranty .... ).
Id. § 2-313(2).
576. See id. § 2-313.
577. See id.; id. § 2-313 cmt. 8.
578. See id. § 2-314(1).
579. Id. § 2-314(2).
580. See id. § 2-315.
581. Id.
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Although express warranties, since made as part of the bargain,
may not be excluded or modified, implied warranties may: "[T]o
exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous .... 's2 Therefore, where electricity
is deemed a good, failure to provide proper voltage or amounts of
electricity could violate an implied warranty unless properly
disclaimed.
Section 2-719(2) of the U.C.C. provides that "[wihere circum-
stances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided [by the U.C.C.] .,58 What
this means as a practical matter, is that the limitation of remedies
is stricken, and the two implied warranties are reinstated. The
U.C.C. further provides that "[clonsequential damages may be
limited or excluded.... Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not."5 4 Therefore, under the U.C.C., a court will not
uphold an attempt by contract to limit personal liability for an
electricity tort or injury to the retail consumer. Being too extreme
in limiting warranties and remedies can backfire where an
intended remedy is rendered nugatory. With the significant public
policy considerations surrounding the provision of electricity, such
an outcome is possible.
6. Remedies
Damages after-the-fact may not be all that an injured party
seeks. Access to a scarce electric commodity may be extremely
582. Id. § 2-316(2). Implied warranties can be disclaimed if the buyer is warned by
language such as "as is," "with all faults" or similar phrases. See id. § 2-316(3)(a). Language
to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face thereof." Implied
warranties may also be excluded or modified as to discoverable defects if the buyer had an
opportunity to fully examine the goods, or by course of dealing or course of performance. See
id. § 2-316(3)(b)-(c).
583. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
584. Id. § 2-719(3). "[To give what looks like relief in the form of an express warranty, but
is not, is unconscionable as a surprise limitation and therefore against public policy." Tuttle
v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Okla. 1978).
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valuable. A party may gain access to this scarce commodity by
invoking equitable remedies, which are available at both common
law and under the U.C.C. Remedies at common law serve to protect
the expectation, reliance, or restitution interests of a promisee. 585
One can require specific performance of a contract or enjoin its
nonperformance, requiring restoration of a specific thing to prevent
unjust enrichment.518 Likewise, under the U.C.C., the buyer's right
to "[sipecific performance may be decreed where the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances,""7 and "[tihe decree for
specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to
payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may
deem just."588
In other circumstances, a traditional damages remedy at law is
sought for breach of contract. Under common law, the injured party
in an electricity transaction "has a right to damages based on his
expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in the value to him
of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency,
plus (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss,
caused by the breach . These other losses could involve
alternative supply of electricity which demand has run up to
585.
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect
one or more of the following interests of a promisee: (a) his "expectation
interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made, or (c) his "restitution
interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
586.
The judicial remedies available for the protection of the interests stated in § 344
include a judgment or order (a) awarding a sum of money due under the
contract or as damages, (b) requiring specific performance of a contract or
enjoining its non-performance, (c) requiring restoration of a specific thing to
prevent unjust enrichment, (d) awarding a sum of money to prevent unjust
enrichment, (e) declaring the rights of the parties, and (f) enforcing an
arbitration award.
Id. § 345.
587. U.C.C. § 2-716(1).
588. Id. § 2-716(2).
589. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
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100,000 times more expensive than the locked-in contractual terms
of trade."' 0
The U.C.C., however, creates distinct remedies available to a
seller (as compared to a buyer) and states that one measure of the
seller's damages for nonacceptance or repudiation by the buyer is
the difference between the market price at the time and place for
tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental
damages provided,59' but less expenses saved in consequence of the
buyer's breach.592 If this measure of damages "is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable
overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance
by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided" by
section 2-710."'s Alternatively, if the electricity is taken by the
buyer or he or she refuses, an action for price is an option.
94
Alternatively, the seller's damages can be the loss of proceeds of
sale of the power. 95
590. See supra Part I.A.
591. U.C.C. section 2-710 states:
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable
charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the
transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection
with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
U.C.C. § 2-710.
592. See id. § 2-708(1).
593. Id. § 2-708(2).
594. See id. § 2-705 cmt. 1. Section 2-705 states:
The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or other
bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (Section 2-702) and may stop
delivery of carload, truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or
freight when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before
delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim
the goods.
Id. § 2-705(1).
595. See id. § 2-706.
Under the conditions stated in section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller may
resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale
is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may
recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article
(Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
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More characteristic of California's electricity crisis situation was
that sellers did not perform and buyers suffered damages.59 Under
the U.C.C., buyers have options to cover their nondelivery of power
from alternative sources,597 obtain a market price set-off,598 or
obtain a valuation of diminution of value provided.599
In the same vein, a buyer's "[iincidental damages resulting from
the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in
inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses
or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.""° Also,
a buyer's "[cionsequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contract-
ing had reason to know ... and (b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."'
596. See supra Part I.
597. See id. § 2-712(1). "After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may 'cover'
by making in good faith and without un reasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller." Id. The Official
C'omment to this section states, "[tihis section provides the buyer with a remedy aimed at
enabling him to obtain the goods he needs thus meeting his essential need. This remedy is
the buyer's equivalent of the seller's right to resell." Id. § 2-712 cmt. 1.
598. See id. § 2-713.
Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the
seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer
learned of the breach and the contract price together with an incidental and
consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
Id.
599. See id. § 2-714.
Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.
Id. § 2-714(1).
600. Id. § 2-715(1).
601. Id. § 2-715(2). Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854), is a famous
English case in which the court defined two classes of damages as (1) those which any
reasonable person should have foreseen, whether or not the defendant actually foresaw them;
and (2) those damages due to remote or unusual consequences, but only if the defendant had
actual notice of the possibility of these consequences.
1954
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The U.C.C. compartmentalizes the types of damage remedies
available to either buyers or sellers in a formulistic manner. The
"math" of damages is spelled out in the U.C.C. The common law,
while embodying a similar concept of expectation, leaves the
parties flexibility as to how to calculate damages. Restitutionary
measures can be chosen as an alternative under common law, 60
2
while the U.C.C. allows restitution as an additional damage, as
long as double recovery is not accomplished.60 3 A classification of
electricity as a good in one jurisdiction and as a service in another
jurisdiction may have a significant impact on how contracts for the
sale of electricity are decided and the remedies available to the
parties.
602. See supra notes 585-95 and accompanying text.
603. See U.C.C § 2-711(1) (providing additive damages).
